Civil Disobedience

The term was coined by HD Thoreau to describe public disobedience for laws considered unjust.

Uniform to acts of civil disobedience is some notion of a moral responsibility to disobey some law or directive. The objective is usually to communicate some message, namely that the law being disobeyed is unjust or wrong.

So, is civil disobedience acceptable? and if so, under what conditions?

Thinking on my "heroes", most are the sort who encourage civil disobedience. Thomas Jefferson advocated regular, violent uprisings against the government, every ten years was his suggestion. When I first read Crito, I remember saying out loud 'No, Socrates! Leave Athens' and I was certainly sad when he did not.

However, it has been many years since I last read Crito, so maybe you can help me. As I recall, Socrates says something to the effect of 'Athens is the best state, so if I cannot live here, I'd not want to live anywhere else'.

That potential argument aside, this is one interesting issue regarding civil disobedience: fidelity to law.

Again, there is the case of Thoreau. He refused to pay the poll tax, which funded the war with Mexico and the fugitive slave act, both pieces of legislation he opposed. For his protest, he spent some time in jail.

It seems we can openly, and intentionally disobey the law and still maintain our obligation to follow the law by willingly accepting the consequences of our civil disobedience - in the case of Thoreau, some jail time.

If we intentionally disobey the law in protest, and readily accept the legal consequences, have we met our obligations to follow the law and met our moral obligations to oppose that law (assuming, in this case, the law is unjust)?

That does not seem much of an argument by Socrates. And, I don't recall it. He had better arguments than that. For, example that not to obey the law would be tantamount to attempting to destroy the State because the foundation of the State is the law. And that to attempt to destroy the State would be an act of ingratitude to what protects, sustains, and educates you. In effect it would be an act of patricide.

Clearly you cannot have met your obligation to obey the law by disobeying the law, and substituting something else. I have not met my legal obligation not to murder by murdering and turning myself in. At best I have recognized my obligation, not met it.

I'm not sure it's so clear, because I'm not sure the obligation is to obey the dictate of the law.

In the case of civil disobedeince, we assume that the law is considered by the agent to be unjust. Murder, of course, is unjust, so laws against murder are not unjust. Therefore, disobeying laws against murder does not seem to fit the criteria for civil disobedience.

Remember, this is very much an issue of reconciling two potentially opposed obligations - moral obligations, and obligations to the state. This is why Thoreau's example is compelling - he was opposed to the Fugitive Slave Act, certainly an unjust law. Should he have complied with the law, and supported the brutalization of slaves, or should he have opposed the law and thereby opposed the brutalization of slaves?

Recall that Socrates did not defend the law itself, but rather he argued that he should face his punishment in accordence with the law. He was sentenced to death, and right or wrong, he should accept that sentence in respect of the law.

In the case of Thoreau, he refused to obey a law he thought unjust (moral obligation), yet accepted his punishment in accordence with the law (obligation to the law). In the process, he did not protest that we have laws, but he protested those particular laws.

So, it seems, this is our question: what obligation do we have to obey the law, if any? And if we do have some obligation to the law, how far does it extend?

If we simply opposed the law, we would not obey the law, and we would avoid the established legal recourse.

However, if we oppose the law by disobeying the law, and then accept our punishment per the established legal recourse, we have stood up for our moral obligation (to disobey the unjust law) and stoop up for our obligation to the state, to respect the state that has invested so much in us by accepting her punishment for breaking the law.

So why would that make the acceptance of punishment tantamount to obeying the law he disobeyed.

I don't know what you mean by "the dictate of the law".

They are not the same. I never said otherwise. What I have said is that accepting the punishment may fulfill the obligation to the state. This is why I asked how far our obligation to the state extends.

Slow down, buddy. The goal isn't to prove everyone else wrong. I'm offering up thoughts for consideration and asking questions, not making arguments.



This is part of the question "if we do have some obligation to the law, how far does it extend?" Do we have an obligation to follow what is being mandated (ex, do not chew gum), or do we have an obligation to accept the punishment determined by law should we break the law?
The problem becomes more difficult when you consider the general condition of civil disobedients - they break laws which they consider unjust. If we are like Thoreau, and standing in opposition to something as heinous as slavery, how do we evaluate our obligations, both moral and to the state, when they conflict?

You bring up examples such as Nazi Germany, and I have to agree, it seems odd to think anyone would have some moral obligation to such a state. But where do we draw the line? If we have no moral obligation to a particular state to even accept punishment for some crime because that state is immoral, how immoral must the state be before we write off our moral obligations to that state?

Myself, I'm not so sure we have moral obligations to the state, but I'm open to reasons why we would.

I believe one should follow one's own moral and ethical codex and nothing else. That's also what the Danish philosopher Martinus said:

Martinus Institute

Rado

Should Adolf Hitler have followed his own moral code?

You don't think he did?

Rado

Yes he did. The question is, should he have.

I don't think that would have changed much, in the greater perspective. Whatever happens here on earth it's is a cocreative venture, Hitler was just the catalyst and orchestrator of those currents that was part of mass consciousness back then. You might say he played the leading part in the play, but without all the other actors playing their parts, and following their moral codes (or not), he would be nothing.

No man has more power than anyone else, it just appears to be so because some are fit to play the role as orchestrators, while others are fit to play the role of followers, for whatever reasons they might have - agreement, fear, apathy, ignorance etc.. But they who follow orders are just as responsible for what they do, as those who gives the orders. If every german soldier had refused to fight for Hitler, WW2 would never had happened, and if everyone who participated in killing the jews had refused to do so, not one would have been killed.

Like a great teacher once said: "No one is guilty, but everyone is responsible."

Rado

You wrote: I believe one should follow one's own moral and ethical codex and nothing else.
I asked whether you believed that Hitler should have followed his own moral code.

What is your reply?

I already answered that by my first statement. If there were any exceptions the statement would be self-contradictory.

Rado

Clearly, the moral obligation to obey a particular law, and the moral obligation to obey the laws of the State are different. Whether I have satisfied my latter obligation when I accept my punishment although I disobeyed a particular law is, it seems to me, not clear. And I know of no argument which would persuade me one way or the other. It may be that it is true that we can say if someone accepts his punishment after having intentionally violated a law something like, At least it shows he respects the law" or something of that sort. But that is, of course, "subjective". He may respect the law, but that does not show he has satisfied his obligation to obey laws.

I believe one should follow one's own moral and ethical codex and nothing else.

Isn't that a central question, though? What sort of obligation, if any, do we have to law?

I think you are right that some states deserve obedience and that others do not, but if we are right, there must be some method of determining the difference between the two.

I think Socrates would agree with me when I say that he did not violate Athenian law by teaching as he taught. Either way, the dilemma of Socrates was not should he continue to teach or not, but whether or not he should comply with his order to be executed.