Frank Apisa wrote:I'd love to discuss the Locke stuff -- and if you want to, let's have a go at it. I suspect that the arguments Locke uses reduce to what Ican is doing, but like I said, I don't normally bite off more than I can chew -- and I am not completely sure of Locke's position on the issue.
Offer what you will on that.
I'll respond.
Setting me to work, and on Labor Day weekend! There should be some sort of rule against that.
OK, let me set forth one theory (albeit admittedly incomplete and imperfect) of natural rights. I'm drawing here primarily on Locke and Hobbes, but I've excluded any theistic references (which is, I think, critical to Locke's thinking, if not his theory), and I start with the right to life (whereas Hobbes starts with liberty and Locke, if I understand him correctly, starts with property).
First, a working definition of right: Rights are justified claims to the protection of persons' important interests. Each right has two components: the rightholder's claim or interest, and the duty of others to forbear from interfering with that claim or interest.
Thesis 1. Persons are masters of their own bodies. This can be derived from any number of sources: Fichtean self-awareness, a Cartesian cogito, a notion of free will, etc. Not only is it, I think, intuitively correct, but I doubt that even a societal rights position could contradict it.
Corollary 1a. No other person has a greater interest in an individual than that individual. If I am master of my own body, then my interest in myself is greater than anyone else's interest in me.
Corollary 1b. No person may transfer this interest to another. This derives from the preceding, and establishes that any right deriving from these bases will be inalienable.
Thesis 2. As master of one's own person, an individual has an interest in preserving his/her own life. This can be derived, again, from free will or perhaps from a Bergsonian notion of time. We can only understand the notion of "rights" by projecting ourselves into the future: if we did not have a notion of a future (and thus a notion of ourselves as being "preserved" or continued into the future), then we would have no notion of "rights."
Corollary 2a. A person has an interest in the means by which that person's life may be preserved. It would be an empty claim if I asserted an interest in my life but did not assert an interest in those things (e.g. food, shelter, etc.) that allow my life to be preserved.
Corollary 2b. No other person has an interest in ending an individual's life that is greater than the individual's interest in preserving it. This is derived from both Thesis 1 and Thesis 2.
Thesis 3. A person is entitled to preserve his/her life as against all other persons. Derived from the above.
Corollary 3. A person is entitled to act as judge of his/her own interest, and punish those who infringe on the person's interest in his/her own life and the means to preserve life. This is derived from both the person's own individuality and interest: it would be an empty claim to assert an interest in one's own life but disclaim any means to prevent others from infringing on that interest. This is a crucial claim for both Hobbes and Locke.
Thesis 4. All persons are under an obligation to refrain from infringing upon an individual's interest in his/her life. If a person has an interest in his/her own life, and if all persons are similarly imbued, and if all are to act as judges of their own interests, then all are bound to respect the interests of others or face punishment. I've probably skipped over some intermediate steps here, but this thesis can be derived from the inherent sociability of humankind (as set forth by Grotius) or innate reason or some sort of categorical imperative (as per Kant).
Thesis 5. Consequently, all persons have a right to life: in that one's interest is a justified claim, and that all others are under a duty to respect that claim.
Note: all of this happens prior to the advent of civil society: i.e. prior to a Hobbesian or Lockean social contract. For both of them, the crucial step toward a civil society was the abandonment of the private right to punish (corollary 3 above). The inherent rights of each individual, however, remained intact.
Now, this is only one right: as I mentioned before, there is also the rights to property and liberty, as well as others (right to think freely, right to form attachments with others, etc.) that I have not set forth. But this should at least focus this discussion more closely on a real theory of natural rights, rather than a strawman argument erected by the theory's opponents.
Can you count on having rights? Absolutely not. Rights are subject to change at any time and may vary from place to place. You simply can't go to Afghanistan and demand to have the same rights you have in New York. That's what scares a lot of people, that rights aren't omnipresent and unchangable. Rights are simply those things given to you by society, you can't demand them. You can't walk into the courtroom and demand to be released from jail because you have a right to be free. They'll just laugh at you.
As far as the social contract is concerned, it is an understood contract between the individual and the society. You follow society's rules, they give you rights. It is a mutual agreement between man and society that man will act in a socially-agreed-upon manner and society will not punish man if he does so. Surely you know this.
Tell that to the Indians. The "right" to own property is meaningless. Land was here before you were born and will be here long after you're dead. From where did this "right" to own the land while you are alive come from? Does God show up to settle property disputes?
Besides, there really isn't a "right" to own property, nothing says you get to own anything. You may purchase it, you may own it, you may sell it, you may give it away, but you don't pop out of the womb with a deed. In a communist society, your "right" to own property is rather moot, everything is community property.
Unfortunately, you're still arguing inherent rights, but you're not doing a damn thing to back it up. I'll ask again, how are these 'inherent' rights defined and by whom? How are they protected and defended? If you can't come up with an answer to that, then you're just blowing hot air.
So where is your test?
You surprised me.
I thought (would have been willing to bet) that you would start with the right to property -- which I thought to be Locke's personal favorite.
Cephus wrote:Can you count on having rights? Absolutely not. Rights are subject to change at any time and may vary from place to place. You simply can't go to Afghanistan and demand to have the same rights you have in New York. That's what scares a lot of people, that rights aren't omnipresent and unchangable. Rights are simply those things given to you by society, you can't demand them. You can't walk into the courtroom and demand to be released from jail because you have a right to be free. They'll just laugh at you.
Once again, you confuse rights with protections of those rights. If I own a piece of luggage, I continue to own that luggage no matter where I travel: in contrast, Cephus, you would contend that, once I enter a country which does not protect the right to own property, I somehow lose that right. It's like saying that an intelligent person who is knocked unconscious is somehow no longer intelligent. I don't buy that, and you probably don't either.
First, a working definition of right: Rights are justified claims to the protection of persons' important interests. Each right has two components: the rightholder's claim or interest, and the duty of others to forbear from interfering with that claim or interest.
Thesis 1. Persons are masters of their own bodies. This can be derived from any number of sources: Fichtean self-awareness, a Cartesian cogito, a notion of free will, etc. Not only is it, I think, intuitively correct, but I doubt that even a societal rights position could contradict it.
Thesis 1. Persons are masters of their own bodies. This can be derived from any number of sources: Fichtean self-awareness, a Cartesian cogito, a notion of free will, etc. Not only is it, I think, intuitively correct, but I doubt that even a societal rights position could contradict it.
Corollary 1a. No other person has a greater interest in an individual than that individual. If I am master of my own body, then my interest in myself is greater than anyone else's interest in me.
Corollary 1b. No person may transfer this interest to another. This derives from the preceding, and establishes that any right deriving from these bases will be inalienable.
Thesis 2. As master of one's own person, an individual has an interest in preserving his/her own life. This can be derived, again, from free will or perhaps from a Bergsonian notion of time. We can only understand the notion of "rights" by projecting ourselves into the future: if we did not have a notion of a future (and thus a notion of ourselves as being "preserved" or continued into the future), then we would have no notion of "rights."
Corollary 2a. A person has an interest in the means by which that person's life may be preserved. It would be an empty claim if I asserted an interest in my life but did not assert an interest in those things (e.g. food, shelter, etc.) that allow my life to be preserved.
Corollary 2b. No other person has an interest in ending an individual's life that is greater than the individual's interest in preserving it. This is derived from both Thesis 1 and Thesis 2.
Thesis 3. A person is entitled to preserve his/her life as against all other persons. Derived from the above.
Corollary 3. A person is entitled to act as judge of his/her own interest, and punish those who infringe on the person's interest in his/her own life and the means to preserve life. This is derived from both the person's own individuality and interest: it would be an empty claim to assert an interest in one's own life but disclaim any means to prevent others from infringing on that interest. This is a crucial claim for both Hobbes and Locke.
Thesis 4. All persons are under an obligation to refrain from infringing upon an individual's interest in his/her life. If a person has an interest in his/her own life, and if all persons are similarly imbued, and if all are to act as judges of their own interests, then all are bound to respect the interests of others or face punishment. I've probably skipped over some intermediate steps here, but this thesis can be derived from the inherent sociability of humankind (as set forth by Grotius) or innate reason or some sort of categorical imperative (as per Kant).
Thesis 5. Consequently, all persons have a right to life: in that one's interest is a justified claim, and that all others are under a duty to respect that claim.
Once again, you confuse rights with protections of those rights. If I own a piece of luggage, I continue to own that luggage no matter where I travel: in contrast, Cephus, you would contend that, once I enter a country which does not protect the right to own property, I somehow lose that right. It's like saying that an intelligent person who is knocked unconscious is somehow no longer intelligent. I don't buy that, and you probably don't either.
And surely you know that those theorists who assert that society is based upon a social contract also believe that people are born with inherent rights.
I'm not sure I can understand what you're talking about here. But perhaps the example of the right to life, that I set forth above, can clear up some of the confusion.
Pop out of the womb with a deed? That would certainly be a neat trick. But of course you are, once more, confused. The ability to own something is not the same thing as the right to own something. In a purely communistic society, where all property is held in common, no one has the ability to own private property. On the other hand, natural law theorists such as Locke would argue that, even in such a society, everyone maintains the inherent right to own private property. Indeed, in such a case, Locke would argue that everyone had the right to overthrow a government that so blatantly disregarded everyone's natural rights.
QUESTION: Is this your take on things, Joe, or are you engaged in a devil's advocate experiment?
This just doesn't seem like you.
Are you saying that absent one of these two components, there is no "right?"
Obviously that question is begged by component #2 -- which is almost impossible to obtain.
If it can be established that others do not have a duty to forbear from interfering with any alleged "right" -- will you agree that, therefore, it is not a right?
I consider this ASSUMPTION to be gratuitous and (inappropriately) extremely self-serving to the argument.
Suppose I were to propose: Persons are NOT masters of their own bodies. (a notion I pulled out of the air.)
How would you deal with that?
Is an infant "master of its own body?" Is an incompetent? Is a mentally defective individual? Is a comatose person? Are you? Am I?
Is this recognized in law? Can you do with your body whatever you will?
Yes and no. People are not necessarily masters of their own bodies. In theory, yes, but in practice there are many cases where the needs and rights of others supercede the control, or lack thereof, of yourself.
Corollary 1b is absolutely wrong, you can certainly transfer your interest and control to another and we do on a regular basis. Heck, there are plenty of times in our lives when others have a greater interest in us than we do in ourselves as well. This is flawed.
Again flawed. What about suicidal people? What about people in combat? What about people who give their lives for others? As your claims do not apply to all, they cannot be claimed to be 'inherent'.
Corollary 2a, as typically applied, is also flawed....
Again, faulty at the core. A murderer has no right to preserve his/her life against legal prosecution and punishment. A combatant has no right to preserve his/her life against enemy soldiers.
Obligation and practice are two very different things, are they not? As your premises are all flawed to the core, this is hardly worth dealing with. Humans are not necessarily sociable, especially in large groups and crowded conditions.
Flawed terribly and drawn from faulty premises. It must be nice in the ivory towers of philosophers that they can make generalizations about humanity that don't take into account *ALL* of humanity, only the perfect few they wish to study.
Try again though and do try to base your claims on REALITY, not some philosophical fantasy.
If you move to another country where property rights are not protected by law, say a communist country, you cannot rationally continue to claim that you have property rights.
You may want to have rights, you may wish you had rights, but because of the social contract that you agreed to upon moving there, you must follow their laws and therefore, you have no property rights. There's quite a difference between being a US citizen travelling abroad, where your US-guaranteed rights follow you, and being a citizen of another country where there are no rights to begin with.
I'm not interested in theorists, I'm interested in reality. Let's try to have some, shall we?
I've already taken that one apart and hung it out ot dry. Try reality please.
Nor does anyone have the right[/] to own property. You couldn't walk into the Kremlin and demand that your right to own property be accepted. The problem with Locke, etc. is that they do a whole lot of claiming and not much else. Pure philosophy is a nice dodge, you get to say anything you want, build faulty conclusions on top of faulty arguments that have no bearing on reality and claim you actually are saying something intelligent. Doesn't work that way as far as I'm concerned.
If you truly think that you would retain the "right" to own property in country where ownership of property is illegal -- then you are defining "right" in a way that doesn't make sense.
If a person from a country where ownership of property is not legal came to the United States with a suitcase -- and I stole the suitcase, are you saying that the person would have no recourse here, because I did not steal property -- just an unowned suitcase that he/she was carrying?
Would the rules of the other country have precedence over the rules of this country?
The right to own property is granted by the government -- OR MORE EXACTLY the freedom to own property is granted as a right by the government when they make laws that deal with, and allow, property ownership.
On the other hand, I do believe that there must be a distinction between rights and protections of rights.
Look at it this way: if we assume, arguendo, that one has a right to life, then does that right change if society decides to abandon capital punishment for murderers?
Likewise, if I have a right to own private property, then does that right change depending upon whether thieves are jailed or ordered to pay restitution? It seems clear to me that the right remains unchanged, even if the protections for that right change.
And certainly Locke and other theorists would argue that the rights remain even when the protections disappear. An inherent right, then, does not depend on the protections afforded them (and, indeed, the people are permitted to revolt against a government that does not protect inherent rights).
Frank Apisa wrote:Are you saying that absent one of these two components, there is no "right?"
Yes.
Frank Apisa wrote:Obviously that question is begged by component #2 -- which is almost impossible to obtain.
Why do you say this? Certainly, if I have a right to life, then everyone else is under a duty not to infringe upon that right. Or am I missing something?
Frank Apisa wrote:If it can be established that others do not have a duty to forbear from interfering with any alleged "right" -- will you agree that, therefore, it is not a right?
Certainly.
Frank Apisa wrote:Suppose I were to propose: Persons are NOT masters of their own bodies. (a notion I pulled out of the air.)
How would you deal with that?
Quite easily, really. I would ask: who else is the master of your body if not you?
So do I. And I also think there must be a distinction between "rights" and a few temporary protected freedoms that are transient and not inherent.
That latter part is where I am focusing, because I think the former distinction is illusional.
I very strongly disagree with Locke about inherent rights -- and thanks to some of the things you are saying, I am gaining a better understanding of why I do. (Ya gotta have a decent understanding of someone's position in order to disagree with it! :wink: )
Well, (strictly for argument's sake) I would say that would depend. If you are saying that the right to life is guaranteed by a god or by nature -- then you might have a case that it does not. But if you are saying the right is transient and not inherent -- and is a "right" only at the sufferance of society and a government, then YES, it does chance if society changes.
(I'm not sure about the "abandon capital punishment" thing. You seem to have that backwards, but...it doesn't matter to my response.)
I could not disagree more!
Once again you are also including the very large IF the rights are inherent.
But that is what this discussion is about. Are the rights inherent -- guaranteed, so to speak, by a god or by nature?
I argue there is no reason to assume they are. And I have heard no arguments so far that persuades me that they are.
Interesting guesses -- but there doesn't seem to be much meat between those buns.
You are missing a huge something. What makes you say I, or the government, doesn't have a right to infringe on other rights?
Even if you assert your "right to life" is god-given, I can certainly assert a god-given right to take your life if I see fit.
And if your "right to life" is a function of society, your argument holds no water at all.
In any case, this "right to life" is, in my opinion, a strawman.
I see no right to life -- given by government, agreement of humans, gods, or nature -- and most particularly not from gods or nature, who both seem to abhor life.
Try to narrow down to one item here -- and let's handle that. We can get to all the other items in due time. And I promise I'll get back to the remainder of your post later also.
Well then there's nothing left to debate. If Thesis 1 is right in theory, then it is right in the only way that matters. After all, we're dealing with a theory here: if it's right in theory, it's right.
Well, this is just silly. Thesis 2 deals with the fundamental conditions for inherent rights in all persons. Just because some people are hell-bent on killing themselves or placing themselves in danger does not contradict the basic assumption that people, on the whole, have an interest in preserving their lives. After all, if everyone was suicidal, we wouldn't be talking about rights.
You just don't get it, do you? OK, I'll explain it one more time: "inherent" doesn't mean "inviolable." Just because rights can be violated doesn't mean they're not rights.
If you're not interested in discussing philosophy, what are you doing on a philosophy board?
Yes you can, if the right to property is inherent. According to natural rights theory, if a regime does not protect that right, the regime itself is unjust. That doesn't mean that the inherent right is abrogated, it just means that the regime has breached the social contract and, by right, should be replaced.
Not so. If you move to a country that does not protect the right to private property, then it's not incumbent upon you to obey that government simply because the government has violated the social contract.
Arguments based upon "how things are in real life" cannot refute deductive theories. Either point out the logical flaws in my argument or save us both some effort.
