@Fido,
Well, you could look at death in this manner as Epicurus proclaimed:
P1. Pain is the thing to be avoided in life and is the "bad".
P2. Death does not induce pain because the sensation or cognizance of pain is not possible when dead.
C. Death is not "bad".
I guess Epicurus would have a fear of dying in a manner that was painful; however, one could argue that whilst we are alive we are also dying simultaneously. It is a strange paradox. Epicurean thinkers would therefore say we need to live and die in pleasure, but death itself is a nonsensical thing to fear. Our immortality is a part of our condition, something the stoics would put on a brave face and get on with as a part of the indifference of the universe.
Personally, I do not believe life is wholly about pleasure. Aristotle convinced me when he argued there is this telos we aim for and defined as "eudaimonia" - to flourish and to be prosperous. All our actions are instrumental to attaining this goal, including the indulgence in pleasure. How we go about granting this flourishing and prosperity to the entirety of humankind seems the bigger issue. Do we adopt a utilitarian model? Is eudaimonia synonymous with "utility"? We all have different concepts of what can be the definition of flourishing and prosperity, but I think it is self-evident that there are some objective and universal morals. The Inuit people may kill their infants, but, despite this ostensible disparity between their morality and our morality, they do this to better the lives of their remaining family - they are not so different from us in terms of values. An objective morality does not mean we lead the exact life in terms of practices, but derive our practices from fundamental values. Imagine a world where humans did not share the universal value to tend for their children. (I agree that I am arguing against a very simplistic moral relativist position, but I am not convinced by moral relativism even in its complex forms).
The fear of death is a "brute fact" according to philosophers like Parfit. It is irrational and founded on a fear of losing our personal identity or what we understand to be personal identity. The continuity of experiential reality as our self seems important to our intuitions; however, practically speaking it makes no difference if someone very closely psychologically connected to me fulfils my life projects or goals or I myself do (the numerically identical me versus the qualitatively identical me). This does not make me an eliminative reductionist, but a constituent reductionist. The concept of personal identity and this "brute fact" is very real and important to our experiential reality and our intuitions, but it is irrational if we take a moral realist perspective (it is objectively irrelevant if you or someone like you completes your life goals).
When you synthesize the fact our moralities all are trying to lead to some fundamental values and that the individual fascination with personal identity is irrational, you sort of have the comfort of knowing everyone is struggling for the same things even if you are not here (maybe you are not even here when you think you are!). The wheels will keep turning and reality will still be. Take comfort in your insignificance; love, learn and live while you can.