Prop 8?

It nice that you feel so free to speak for 10 of millions of your fellow citizens who only thing in commen is a medical disorder.

It nice that you feel so free to speak for 10 of millions of your fellow citizens who only thing in commen is a medical disorder.

What is already interesting is that the gay rights groups, who claim that homosexuality is natural and biologic, have embraced the transgender rights groups, who claim that biology got it wrong.

For me this indicates that the rational argument for why homosexuality must be accepted is wall paper. The behaviour is "I want what I want and you can't tell me no!".

I long ago learned that with women one should always follow what they do over what they say, and I suspect that the same rules applies to gays.

The argument is: "I am, I am, who are you to tell me I'm not?" Your argument is the wall paper: You want not for them and you can't understand your limits.

Debra Law wrote:

That's like saying if freedom of speech was a fundamental right, then the state could never punish defamation or fighting words.

That's kinda my point, right? Look, we know that speech is fundamental because it is specifically provided for in the Constitution. Other rights have been read into the Constitution (both Fed and State), but in the end, none of them are universal. I never said that speech wasn't fundamental or universal, I simply said that the right to marry is not universal. And you helped me out by pointing out that even ones we hold so dear, like speech and religion, are not entirely protected. So, why is it that we can abridge speech, but not marriage? Why is it that speech, the first right, is less protected than marriage? You seem to take that stand, but I don't. I think marriage has its limits, just like speech.

Copper Seth wrote:

Furthermore, the right to marriage is neither universal nor fundamental, meaning it can be abridged, interrupted, and otherwise prohibited.

Marriage is a fundamental right. The State may not deprive any individual or class of individuals from exercising a fundamental right unless the deprivation is NECESSARY (and narrowly tailored) to serve a COMPELLING State interest.

Copper Seth wrote:

If marriage was a universal right, then the state could never prevent minors, relatives, or specific otrhers from marrying.

That's like saying if freedom of speech was a fundamental right, then the state could never punish defamation or fighting words. That's silly. Every denial or deprivation of a fundamental right must be necessary to serve a compelling state interest. Each denial or deprivation must be analyzed on its own merits.

Every denial or deprivation of a fundamental right must be necessary to serve a compelling state interest. Each denial or deprivation must be analyzed on its own merits.

The Due Process Clause guarantees more than fair process, and the "liberty" it protects includes more than the absence of physical restraint. Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (Due Process Clause "protects individual liberty against `certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them' ") (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)). The Clause also provides heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301 -302 (1993); Casey, 505 U.S., at 851 . In a long line of cases, we have held that, in addition to the specific freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, the "liberty" specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes the rights to marry, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); to have children, Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); to direct the education and upbringing of one's children, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); to marital privacy, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); to use contraception, ibid; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); to bodily integrity, Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), and to abortion, Casey, supra. We have also assumed, and strongly suggested, that the Due Process Clause protects the traditional right to refuse unwanted lifesaving medical treatment. Cruzan, 497 U.S., at 278 -279. . . .

As we stated recently in Flores, the Fourteenth Amendment "forbids the government to infringe . . . `fundamental' liberty interests at all, no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest."507 U.S., at 302 .

They sold their souls for a little peace in the 1970s and the results are there for all to see.

Copper Seth wrote:

Loving v. Virginia should also not be used in conjuntion with Brown v Board of Education, because this is not an issue of seperate but equal.

You're advocating separate and disparate treatment, and yet you say this is NOT an issue of the "separate but equal" doctrine that was discredited? How can you look at yourself in the mirror with a straight face?

Marriage for heterosexual couples vs. Civil Unions or domestic partnerships for homosexual couples

That's separate and unequal.

Copper Seth wrote:

BvB dealt with public education, something given to everyone for very specific reasons.

Education at public expense is not a right. However, when the State provides public education to children (and mandates compulsory attendance under the penalty of law), then the state has a constitutional duty to treat all children alike. In other words, the State cannot establish superior schools and reserve those schools for a "special class" of heterosexual students and establish inferior second-class schools for disfavored homosexual students. That would be unconstitutional discrimination.

Copper Seth wrote:

But marriage is not given to everyone. Even the ancillary rights that accompany marriage are reserved for that special class of relationships.

Marriage is a fundamental right. The State may not deprive any individual or class of individuals from exercising a fundamental right unless the deprivation is NECESSARY (and narrowly tailored) to serve a COMPELLING State interest. Although you place yourself and your fiancee in that "special class" of heterosexuals whom you believe are entitled to superior rights, you're not any more special than homosexuals.

In Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), a unanimous Court recognized that "education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments." Id., at 493. What was said there in the context of racial discrimination has lost none of its vitality with the passage of time:

"Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our [411 U.S. 1, 30] recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms." Ibid.

This theme, expressing an abiding respect for the vital role of education in a free society, may be found in numerous opinions of Justices of this Court writing both before and after Brown was decided. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (BURGER, C. J.), 237, 238-239 (WHITE, J.), (1972); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963) (BRENNAN, J.); McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948) (Frankfurter, J.); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Interstate Consolidated Street R. Co. v. Massachusetts, 207 U.S. 79 (1907).

Nothing this Court holds today in any way detracts from our historic dedication to public education. We are in complete agreement with the conclusion of the three-judge panel below that "the grave significance of education both to the individual and to our society" cannot be doubted. 69 But the importance of a service performed by the State does not determine whether it must be regarded as fundamental for purposes of examination under the Equal Protection Clause.

. . . Thus, the key to discovering whether education is "fundamental" is not to be found in comparisons of the relative societal significance of education as opposed to subsistence or housing. Nor is it to be found by weighing whether education is as important as the right to travel. Rather, the answer lies in assessing whether there is a right to education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution. . . .

We have carefully considered each of the arguments supportive of the District Court's finding that education is a fundamental right or liberty and have found those arguments unpersuasive. In one further respect we find this a particularly inappropriate case in which to subject state action to strict judicial scrutiny. The present case, in another basic sense, is significantly different from any of the cases in which the Court has [411 U.S. 1, 38] applied strict scrutiny to state or federal legislation touching upon constitutionally protected rights. Each of our prior cases involved legislation which "deprived," "infringed," or "interfered" with the free exercise of some such fundamental personal right or liberty. . . .

It should be clear, for the reasons stated above and in accord with the prior decisions of this Court, that this is not a case in which the challenged state action must be subjected to the searching judicial scrutiny reserved for laws that create suspect classifications or impinge upon constitutionally protected rights....

Among other things, the State is constrained to recognize a student's legitimate entitlement to a public education as a property interest which is protected by the Due Process Clause and which may not be taken away for misconduct without adherence to the minimum procedures required by that Clause....Although Ohio may not be constitutionally obligated to establish and maintain a public school system, it has nevertheless done so and has required its children to attend. Those young people do not "shed their constitutional rights" at the schoolhouse door.

In each of the cases, minors of the Negro race, through their legal representatives, seek the aid of the courts in obtaining admission to the public schools of their community on a nonsegregated basis. In each instance, [347 U.S. 483, 488] they had been denied admission to schools attended by white children under laws requiring or permitting segregation according to race. This segregation was alleged to deprive the plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. In each of the cases other than the Delaware case, a three-judge federal district court denied relief to the plaintiffs on the so-called "separate but equal" doctrine announced by this Court in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 . Under that doctrine, equality of treatment is accorded when the races are provided substantially equal facilities, even though these facilities be separate. In the Delaware case, the Supreme Court of Delaware adhered to that doctrine, but ordered that the plaintiffs be admitted to the white schools because of their superiority to the Negro schools.

The plaintiffs contend that segregated public schools are not "equal" and cannot be made "equal," and that hence they are deprived of the equal protection of the laws. Because of the obvious importance of the question presented, the Court took jurisdiction....

In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We must consider public education in the light of its full development and its present place in American life throughout [347 U.S. 483, 493] the Nation. Only in this way can it be determined if segregation in public schools deprives these plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws....

In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We must consider public education in the light of its full development and its present place in American life throughout [347 U.S. 483, 493] the Nation. Only in this way can it be determined if segregation in public schools deprives these plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws.

To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone. The effect of this separation on their educational opportunities was well stated by a finding in the Kansas case by a court which nevertheless felt compelled to rule against the Negro plaintiffs:

"Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction of the law; for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the educational and mental development of negro children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school system." 10

Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding is amply supported by modern authority. 11 Any language [347 U.S. 483, 495] in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected.

We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of "separate but equal" has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly situated for whom the actions have been brought are, by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. This disposition makes unnecessary any discussion whether such segregation also violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

They can look themselves in the mirror, because they are so ignorant about civil rights and equality. There's not cure for stupid.

Given four decades of ineptitude from the profession their deciding that homosexuality is not an illness has little credibility.

Come on if you would dare to take any other stand in those fields how likely do you think you would get any more funding and how likely would it be for your family to find protectors marching outside your home?

The California blacklist and the marching around churches tell how the homosexual community react to any one who would dare to disagree with any of their positions.

The gay community and it supporters can not use riots, uncivil protects, and blacklists and after getting such associations as the APA to bend under those kind of pressures, point to the new positions of those associations as scientific proof that homosexuality is not a disorder.

a person does not need to be ignorant to not agree with you on values.

I don't think that civil rights and equality are as important as you do. I am all for promoting both when possible, but we don't agree on where we are right now it seems.

Or maybe you are so ignorant that you think that no matter where we are we would be better with a little more civil rights and a little more equality.

If you are the latter than you promote the distruction of civilization, if you are the former then we can better come to a mutual understanding if you would stop calling me ignorant and stupid.

Then again, if you don't care enough about civility to act civil maybe I already know where you want to go.....

Sorry my friend the gay right movement had broken the law many times over the course of the years.

All for a good ‘cause” of course.

The very event that is used to mark the start of the movement was a three day riot in New York City.

The breaking into meetings and taking them over in many cases such as the Act Out Group was known for is also illegal my friend.

The APA did not find it was invalid that homosexuality was a disorder for any scientific reason but so they could have some peace and it all there in the records.

You are willing to benefit from the movement illegal acts such as the APA de-listing homosexuality as a disorder after they suffer many illegal disruptions to their meetings.

You do not normally decide scientific facts in my worldview by negotiations with a social right movement to stop disrupting your organization meetings.

Your efforts to claimed that this de-listing has some basic in science when we both know better is shameful in my opinion and make you a very willing partner in the movement illegal behaviors over the years.

Hooker's work was the first to empirically test the assumption that gay men were mentally unhealthy and maladjusted. The fact that no differences were found between gay and straight participants sparked more research in this area and began to dismantle the myth that homosexual men and women are inherently unhealthy.

n conjunction with other empirical results, this work led the American Psychiatric Association to remove homosexuality from the DSM in 1973 (it had been listed as a sociopathic personality disorder). In 1975, the American Psychological Association publicly supported this move, stating that "homosexuality per se implies no impairment in judgment, reliability or general social and vocational capabilities…(and mental health professionals should) take the lead in removing the stigma of mental illness long associated with homosexual orientation." Although prejudice and stigma still exist in society, this research has helped millions of gay men and women gain acceptance in the mental health community.