Frank Apisa wrote:I'd love to discuss the Locke stuff -- and if you want to, let's have a go at it. I suspect that the arguments Locke uses reduce to what Ican is doing, but like I said, I don't normally bite off more than I can chew -- and I am not completely sure of Locke's position on the issue.
Offer what you will on that.
I'll respond.
Setting me to work, and on Labor Day weekend! There should be some sort of rule against that.
OK, let me set forth
one theory (albeit admittedly incomplete and imperfect) of natural rights. I'm drawing here primarily on Locke and Hobbes, but I've excluded any theistic references (which is, I think, critical to Locke's thinking, if not his theory), and I start with the right to life (whereas Hobbes starts with liberty and Locke, if I understand him correctly, starts with property).
First, a working definition of
right:
Rights are justified claims to the protection of persons' important interests. Each right has two components: the rightholder's claim or interest, and the duty of others to forbear from interfering with that claim or interest.
Thesis 1. Persons are masters of their own bodies. This can be derived from any number of sources: Fichtean self-awareness, a Cartesian
cogito, a notion of free will, etc. Not only is it, I think, intuitively correct, but I doubt that even a societal rights position could contradict it.
Corollary 1a. No other person has a greater interest in an individual than that individual. If I am master of my own body, then my interest in myself is greater than anyone else's interest in me.
Corollary 1b. No person may transfer this interest to another. This derives from the preceding, and establishes that any right deriving from these bases will be
inalienable.
Thesis 2. As master of one's own person, an individual has an interest in preserving his/her own life. This can be derived, again, from free will or perhaps from a Bergsonian notion of time. We can only understand the notion of "rights" by projecting ourselves into the future: if we did not have a notion of a future (and thus a notion of ourselves as being "preserved" or continued into the future), then we would have no notion of "rights."
Corollary 2a. A person has an interest in the means by which that person's life may be preserved. It would be an empty claim if I asserted an interest in my life but did not assert an interest in those things (e.g. food, shelter, etc.) that allow my life to be preserved.
Corollary 2b. No other person has an interest in ending an individual's life that is greater than the individual's interest in preserving it. This is derived from both Thesis 1 and Thesis 2.
Thesis 3. A person is entitled to preserve his/her life as against all other persons. Derived from the above.
Corollary 3. A person is entitled to act as judge of his/her own interest, and punish those who infringe on the person's interest in his/her own life and the means to preserve life. This is derived from both the person's own individuality and interest: it would be an empty claim to assert an interest in one's own life but disclaim any means to prevent others from infringing on that interest. This is a crucial claim for both Hobbes and Locke.
Thesis 4. All persons are under an obligation to refrain from infringing upon an individual's interest in his/her life. If a person has an interest in his/her own life, and if all persons are similarly imbued, and if all are to act as judges of their own interests, then all are bound to respect the interests of others
or face punishment. I've probably skipped over some intermediate steps here, but this thesis can be derived from the inherent sociability of humankind (as set forth by Grotius) or innate reason or some sort of categorical imperative (as per Kant).
Thesis 5. Consequently, all persons have a right to life: in that one's interest is a justified claim, and that all others are under a duty to respect that claim.
Note: all of this happens
prior to the advent of civil society: i.e. prior to a Hobbesian or Lockean social contract. For both of them, the crucial step toward a civil society was the abandonment of the private right to punish (corollary 3 above). The inherent rights of each individual, however, remained intact.
Now, this is only
one right: as I mentioned before, there is also the rights to property and liberty, as well as others (right to think freely, right to form attachments with others, etc.) that I have not set forth. But this should at least focus this discussion more closely on a
real theory of natural rights, rather than a strawman argument erected by the theory's opponents.