Kennythamy,
What I have in mind is trying to learn something.
The Truth concept before us has to deal with "subjective knowledge". Using your example A knows that p is true, is a statement about what A knows, not whether or not p is true or not: so it really can't be a falsehood (unless A is lying about it), nor can you prove it one way or the other (short of being able to read A's mind).
So what I am trying to get to, is if it is even possible to have Truth Values for "Subjective Knowledge" (within the two guidelines I have posted earlier), and how would you prove it one way or the other.
I really don't understand why you are so against me trying to understand someone else's perspective; to see what merit it may have, or what I can learn from it.
And though you feel that your answer is THE answer, this subject of "what is truth?" has been debated at least since Plato's day: and there are more than half a dozen concepts on this subject, and as of yet, none of them has come out as the accepted provable truth about "what truth is."
Truth - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
So take a couple deep breaths . . . and let's see if we can learn something together. Is that really asking too much?
"P.S. I notice that Bogie asks, Why would you believe you know something without knowning it?" I would think that the answer is all too obvious: because you have made a mistake. In the middle ages lots of people believed they knew that the Earth was flat. They made a mistake."
It has long been established that both perception and judgement are not infalliable, thus to error is common.
I do not know what you might mean by a "perspective" on knowledge. Knowledge is not the sort of thing one has a perspective on, anymore than one can have a perspective on gravity or electrons. One can have a theory about the nature of knowledge, just as there is a theory about the nature of gravity, or of the nature of electrons. One can have this or that perspective on the forthcoming presidential election. But how can one have a perspective on what knowledge is? What we want to do is to find out what knowledge is, not have an attitude toward it.
I still do not know what you can mean by truth values for subjective knowledge. Only propositions or statements have truth values. Subjective knowledge, whatever it is, is neither a proposition nor a statement. So you can draw your own conclusion. The idea of a truth value of subjective knowledge is comparable to the idea of color (red or purple) of the square root of 9.
Perspective=the faculty of seeing all the relevant data in a meaningful relationship
perspective - Definitions from Dictionary.com
Why are there so many theories on "The Truth"? Because they each have their own perspective.
Look through the thread. This was started with a comment to the effect that truth is subjective, because knowledge is subjective.
And as far as telling you how there can be a truth value for subjective knowledge: that is what I've been trying to find out with my questions.
It seems that propositions and statements would also fall under the heading as subjective knowledge; as it has been defined by Boagie.
Who is they? Why were there two conflicting theories about the shape of the Earth? A difference of perspective? I don't think so. It was because of a lack of understanding together with a lack of knowledge. The Earth had a particular shape, and we had to find out what it was. The same is true of truth, or of knowledge.
The theory of truth generally accepted is that truth is a dyadic (two term) relation between a statement or proposition, and a fact or a state of affairs in the world. And a statement is true when it corresponds to a fact or state of affairs, and it is false when it fails to correspond to any fact of state of affairs. So, the proposition, the cat is on the mat is true if and only if, there is a cat, and a mat, and the cat is in the relation on as regards the mat.
Now that theory (not perspective) of truth seem to me to be correct. Since we are all fallible, it is not certainly correct, but then, neither are scientific theories certainly correct. It is always possible that a better theory may come along and supplant the prevailing theory. Scientists accept the best available theory, the one that best accounts for the facts they want the theory to account for; and similarly philosophy searches for the best available theory which accounts for the facts they want the theory to account for. If someone thinks that some other theory of truth would be better than the above correspondence theory, they can first show what objections there are to correspondence theory, and then offer a theory that accounts for the facts as well or better than the correspondence theory, and show how the new theory does not have the flaws they claim that the correspondence theory has.
This is not a matter of perspective or attitude. It is a matter of thinking about the question in a logical and sequential way so as to discover the truth of the matter.
You seem to think that philosophical inquiry is analogous to that famous story of the blind men and the elephant, when a number of blind men attempt to describe an elephant, and each one describe the elephant differently, because each touches a different part of the animal and describe the animal in terms of the particular part he touches. But what is true about the blind men is not true about philosophers. It is not true that each philosopher perceives only one part of the whole (what you might call "perspective") each of them perceives the whole thing, and if he does not, another philosopher will soon make him aware of the part he missed. So it is not like that story at all.
"The term (Truth) has no single definition about which the majority of professional philosophers and scholars agree. Various theories of truth continue to be debated. There are differing claims on such questions as what constitutes truth; how to define and identify truth; the roles that revealed and acquired knowledge play; and whether truth is subjective, relative, objective, or absolute. This article introduces the various perspectives and claims, both today and throughout history."
(Some Truth Theories): Correspondence theory, Coherence theory, Constructivist theory, Consensus theory, Pragmatic theory, Performative theory of truth, Redundancy theory, Truth in mathematics, Semantic theory of truth, Kirpke's theory of truth.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Truth
It seems that all these philosophers just needed to contact you to get the one TRUE theory of the truth. Obviously these philosophers just didn't give their theories as much thought nor were they as bright as you.
Now can we get on with learning about some of these different theories of the truth; or are you going to continue with the Kennethamy Truth Dogma and the Kennethamy Inquisition?
Truth depends on belief. There is no truth apart from belief.
--
Consider this too: for you to insist that since there are several theories of truth, none of them is known to be true, or even that none of them is true (and I am not clear which of those you are saying-maybe both) seems to me very dogmatic of you.
Have you any such objections?
What I am saying would be more like: the proponent of each theory holds their theory to be true; but they can't all be true. But each theory has strengths/points as well as weaknesses. And maybe, by understanding all the strengths and weaknesses, either one theory will be adjusted to fix it's weakness, or there may be yet another/new theory that is complete and true.
This is not dogmatic, just a fact of logic: conflicting theories can not all be true.
Also, if one were proven to be true, the rest could be proven to be false: conflicting theories can not all be true.
I would also add: The fact that so many very intelegent Philosophers and Scholars have so many different theories about what truth means, and each feels their theory is true; ought to make one question what is really meant when one says that something is true.
OK, I'll ask again.
A knows that P is true.
P is indeed true.
A's knowledge of P being true came by way of a formula/theory that is false, but due to miscalculations that A made, A accidentally came up with the correct answer.
Is A's knowledge true?
To what does P correspond to, to determine the truth value of what A knows?
Clearly, if A's justification for his claim to know that p, is false, then his justification is (to say the least) inadequate. And since a necessary condition of A's knowing that P is that his claim to know that P be adequately justified, the answer to your question is, no, A doesn't know that p. So it is false that A knows that p.
On the other hand, if you are asking whether p is true, even if A does not know that p is true, well, you yourself say that A's answer is correct even if by accident. So what he claims to know, namely p, is true (according to you) but his claim to know is clearly false since A has failed to satisfy one of the necessary conditions of knowing, namely the condition of adequate justification.
A, of course, does not have any knowledge that p, so to ask whether A's knowledge is true really makes no sense. Since it assumes that A has knowledge, but he does not. I think you should take Wittgenstein's dictum that philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of the intelligence by language more to heart, and ask yourself what you can mean when you ask whether A's knowledge that p is true when A has no such knowledge. Indeed if if A did know that p (and I suppose that is what you mean by "A's knowledge" don't you?) then p would have to be true, since A could not know that p unless p was true. So A's knowledge would have to be true, since anyone's knowledge has to be true. Truth is a necessary condition of knowing. So you cannot have false knowledge. (Although you can, of course, have false belief). But, as I pointed out, A has no knowledge in this case for his claim to know fails to meet a necessary condition of knowing, namely the condition of adequate justification. So, to repeat, since A has (in this case) no knowledge, his knowledge is not true (nor false, for that matter). As I pointed out, if someone guesses that Whirlaway will win the next race at Saratoga, and Whirlaway does win, that doesn't mean that the person knew that the horse would win. A lucky guess is not knowledge.
But let me add, finally. that whether or not A knows that p is true or whether A knows that p is false, p is true or p is false whether or not A knows it. Or indeed, whether or not anyone knows it. After all, 500 years ago no one knew that water was H20, but water was H20 anyway. So, even when no one knew that water was H20, since water was H20, the statement or proposition that water is H20 corresponded to the fact that water is H20 then just as it does now.
The relation between knowledge and truth is as follows: knowledge implies truth, but truth does not imply knowledge. So I cannot know that p, unless p is true; but p may be true without my knowing it is (or indeed, without anyone knowing it is true).
Kennethamy,
If you will indulge me one more:
A publishes a paper, in which he states P is true.
B reads the paper published by A.
And now:
B knows that P is true
P is indeed true
Is it true that B knows that P is true?
Sure.
1. Why should B know that p is true just because A publishes a paper stating that p is true? A might be a fool, or he might know nothing about the subject. That A states that p is true is evidence that p is true only if A is a credible authority on the subject matter of the paper.
2.
Well you seem to be asking whether if B knows that p is true then is it true that B knows that p is true, and the answer is trivially, yes. It is a trivial tautology that if someone knows that p is true, then it is true that that someone knows that p is true. If it is true that B knows that p is true, then obviously, and trivially, B knows that p is true. After all, the sentence, "it is is true that B knows that p is true" means the same thing as the sentence, B knows that p is true.
Is that really the question you mean to ask?
No, on #2.
Is B's knowledge true?
