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A perfect god can not exist?

 
 
Night Ripper
 
  1  
Reply Thu 22 Apr, 2010 10:45 am
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;155236 wrote:
That means that there is no use arguing about matters of taste. So, if whether chocolate ice-cream tastes better than vanilla is a matter of taste, then there is no use arguing about it. That means, I suppose, that there is no right or wrong about it. But is whether torturing babies is wrong a matter of taste? That's the question. What makes you think that it is?


If it weren't a matter of taste, what would it be a matter of? The height of the Statue of Liberty isn't a matter of taste, it's a matter of fact. Is morality a matter of fact?
kennethamy
 
  1  
Reply Thu 22 Apr, 2010 11:03 am
@Night Ripper,
Night Ripper;155237 wrote:
If it weren't a matter of taste, what would it be a matter of? The height of the Statue of Liberty isn't a matter of taste, it's a matter of fact. Is morality a matter of fact?


You are assuming that either something is a matter of taste, and so there is no right or wrong about it, or something is a matter of fact. But need those be the only alternatives? Maybe matters of morality constitute a third category. It is true that morality is a matter of feeling, unlike the height of the Statue of Liberty. But that does not mean it is only a matter of feeling. David Hume talks about this, and he uses as an analogy colors. Hume points out that the property of color is unlike that of height. Color is not simply "out there" so that if an apple is red, that is not like saying of the apple that is weighs so many ounces. Color, Hume tells us is an interactive property (he does not use the term, "interactive") It is a property that results from an interaction between our faculties of perception, and certain properties of the object, in this case, the apple. Is it a fact that the apple is red? Well yes. But is it a fact like the fact that the apple weighs so many ounces. Well no, it isn't. The redness of the apple is a kind of joint product between the apple and the person who perceives it. But that is not true of the weight of the apple (nor of the height of the Statue of Liberty). Hume asks us to consider whether moral properties are not interactive properties like the color properties, too. And he explores this analogy.
Night Ripper
 
  1  
Reply Thu 22 Apr, 2010 11:46 am
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;155238 wrote:
You are assuming that either something is a matter of taste, and so there is no right or wrong about it, or something is a matter of fact.


No, I'm not. I offered those as two alternatives and asked if you had anymore. Please try to pay attention since I was careful not to imply that. I anticipated your pedantry but as usual, you were already on course to make your forced point. Either way, I don't want to get bogged down in what I said or didn't say. You've already forced the topic so let's get to it.

kennethamy;155238 wrote:
Maybe matters of morality constitute a third category.


Maybe it is. I did ask you if it's not a matter of taste then what is it a matter of? I solicited you for alternatives. That's kind of the point of my asking.

kennethamy;155238 wrote:
Is it a fact that the apple is red? Well yes. But is it a fact like the fact that the apple weighs so many ounces. Well no, it isn't. The redness of the apple is a kind of joint product between the apple and the person who perceives it.


So what about people with inverted spectra? They see green instead of red and so on. Are they wrong because they are in the minority? Argumentum ad populum? Or are they wrong because they aren't natural? Naturalistic fallacy?

That apple maybe really is red to you. But it also might really be green to me. That doesn't sound like objectivity. That sounds rather subjective.
kennethamy
 
  1  
Reply Thu 22 Apr, 2010 12:01 pm
@Night Ripper,
Night Ripper;155244 wrote:
No, I'm not. I offered those as two alternatives and asked if you had anymore. Please try to pay attention since I was careful not to imply that. I anticipated your pedantry but as usual, you were already on course to make your forced point. Either way, I don't want to get bogged down in what I said or didn't say. You've already forced the topic so let's get to it.



Maybe it is. I did ask you if it's not a matter of taste then what is it a matter of? I solicited you for alternatives. That's kind of the point of my asking.



So what about people with inverted spectra? They see green instead of red and so on. Are they wrong because they are in the minority? Argumentum ad populum? Or are they wrong because they aren't natural? Naturalistic fallacy?

That apple maybe really is red to you. But it also might really be green to me. That doesn't sound like objectivity. That sounds rather subjective.


By asking, if morality is not a matter of taste, then what is it a matter of, you were asking a rhetorical question. That means that you were actually saying that that is no alternative to morality being a matter of taste. For instance, suppose I say to someone, "You deny you are an idiot, but if you are not an idiot, then what are you?". That is obviously a rhetorical question. I am really saying (and mean him to understand) that he is an idiot.

I did not say anything about right or wrong about colors. I simply suggested that moral properties are like color properties. And, yes indeed. If you said that a fire engine was some other color than red, you would be wrong. Suppose you were in a court room, and you were testifying about some apparel. And you were under oath as you were asked what color the coat was. Suppose it was red, and you said that you did not know, or that it was green. You could be prosecuted for perjury. You would be wrong not to say that the coat was red, if the coat was red. Philosophy would not help you.
Amperage
 
  1  
Reply Thu 22 Apr, 2010 12:08 pm
@kennethamy,
if morality is relative then can you say that we've progressed morally at all since the time of slavery or barbarism? Heck can you even say you've progressed? You were right yesterday because you thought X was good and today you're still right because now you think X is false. in fact you can't be wrong it seems

It would seem to me that anyone believing in the law of bivalence would see this cannot be so.

To be honest, I'm not quite sure why anyone would want to espouse moral relativity. It seems quite obvious to me that some thing really are wrong all the time and some things really are right. Regardless of what society says or not
kennethamy
 
  1  
Reply Thu 22 Apr, 2010 12:16 pm
@Amperage,
Amperage;155247 wrote:
if morality is relative then can you say that we've progressed morally at all since the time of slavery or barbarism? Heck can you even say you've progressed? You were right yesterday because you thought X was good and today you're still right because now you think X is false.

It would seem to me that anyone believing in the law of bivalence would see this cannot be so.

To be honest, I'm not quite sure why anyone would want to espouse moral relativity. It seems quite obvious to me that some thing really are wrong all the time and some things really are right. Regardless of what society says or not


I suppose you can talk about moral progress relative to a particular society, but not universally, if moral relativity is true. Can't you?

What makes you think that bi-valence applied to good and bad, or right and wrong, just because it applies to true and false?

I suppose that someone might want to espouse moral relativity because they do not have the same moral intuitions you have. And what seems obvious to you does not seem obvious to him. Isn't that a possibility?
Amperage
 
  1  
Reply Thu 22 Apr, 2010 12:23 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;155250 wrote:
I suppose you can talk about moral progress relative to a particular society, but not universally, if moral relativity is true. Can't you?
it wouldn't be moral "progress" it would simply be moral "difference" or moral "change"

progress implies a moving forward, an advancing, being better than it was.

relativity would suggest they were just as right as we are. There is no such thing as "progress" for a moral relativist.

kennethamy;155250 wrote:
What makes you think that bi-valence applied to good and bad, or right and wrong, just because it applies to true and false?
Because morality can be stated in the form of a proposition.
P1. Rape is always wrong.

kennethamy;155250 wrote:
I suppose that someone might want to espouse moral relativity because they do not have the same moral intuitions you have. And what seems obvious to you does not seem obvious to him. Isn't that a possibility?
Yes that is possible. But why would someone having a different moral intuition necessarily mean they would espouse moral relativity? I know there are people who have different moral intuitions than myself, and I also understand that either I or they are wrong since we can't be on opposite sides(of such a proposition) and both be right. I guess I just don't see that as a good reason, though I suppose it's possible that such a reason could be the reason someone would want to espouse moral relativism.
kennethamy
 
  1  
Reply Thu 22 Apr, 2010 12:42 pm
@Amperage,
Amperage;155251 wrote:
it wouldn't be moral "progress" it would simply be moral "difference" or moral "change"

progress implies a moving forward, an advancing, being better than it was.

relativity would suggest they were just as right as we are. There is no such thing as "progress" for a moral relativist.

Because morality can be stated in the form of a proposition.
P1. Rape is always wrong.

Yes that is possible. But why would someone having a different moral intuition necessarily mean they would espouse moral relativity? I know there are people who have different moral intuitions than myself, and I also understand that either I or they are wrong since we can't be on opposite sides(of such a proposition) and both be right.


It would be moral progress within a framework. You are simply assuming that moral progress has to be universal. It need not be.

True. But it need not be true that if an action is not right, then it must be wrong, or if it is not wrong, then it must be right. That would be moral bivalence. But consider this example: Eating ice-cream is neither right nor wrong. It isn't morally right to invest in the stock market, but it is all right to invest in the stock market. It certainly isn't morally wrong.

I did not say that if someone had a different moral intuition he would espouse moral relativity. I just said that a person might not have your intuition that things which are wrong are wrong regardless of the society, and that things that are right are right regardless of the society. You have that intuition. But he may not. Not everything you find obvious need be found so by others.
Amperage
 
  1  
Reply Thu 22 Apr, 2010 12:45 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;155255 wrote:
Eating ice-cream is neither right nor wrong.
isn't it though Ken.....isn't it?

if eating ice-cream is wrong I don't wanna be right Smile

---------- Post added 04-22-2010 at 01:51 PM ----------

I still don't think it could be classified as progress. Change, yes. Progress, not so much. You were right when you felt slavery was right....you were also right when you felt it was wrong. Also one cannot judge another society because of these differences, but I posit that one cannot even judge one's self, nor ones own culture. Since any difference between you ''now'' and you ''then'' can be seen as ''you'' being a different person, if you will; same for one's own culture.

I also don't think anyone would state such a proposition about ice-cream(it wouldn't make sense to say eating ice-cream is right....would it?) but still. I also think that bivalence clearly states that ALL propositions must necessarily either be true or false....not neither and not both. If a proposition is not "wrong" then it must necessarily be right according to bivalence or vice versa.

Then I agree a person might

---------- Post added 04-22-2010 at 02:03 PM ----------

of course I suppose it's possible that such moral statements may not be classified as a proposition but as an opinion like saying today is a nice day. But I'm not schooled enough in such matters to know for sure
kennethamy
 
  1  
Reply Thu 22 Apr, 2010 01:22 pm
@Amperage,
Amperage;155258 wrote:
isn't it though Ken.....isn't it?

if eating ice-cream is wrong I don't wanna be right Smile

---------- Post added 04-22-2010 at 01:51 PM ----------

I still don't think it could be classified as progress. Change, yes. Progress, not so much. You were right when you felt slavery was right....you were also right when you felt it was wrong. Also one cannot judge another society because of these differences, but I posit that one cannot even judge one's self, nor ones own culture. Since any difference between you ''now'' and you ''then'' can be seen as ''you'' being a different person, if you will; same for one's own culture.

I also don't think anyone would state such a proposition about ice-cream(it wouldn't make sense to say eating ice-cream is right....would it?) but still. I also think that bivalence clearly states that ALL propositions must necessarily either be true or false....not neither and not both. If a proposition is not "wrong" then it must necessarily be right according to bivalence or vice versa.

Then I agree a person might

---------- Post added 04-22-2010 at 02:03 PM ----------


of course I suppose it's possible that such moral statements may not be classified as a proposition but as an opinion like saying today is a nice day. But I'm not schooled enough in such matters to know for sure


Therefore, some actions are neither right nor wrong, and bi-valence does not apply to moral judgments.

Today is a nice day is either true or false.


I suppose that if within a society, cannibalism is no longer practiced when it once was, you might like to call it change, but I would think it was progress in that society. Of course, it is both change and progress. The changes is progress.
Amperage
 
  1  
Reply Thu 22 Apr, 2010 01:23 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;155266 wrote:
Today is a nice day is either true or false.
"today is a nice day" would not be classified as a proposition therefore. Correct? Rather, "today is a nice day", is not a proposition....right?
kennethamy
 
  1  
Reply Thu 22 Apr, 2010 01:27 pm
@Amperage,
Amperage;155268 wrote:
"today is a nice day" would not be classified as a proposition therefore. Correct? Rather, "today is a nice day", is not a proposition....right?


But why not? Today is a nice day. The sun is shining. It is in the high 60's. It is a true proposition.
Amperage
 
  1  
Reply Thu 22 Apr, 2010 01:28 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;155269 wrote:
But why not? Today is a nice day. The sun is shining. It is in the high 60's. It is a true proposition.
I'm saying I don't know....I just looked something up on the web, becasue I don't know and it said that the sentence "Today is a nice day" is NOT a proposition. That's why I was asking. If it is then, fine. But if it is then it must necessarily be either true or false and cannot be both and cannot be neither. And it cannot change its value
kennethamy
 
  1  
Reply Thu 22 Apr, 2010 01:31 pm
@Amperage,
Amperage;155270 wrote:
I'm saying I don't know....I just looked something up on the web, becasue I don't know and it said that the sentence "Today is a nice day" is NOT a proposition. That's why I was asking. If it is then, fine. But if it is then it must necessarily be either true or false and cannot be both and cannot be neither. And it cannot change its value


Yes, I think that is right. What would that have to do with the sentence, torturing children is wrong, though?
Amperage
 
  1  
Reply Thu 22 Apr, 2010 01:35 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;155272 wrote:
Yes, I think that is right. What would that have to do with the sentence, torturing children is wrong, though?
I was simply critiquing my OWN viewpoint.

I said that since propositions are bivalent it must follow that morality is objective.

Because if I formulate a proposition:

P: Rape is always wrong.

It must necessarily either be true or false and cannot be neither and cannot be both and it cannot change values and it is the same for everyone.

I was simply stating that perhaps I am mistaken because perhaps such a statement is NOT a proposition, therefore would NOT fall under LEM, non-contradiction, and bivalence.

Hey, I would love if you agreed with me and said that, yes, such a statement is indeed a proposition....
Extrain
 
  1  
Reply Thu 22 Apr, 2010 01:41 pm
@Krumple,
Krumple;155209 wrote:
You are trying to use something that is testable towards reality. Obviously a shape of something can be determined. However; moral objectiveness can not be determined because moral values are completely subjective. The same goes for you name example. You can test such a theory through questioning the person, their name, however; once again with moral values you can not determine their objectivity because they are not objective truths.If they are objective, prove it to me. You say the burden is on me, I say you are equally required to do so or state the case that moral values are objective truths.


You are just begging the question. You say, "You cannot test their objectivity because they are not objective truths." That's not an argument. That's another logical fallacy.

Empirical testability is not a necessary condition for claim to have a truth-value. You can't test the hypothesis you were once born, but does that mean there is no fact of the matter about your being born? No.

"Torturing babies is morally wrong" is not empirically testable, but it is more likely to be true than false--just as the pythagorean theorem is not emprically testable--but it is more likely true than false.

So the burden is certainly on you to show otherwise. So far I haven't seen any arguments whatsoever. You just irrationally stipulate morality is subjective.
Krumple
 
  1  
Reply Thu 22 Apr, 2010 01:48 pm
@Amperage,
Amperage;155273 wrote:
I was simply critiquing my OWN viewpoint.

I said that since propositions are bivalent it must follow that morality is objective.

Because if I formulate a proposition:

P: Rape is always wrong.


Well not according to the bible. It says that you can rape a woman, so if it is clearly wrong, why does it promote it?
Amperage
 
  1  
Reply Thu 22 Apr, 2010 01:50 pm
@Krumple,
Krumple;155277 wrote:
Well not according to the bible. It says that you can rape a woman, so if it is clearly wrong, why does it promote it?
why on earth would you think the bible says it's OK to rape someone? please direct me to this passage. Anyone using even an ounce of discernment, I would imagine, can understand that God does not condone rape.

And how on earth does this have any bearing on objective morality vs relativism??

---------- Post added 04-22-2010 at 02:53 PM ----------

unfortunately I leave for class in 5 minutes so I may have to wait to address this until later, but I can assure you the bible does not condone rape, but nice strawman attempt.
Krumple
 
  1  
Reply Thu 22 Apr, 2010 02:00 pm
@Extrain,
Extrain;155276 wrote:
You are just begging the question. You say, "You cannot test their objectivity because they are not objective truths." That's not an argument. That's another logical fallacy.


You only say this because you realize that what you previously wrote was flawed. You take the shape of something as an example of a subjective view point? No, because the shape of something can be determined. But just like I thought. If moral values can be determined then by what criteria are they determined?

Extrain;155276 wrote:

Empirical testability is not a necessary condition for claim to have a truth-value.


I never said this was the case for all things. I said for determining the shape of an object is surely can. Also the name of a person, can surely be discovered. Yet objective moral values can not.

Extrain;155276 wrote:

You can't test the hypothesis you were once born, but does that mean there is no fact of the matter about your being born? No.


Yeah, use another example of something that is not a parallel to moral values as an example of how they can be determined? Silly.

Extrain;155276 wrote:

"Torturing babies is morally wrong" is not empirically testable, but it is more likely to be true than false--


By what criteria are you making this assessment?

Extrain;155276 wrote:

So the burden is certainly on you to show otherwise. So far I haven't seen any arguments whatsoever. You just irrationally stipulate morality is subjective.


I find it funny that you can make claims without basis, yet I have to be the one who has basis? By the way, if torturing babies is morally wrong, why does the bible say that it is alright to do it?
Extrain
 
  1  
Reply Thu 22 Apr, 2010 02:04 pm
@kennethamy,
Originally Posted by Night Ripper http://www.philosophyforum.com/images/PHBlue/buttons/viewpost.gif
What's really the difference? As far as I'm concerned, the only difference is that I have a strong emotional response at the thought of torturing babies for fun (as opposed to profit?) whereas I really don't care what you do to ice cream. If you think that my moral qualms go beyond that, I don't see it.

If we disagree on the height of the Statue of Liberty we can always just go measure it and see who is wrong. If we disagree on the morality of abortion, there's nothing we can do. Likewise, if we disagree on the taste of ice cream, we can either agree to disagree or go to war.

De gustibus non est disputandum.

kennethamy;155236 wrote:
That means that there is no use arguing about matters of taste. So, if whether chocolate ice-cream tastes better than vanilla is a matter of taste, then there is no use arguing about it. That means, I suppose, that there is no right or wrong about it. But is whether torturing babies is wrong a matter of taste? That's the question. What makes you think that it is?


Right. That's the ridiculous stipulation the moral relativist, or anti-realist, demands everyone start accepting. The two assumptions are,

(1) All moral judgments are nothing but Humean subjective belief reports about one's tastes and preferences.
(2) If I can't empirically test a hypothesis, it doesn't have a truth value (or is false).

I see no good reason for thinking (1) or (2) are true at all.

And the logical fallacy comes here:

(a) Persons A, B, C, and D all believe different things about X.
(b) Therefore, there is no fact of the matter about X.
(c) Hence all beliefs about X are subjective belief reports about one's taste-preferences.

How does (b) and (c) follow? The argument is obviously invalid. Moral relativism is a groundless stipulation.
 

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