What we (edit: missing 'we' added) will have to be kept in mind, regardless of any philosophical disposition, is that if the tenets of a particular claim, or assertion, cannot be demonstrated to have value in practical reality, they have no right to pressed in such absolute nuance.
That said, I will note that I don't think anything that Kasiejin presents amounts to a philosophical argument, as it is all based on the premise that whatever claims are to be made, must be supported by scientific evidence.( color mine)
I used my own quote (corrected version) to assure the connectedness of it . . . since jeeprs had cut part of it out, rendering it somewhat incoherent
. I think it far more than simply fair to suggest that 1
) we pay attention to the facts of the reality we live in, and that 2
) appeal to a certain traditional formulation of thought experimentation alone ( and please do notice this significance of 'alone' here
) is not enough to override the results of being more realistic, pragmatic, and down to earth about the world we have come to find ourselves in.
has posited (highlighted in indio, above) is paradoxically both true and false at the same time. It is true that I am not presenting, in the strictest sense on one end of the spectrum, philosophical arguments
. However, it is nevertheless true that I am actually applying a philosophical position--namely, pragmatism
(and in which sense, on the other end of the spectrum, I am, indeed, presenting a philosophical argument).
However (and possibly even setting the above aside) there are the basics which we'll have to face up to. We can assert that it is known that the normal H. sapiens will have two retinas, lined with photoreceptors (rods and cones) which project towards the lens of the eye. These are interconnected by amacrine and horizontal cells which are which contact with the projection intermediate bipolar cells. The outer ganglion layer projects through the optic disk and forms the optic nerves that project to the lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN), and we don't even know it on our own
(purely subjectively speaking [there's the blind spot we never see, you see]).
To assert that the above is not true by offering philosophical argumentation is nonsensical in nature. Likewise, to argue that it cannot be known just what these sensory nerves do, in the practical sense, is an exposure of ignorance. To offer philosophical reasonings on just how it is that this particular brain structure had come about, is open territory (to some degree)--we are dealing more into speculation in such an area of inquiry.
In this very same manner, we can surely understand that there would be no gain at all, in trying to present philosophical arguments towards the proposition that the planet earth were the center of the solar system. Neither would the knowledgeable populace offer much attention to those who might wish to assert that the H. sapiens is the only species of the homo genus. What is known to be true, is just that; and any unknown to be true items, or known to be untrue items, will all fit within their several places on that bell curve
Therefore the point of error in the opposition's statement, is that element of what it means to do methodological reasoning
(whether the adjective scientific
is, or is not, added). What is not testable, of course, is not falsifiable, but what has been shown to be true, will always refute what is shown to be untrue by that very discovery of truth. Be it a theist-based-religious-belief-system derived claim (e.g. an immaterial memory), or a claim due to the tradition of philosophical pondering and exposition (e.g. solipsism), what is eventually more clearly demonstrated to be the case, in all practical and fair concerns, regarding the source of consciousness and mind, is the case.
In today's library of time-tested empirical knowledge (leaving the modifier scientific
out of the picture, even), the person who claims to know that memory is immaterial, that visual, auditory, olfactory, and taste sensations are immaterial, that self-awareness and self-orientation are immaterial, that cognition is immaterial in nature, are under the absolute obligation to present evidence--beyond-a-doubt-cold-cash-on-the-barrel-head
evidence--that our discoveries are false! This, I charge, cannot be done in any manner or way by traditional philosophical positions at all. Likewise and equally, the person who wishes to disseminate as truth the proposition that all these above elements had been present in the form of a 'will of nature,' or 'will of deity,' before even the bipedal tracks left in East Africa some 3 million years ago, is going to have to demonstrate for all to see, just how it can be determined that such is, actually, the truth of the world in which we live.