@kennethamy,
Originally Posted by
Night Ripper
What's really the difference? As far as I'm concerned, the only difference is that I have a strong emotional response at the thought of torturing babies for fun (as opposed to profit?) whereas I really don't care what you do to ice cream. If you think that my moral qualms go beyond that, I don't see it.
If we disagree on the height of the Statue of Liberty we can always just go measure it and see who is wrong. If we disagree on the morality of abortion, there's nothing we can do. Likewise, if we disagree on the taste of ice cream, we can either agree to disagree or go to war.
De gustibus non est disputandum.
kennethamy;155236 wrote:That means that there is no use arguing about matters of taste. So, if whether chocolate ice-cream tastes better than vanilla is a matter of taste, then there is no use arguing about it. That means, I suppose, that there is no right or wrong about it. But is whether torturing babies is wrong a matter of taste? That's the question. What makes you think that it is?
Right. That's the ridiculous stipulation the moral relativist, or anti-realist, demands everyone start accepting. The two assumptions are,
(1) All moral judgments are nothing but Humean subjective belief reports about one's tastes and preferences.
(2) If I can't empirically test a hypothesis, it doesn't have a truth value (or is false).
I see no good reason for thinking (1) or (2) are true at all.
And the logical fallacy comes here:
(a) Persons A, B, C, and D all believe different things about X.
(b) Therefore, there is no fact of the matter about X.
(c) Hence all beliefs about X are subjective belief reports about one's taste-preferences.
How does (b) and (c) follow? The argument is obviously invalid. Moral relativism is a groundless stipulation.