I am sorry, but I don't know what you are asking? Are you asking whether B knows that p? Well, you say he does, and it is your story, so I guess he does? Are you asking whether if B knows then is what he knows, p, is true? The answer is trivially yes. Of course, if the proposition p is known, then that proposition is true.
I cannot imagine what else you are asking. After all, the phrase, "true knowledge" is not standard English, so you have to tell me what you mean by it.
Ok, let me try it another way.
Given the same scenario I set up previously:
A says that P is true.
B says that P is true.
What are the truth value of these statements?
Which statements? That A says that p is true, and that B says that P is true. Well, if you say that A and B said those things, I'll take your word for it. What other statement are you talking about? At the moment you are really making no sense. Place the statements you want me to comment on in italics, or in quotes, and then try again. For I really do not know what you are talking about. Did you read my previous post. I have a distinct feeling you did not. Do you see why the notion of true knowledge makes no sense, and so, why asking whether knowledge is true makes no sense?
What I suspect is the source of your confusion is that you do not clearly distinguish between knowledge and belief. Is is perfectly all right to ask whether a belief is true because it is perfectly all right to ask whether a belief is false, since a belief may be true or false. But, as we have just seen, since it really makes no sense to ask whether knowledge is false, since if you know something what you know cannot be false, therefore, if makes no sense to ask whether knowledge is true, since if you know something, then it must be true.
What are the significant differences between the following statements?
I believe.
I believe I know.
I know.
"A knows that p is true" implies: 1. p is true; 2. A has adequate evidence that p is true; 3. A believes that p is true. (The classical Platonic definition to be found in the Theateus is that knowledge is true, adequately justified, belief).
"A believes A knows that p" = A accepts that A knows that p. (That does not imply that A knows that p, nor does it imply either that A has adequate evidence for the proposition that A knows that p).
What the truth value of a belief is depends on what that belief is. You tell me what those beliefs are, and I'll try, if I can, to tell you what whether those beliefs are true or false. For, you realize that when you ask what the truth value of a belief is, you are just asking whether the belief is true or false. Don't you? So, I cannot tell whether a belief is true or false unless I know what that belief is, and, of course, I may not be able to tell even then unless I have enough information.
What I suspect is the source of your confusion is that you do not clearly distinguish between knowledge and belief. Is is perfectly all right to ask whether a belief is true because it is perfectly all right to ask whether a belief is false, since a belief may be true or false. But, as we have just seen, since it really makes no sense to ask whether knowledge is false, since if you know something what you know cannot be false, therefore, if makes no sense to ask whether knowledge is true, since if you know something, then it must be true.
But let me add, finally. that whether or not A knows that p is true or whether A knows that p is false, p is true or p is false whether or not A knows it. Or indeed, whether or not anyone knows it. After all, 500 years ago no one knew that water was H20, but water was H20 anyway. So, even when no one knew that water was H20, since water was H20, the statement or proposition that water is H20 corresponded to the fact that water is H20 then just as it does now.
The relation between knowledge and truth is as follows: knowledge implies truth, but truth does not imply knowledge. So I cannot know that p, unless p is true; but p may be true without my knowing it is (or indeed, without anyone knowing it is true).
I don't quite understand. Earlier you said that only beliefs can be true or false; how can a belief be false if it doesn't imply that something is true or false? In essence, all one is then saying is this is what I believe, but it may or may not be true. How can that possibly be false?
And you have also said that it makes no sense to say knowledge is false.
Earlier you were confused when asked about the truth value of statements: it seems that these are not true or false for you either.
So what does have a truth value?
Oh yes, only the object.
But what does that mean? P is true if P=P? Is this not just a trivially true tautology?
Your example of H2O is water:
H2O is the scientific notation for the water molecule (2 hydrogen atoms 1 oxygen atom), which represents water.
"Water" is the English word which represents water.
"Agua" is the Spanish word which represents water.
Saying that H20 is water, is no different than saying that agua is water; which is no different than saying that water is water.
Or are you simply saying that it is true that modern society agrees that H2O is water? If so, then truth is nothing more than the agreed norm that perplexity has spoken of: which you also say makes no sense.
So what does truth mean? What does the tautology P = P correspond to, to determine truth? Not to statements. Not to knowledge.
And if beliefs don't imply that P is either true or false, nor even that one has any evidence at all to imply any kind of proof that P is true, beliefs can't be false. If beliefs can't be false, they can't have a truth value (Law of excluded middle). So beliefs also can't have a truth value.
Now I'm confused, what do you mean by truth?
The word "water" in English, is synonymous with the word, "agua" in Spanish. Which is to say that those two terms mean the same thing. But we have to distinguish between meaning and reference. The term "reference" means what the term designates (if anything) in the world. So, the terms "water" and "agua" mean the same thing, and they both refer to H20. The difference between meaning and reference is a very important difference. For example, the terms, "the author of Tom Sawyer" and, "the author of Huckleberry Finn" do not mean the same thing. But they do have the same reference. That is, Mark Twain. If two terms mean the same thing, then they refer to the same thing. But not conversely: if two terms refer to the same thing, they need no mean the same thing.
Also, all terms have meaning (otherwise they would not be terms in the language). But not all terms have a referent. For example, the term, "mermaid" has a meaning. You can look the meaning up in the dictionary. But the term, "mermaid" does not have a referent, since there are no mermaids.
Truth is a relation between a statement, and the world. If what the statement states corresponds with the world, then the statement is true. But if the statement fails to correspond with the world, then the statement is false. So, for example: the statement that Abraham Lincoln was assassinated is true, because there is the fact that Abraham Lincoln was assassinated. But the statement that Abraham Lincoln died of malaria is false because there is not such fact.
Objects do not have truth value. For example the object, my table, is neither true nor false. But statements (or propositions) have truth value. For example, the statement that my table is brown is either true or false. And if I believe that my table is brown (and if it is brown) then my belief is true. But, if I believe that my table is brown (and if it is not brown) then my belief is false. So any belief may be true or it may be false. And which it is depend on what I believe, and on what is the fact.
Does this help?
Now you are just being equivocal.
So I'll just start with this:
Referent: The object or event to which a term or symbol refers.
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/referent
Referent: the thing that a symbol (as a word or sign) stands for.
http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary?book=Dictionary&va=referent
First, since the words "water" and "agua" were coined well before there was the symbol H2O, those words can not possibly refer to H2O: they refer to the liquid that covers the majority of the surface of this planet.
Second, what is H2O? (try not to equivocate) It is water: the liquid that cover the majority of the surface of this planet.
And "mermaid" refers to characters/creatures in folklore (the event).
Mermaid: (in folklore) a female marine creature, having the head, torso and arms of a woman and the tail of a fish.
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/mermaid
You are equivocating again.
Are you really trying to say that when a person says "I believe that God exists," they are really saying that they accept that God exists, but they can't prove that God exists, so they are not implying that God exists?
But didn't you say that a belief means there is not evidence that p is true?
And knowing is when you know something that is true, and it is true?
You say a true belief is one that believes something that is true. But you also say that belief means there is no evidence that something is true. So how can one have a true belief if there is no evidence to prove that the thing one believes in is true?
And once there is evidence to prove something is true, doesn't it change from a belief to what one knows?
For the same reason you can't have a false belief, because once you can prove that it is false, it becomes what you know to be false.
Then a true belief can only be about something in the past? Way back when they first believed that the Earth was round, and now that we know that the world is round, so now we also know that their belief was true.
Again, so what is truth?
Since we were ignorant, we did not know that "water" referred to H20, but now we do know it. The ancient astronomers, when they looked up into the heavens, saw a body which rose in the morning, which they called "the morning star" (of course, it turned out not to be a star at all, but the planet Venus) and, then in the evening they looked up, and saw what they thought to be a different heavenly body which rose in the evening, and they called it, "the evening star". Guess what? What they thought were two bodies were really one and the same body, namely the planet, Venus, which first appeared in the morning, and then appeared in the evening. They did not know that. It was discovered later. You would not insist that since we used to think there were two different bodies so we used the two different terms, "morning star" and evening star", that we should continue to think of them as two different bodies because they have two different names, do you? We know better now. And, notice, the terms, "the evening star" and "the morning star" have two different meanings, the first means, the star that rises in the morning, and the second, the star that rises in the evening. But, those two terms have one and the same referent, namely, the planet (not star) Venus. We can't go around disregarding science just because when we formulated the language, we didn't know science, and our language was formulated in ignorance. We still talk about "sunrise" and "sunset" but we now know that the Sun doesn't really rise, nor does it set. It is the Earth that does the moving. But we still talk in the old way, but we don't have to think in the old way, do we? As the 18th century philosopher, George Berkeley remarks, "We should talk with the vulgar" (he meant the common untutored people, "but we must think with the intelligent". We can, of course, and should, continue to call that liquid, "water", which, according to the dictionary means, a colorless, tasteless, odorless, liquid. But now we know that it refers to H20. The distinction between meaning and reference is very important here. The same, of course, is true of the term "salt" which we now know refers to sodium chloride, or NaCl. It would be a joke to say, "please pass the NaCl" if you wanted the salt shaker, but that is what we are referring to, NaCl. Isn't that right?
As for "mermaid", "mermaid" means, "a female marine creature, having the head, torso and arms of a woman and the tail of a fish". That's right. But "mermaid" can't refer to such a creature. Know why? Well, because no such creatures exist. The term "mermaid" is a referring term, a noun. But if you think about it, it need not follow that just because there is noun, there must be something to which that noun refers. If that were true, that would be a fast way of proving that God exists. Too fast, wouldn't you agree. In the middle ages they spoke of the fallacy of, unum nomen, unum nominatum, (a name, therefore something named). You cannot infer from the fact that there is a noun, that there is something to which the noun refers. What about, "Easter Bunny" or "Santa Claus"? Again, the distinction between meaning and reference is very important. The terms, "Easter Bunny" and "Santa Claus" have meanings, but they have no referents. Just as nothing answers to the description, a female marine creature, having the head, torso and arms of a woman and the tail of a fish, so. also, nothing answers to the description, "Jolly old elf who delivers presents to good little girls and boy on Christmas Eve", and nothing answer to the description, "Large Rabbit which appears around Easter Time", and I am afraid I have to reveal to you that nothing answers to the description, "lovely and kind fairy who places a quarter under you pillow when you lost a baby tooth". There is, I am sorry to tell you, no Tooth Fairy, either. But, of course, the terms, "Santa", and "Easter Bunny" are not meaningless nonsense terms. They are terms with meanings in the dictionary, or "descriptions" associated with them. But, they have no referents. There is nothing to which they refer, or nothing which those descriptions describe.
Tom Sawyer.
Refers to the character in the book of the same name; written by Mark Twain.
Referent: The object or ENVENT to which a term or symbol refers.
You can still refer to something that does not occupy space.
I have no quarrel with it not occupying space. The number three does not occupy space, but exists. Unicorns do not exist. I agree that the referent is the object or event to which the term or symbol refers. But there is no object or event to which the term "mermaid" refers, so the term, "mermaid" does not have a referent. "Tom Sawyer" is the name of a character in a novel, But characters in novels do not exist. They are fictional characters.
Are you happy about what I said about belief, and knowledge, and truth?
. . . but that many beliefs do have evidence, and some have a great deal of evidence, only not enough for them to have the quantity or quality of evidence required for knowledge.
Knowledge can be only true.
If these characters do not exist, how is it that you know who they are? I believe writing still qualifies as an event.
. . .
Happy? Strange question. But OK, I'll bite, and repeat myself.
Again, from the way you define belief, it is a logical impossibility to have a false belief, or a true belief: except as an evaluation of past beliefs.
You can not prove that a belief is true, because once you can prove truth, it is no longer a belief because it has become what is known to be true.
Conversely, you can not prove that a belief is false, because once you can prove falsehood, it is no longer a belief because it has become what is known to be false.
So you can not have a belief that is either true or false, according to your definition, so your beliefs can have no truth value (Law of excluded middle).
Once you know something, according to your definition, you can no longer say that you believe that thing.
And once you know something, again according to your definitions, it can only be true. And if knowledge can not be false, it can not have truth value.
So you have nothing that can have truth value. So you have nothing that could be called the truth.
If you can refute this, please do so with solid reasoning; instead of continuing to equivocate.
Or at least find a new way to equivocate by using your truth system and answering my question (again I repeat myself):
Using the scenario I've set up before.
"A" knows P, where P is the circumference of the earth.
"A" did some very strange and wrong math, and accidentally came up with the figure of 24,901.55 miles for the circumference of the earth around the equator.
"A" publishes simply the fact, that the circumference of the earth is 24,901.55 miles around the equator, in one of his papers.
"B" reads "A"'s paper.
"A" makes the statement that the circumference of the earth is 24,901.55 miles around the equator.
"B" makes the statement that the circumference of the earth is 24,901.55 miles around the equator.
"C" makes the statement that the circumference of the earth is 24,901.55 miles around the equator.
It is true that the circumference of the earth is 24,901.55 miles around the equator: so what are the truth values for the statements made by "A", "B" and "C"?
_________________________________________________________
But, as I have pointed out, I can have beliefs about the future, and about the present, so I do not understand why you believe I think there are only beliefs about the past.
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And, as I pointed out, once I knew that Quito was the capital of Ecuador, after I only believed it, I could not say that I now only believe it is the capital of Ecuador. But I can certainly say I believe it is the capital of Ecuador, for if I know it, I also believe it. You have to distinguish between: believing, and only believing. If I am six feet tall, then I am certainly 5 feet tall, since I cannot be six feet tall unless I am 5 feet tall. But if I am six feet tall, then I cannot be only five feet tall. And I should not say I am 5 feet tall, although that would be true, because that would be taken as my saying that I am only 5 feet tall, and that would be false. It is not that I can't say I am 5 feet tall, for that would be true if I said it. It is that I should not say it. For it would be misleading if I did say it. Isn't that so? And, in the same way, if I know that p, then I believe that p, but if I know that p, then I do not only believe that p, and consequently, I should not say I believe that p, even though that would be true, for that would be misleading. So although if I know that p, I could say that I believe that p, since that would be true, I should not say I believe that p, because that might be taken as, I only believe that p, and that would be false.
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If I know that p, then it must be that p is true. So, what I know (p) can only be true, if I know it. Although p may be either true or false. But if I know p, then it is true, otherwise, of course, I do not know it.
And, if p is true, and if I believe p is true, and I have adequate justification for that belief that p is true, then, I have satisfied the three conditions for knowing, namely truth, adequate justification, and belief, and then, since I have satisfied those three conditions for knowing, I know, and it is true that I know. So, if A satisfies the three conditions for knowing, then it is true that A knows. Now, to say "knowledge can only be true" if it means anything at all, but be just a way of saying that if someone, A., knows that p, then it must be that p is true. And, of course, that is correct. And, if to say that "knowledge cannot be false" just means that if someone, A., knows that p , then p cannot be false, since then p could not be known, than that is correct too. So, if the statements, "knowledge is true" and "knowledge is not false" are just shorthand ways of expressing the truths, "Only if what I know is true, can I know it" or "if what I claim to know is false, then I don't know it", then fine, we can use those shorthand expressions for those longer expression if you like. And then, of course, "knowledge is (or must be) true" will have the truth value, true, and "knowledge is false" will have the truth value, false. So, with the above stipulations, I am willing to say that we now seem to agree that the truth value of "knowledge is true" is true. All right? (This, in literary terms would, I suppose, be called, an "irenic compromise")
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Now, supposing that the circumference is, 24,901.55 miles, then whoever asserts that the circumference is, 24,901.55 miles will be asserting what is true. So, if A, and B, and C, etc. assert that the circumference is 24,901.55 miles then they will be stating what is true. However, if A asserts that he knows that the circumference is 24,901.55 miles, and that assertion that he knows is based on "some very strange and wrong math" then his assertion that he knows that the circumference is, 24,901.55 miles is false, for one of the necessary conditions for knowing namely that of adequate justification is not met or satisfied. So, although the proposition he claims to know is true, his claim to know is false. And, if the claims to know of the others is based on A's claim to know, then their claims to know are also false. So, we have to distinguish between the truth value of what it is that A claims to know, and the truth value of A's claim to know. And you can see that even if what A claims to know is true, A's claim to know is false. And that is because although it is a necessary condition that what A claims to know be true for his claim to know to be true, it is not a sufficient condition that what A claims to know be true for A's claim to know be true.
So, now, I think I have answered all your comments and objections. Right?
Wrong.
You still haven't shown what criterion is used to prove something to be true. If there is a correspondence between beliefs and reality, what is that correspondence and how is it evaluated to prove truth? And how can the evaluation that proves a belief to be true, be different from the evaluation that forms the belief: in that they are both observations of the same reality?
What is entailed for "adequate justification"; for truth, and for knowing?
If a person claims to know something, but it turns out to be false, then they do not know it; correct? So what criterion has to be met, so that someone can be 100% sure that they do know something, with no chance of it turning out to be false at some later date?
If you can believe and know one in the same truth, what then is the difference between belief and knowing, in regards to a single truth? Use H20 as an example. How is it different when you say that you know H20 is water, and that you also believe H20 is water?
Also, how is it that you know H2O is water? To what reality/referent does H2O correspond to, that allows you to say you know that H2O is water?
I there can no two things in the universe. Richard
