Gates: with them or against them?

July 31, 2008
Gates: with them or against them?
Posted by Jonathan Landay
McClatchy Blog

One has to wonder what Secretary of Defense Robert Gates is really trying to say in his essay in the latest issue of Parameters, the journal published by the Army War College in Carlisle, Pa.

On its face, the essay entitled "Reflections on Leadership" is about what Gates took away from a book on the relationship between Gens. Dwight Eisenhower and George Marshall called Partners In Command by Mark Perry.

Gates writes about the influence on both men of their mentor, Gen. Fox Conner, especially Fox's three principles that a democracy should observe when it goes to war: Never fight unless you have to; never fight alone, and never fight for a long time.

This is where the piece starts to get really interesting. As Gates sets out how he believes the United States should be applying these principles to the threats of the 21st century, its hard not to come away with an impression that he has serious questions about the way his bosses - President Bush and Vice President Cheney - and his predecessor - Donald H. Rumsfeld - took the country to war in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Gates then appears to take aim at the top military brass of the time. In a section subtitled "Candor, Credibility and Dissent," he writes that service members have a duty to speak their minds and refuse to kowtow to their superiors when they believe them to be wrong.

"If as an officer one does not tell blunt truths or create an environment where candor is encouraged, then they have done themselves and the institution a disservice," writes Gates, who goes on to give examples of how Marshall, Eisenhower and other officers spoke their minds to their superiors.

One has to wonder why Gates didn't include in his examples ret. Gen. Eric Shinseki, the former Army Chief of Staff. Perhaps it would have gotten him into too much hot water. Shinseki, let's not forget, was the only senior officer with the courage to defy the administration - at least publicly - by saying he believed several hundred thousand troops would be needed to occupy Iraq, far more than Rumsfeld believed were necessary. For his candor, Shinseki earned a public slapdown from Rumsfeld's deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, who dismissed his estimate as way off the mark. Shinseki, the combat veteran, turned out to be right.