I don’t know why the link to my blog was deleted because of the importance of the issue. However, if you chose to educate yourself on internet sting entrapment do a Google search with the title of my blog “Florida Scandal: The truth about internet sting entrapment”.
There are volunteer positions available with “Perversion of Justice” including but not limited to web designers, investigators, and reporters. Reporters are in charge of monitoring adult web sites looking for any suspicious profiles and kicking them out reporting on the activity that they encountered to post to the web. Investigators are in charge of investigating internet stings and finding evidence of entrapment from past arrests. Web developers will of course be in charge of posting content and the evidence that is found. Also, I am not a web developer so I am having trouble designing the web page myself. All serious inquiries should go to
[email protected].
Finally, since people seem to be ignoring the blogs in the side bar with the supporting case law that proves entrapment here are the cases along with the Florida Statute on entrapment:
Fla. Stat. ch. 777.201
Entrapment—
(1) A law enforcement officer, a person engaged in cooperation with a law enforcement officer, or a person acting as an agent of a law enforcement officer perpetrates an entrapment if, for the purpose of obtaining evidence of the commission of a crime, he or she induces or encourages and, as a direct result, causes another person to engage in conduct constituting such crime by employing methods of persuasion or inducement which create a substantial risk that such crime will be committed by a person other than one who is ready to commit it.
Jeffery L. Cashatt v. State of Florida, 873 So. 2d 430 (2004)
…sexually oriented communication on a computer on-line service which is viewed by a child is not a violation of the statute unless the sender of the communication “knowingly” attempts by the communication to seduce the child.
Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958)
Entrapment occurs only when the criminal conduct was "the product of the creative activity" of law enforcement officials.
In Sorrells v. United States, 287 U. S. 435, this Court firmly recognized the defense of entrapment in the federal courts. The intervening years have in no way detracted from the principles underlying that decision. The function of law enforcement is the prevention of crime and the apprehension of criminals. Manifestly, that function does not include the manufacturing of crime. Criminal activity is such that stealth and strategy are necessary weapons in the arsenal of the police officer. However,
"A different question is presented when the criminal design originates with the officials of the government, and they implant in the mind of an innocent person the disposition to commit the alleged offense and induce its commission in order that they may prosecute."
…But to look to a statute for guidance in the application of a policy not remotely within the contemplation of Congress at the time of its enactment is to distort analysis. It is to run the risk, furthermore, that the court will shirk the responsibility that is necessarily in its keeping, if Congress is truly silent, to accommodate the dangers of overzealous law enforcement and civilized methods adequate to counter the ingenuity of modern criminals. The reasons that actually underlie the defense of entrapment can too easily be lost sight of in the pursuit of a wholly fictitious congressional intent.
Cruz v. State of Florida, 465 So. 2d 516 (1985)
The Casper court found that an otherwise un-predisposed passerby who chose to take the money did not acquiesce, but "succumbed to temptation.... to the lure of the bait."
Petitioner would have this court hold that where the only evidence of predisposition is the commission of the crime the police scenario was designed to elicit, there is an insufficient showing of predisposition, as a matter of law.
The entrapment defense arises from a recognition that sometimes police activity will induce an otherwise innocent individual to commit the criminal act the police activity seeks to produce. The United States Supreme Court has addressed the issue in four principal cases.
Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 96 S.Ct. 1646, 48 L.Ed.2d 113 (1976);
United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 93 S.Ct. 1637, 36 L.Ed.2d 366 (1973);
Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 78 S.Ct. 819, 2 L.Ed.2d 848 (1958);
Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 53 S.Ct. 210, 77 L.Ed. 413 (1932).
State of Florida v. Donald Casper, 417 So.2d 263 (1982)
Upon these facts, the decoy simply provided the opportunity to commit a crime to anyone who succumbed to the lure of the bait. Accordingly, we uphold the trial court's ruling that, as a matter of law, the defendant was entrapped.
None of the unsolved robberies or thefts involved the same type of victim or modus operandi of this case. The Sheriff's office had no suspects or identifications of possible suspects for the thefts and robberies and did not employ the decoy to catch any particular individual.
Newman v. United States, 299 F. 128, 131 (4th Cir.1924)
"It is well settled that decoys may be used to entrap criminals, and to present opportunity to one intending or willing to commit crime. But decoys are not permissible to ensnare the innocent and law-abiding into the commission of crime. When the criminal design originates, not with the accused, but is conceived in the mind of the government officers, and the accused is by persuasion, deceitful representation, or inducement lured into the commission of a criminal act, the government is estopped by sound public policy from prosecution therefore.”