Re: Howard Dean's Confusing Anti-Terrorist Policy
OK, I shouldn't have said "seems to be Dean's suggestion". That is clearly his idiotic alternative to continuing the fight in Iraq....to fight a war long distance from some other country.
Some other country? What country do you think the terrorists all live in now? Terrorvania? The terrorists are everywhere, so basing troops in one country should be just as good as basing them in another.
Of course all terrorists do not live in Iraq or Afghanistan, but a lot of them do. So why not continue the fighting in Iraq? I don't see us fighting them in battles outside of Afghanistan and Iraq right now. Dean and you seem to believe that we can pull out of Iraq to the safety of some Middle East "friendly nation" and then kick back and, at our leisure and comfort, knock off terrorists from afar. You seem to think that by "redeploying" to this friendly country that somehow we'll be able to continue the battle unmolested by IEDs and suicide bombers.
Of what possible benefit could moving from Iraq to some other country do? Other than encouraging the terrorists with some reason to gloat and offering them safe haven in Iraq. Do you think they'll simply ignore us if we move out? Of course not, they'll enjoy the respite we've given them by abandoning Iraq and attack us anew elsewhere.
I don't understand. Why on Earth did you think Howard Dean wants the US to attack from a completely different country?
He stated, "a force". Not "our force", so obviously he doesn't care who they are as long as they are with the US and fighting for the US against the terrorists.
That, I find, is frankly ridiculous. Where's he going to find a force that's friendly to the US in Iraq? Thanks to Bush, nearly everyone in the world either hates the US or is very wary of it.
As far as illegal wars go, the US is in an illegal war because they technically never made an official declariation of war to Saddam. Then again, official declariations of war haven't really been made since World War II, so technically every war since then has been illegal.
The war is not going to be won, but since the US started the conflict it might as well slog on to the very end. Never do things half-arsed (which should really have applied to its invasion of Iraq in the first place).
joefromchicago wrote: slkshock7 wrote:
No, my point was that you, Dean and Osama would judge success for your respective points of view the same way...by the US leaving Iraq. I'm quite sure that there are many other issues, however, that you, Dean and Osama would disagree on.
The US leaving Iraq would not be a success: it would mark the final act in a tragic error.
Again I agree...so why leave??? How does leaving Iraq in any way, shape, or fashion,
advance the war on terror in our favor?
To think that invading Iraq was an advance in the war on terror in the first place was a fallacious idea. There wasn't any connection between Saddam and Osama. Sure, it was nice to get rid of Saddam and everything, but it really wasn't going to advance the War on Terror.
I rue the day, though, when the British created Iraq in the first place in the 1920s. They kind of created a country and shoved a load of different tribes together, most of which hated each other. Then when the British occupied Iraq in 1920 the Arabs and Kurds kinda rebelled...
Does this sound familiar to anyone?
[BACKGROUND: In 1917, following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire, the British occupied Iraq and established a colonial government. The Arab and Kurdish people of Iraq resisted the British occupation, and by 1920 this had developed into a full scale national revolt, which cost the British dearly. As the Iraqi resistance gained strength, the British resorted to increasingly repressive measures, including the use of posion gas.] NB: Because of formatting problems, quotation marks will appear as stars *
All quotes in the excerpt are properly footnoted in the original book, with full references to British archives and papers. Excerpt from pages 179-181 of Simons, Geoff. *IRAQ: FROM SUMER TO SUDAN*. London: St. Martins Press, 1994:
Winston Churchill, as colonial secretary, was sensitive to the cost of policing the Empire; and was in consequence keen to exploit the potential of modern technology. This strategy had particular relevance to operations in Iraq. On 19 February, 1920, before the start of the Arab uprising, Churchill (then Secretary for War and Air) wrote to Sir Hugh Trenchard, the pioneer of air warfare. Would it be possible for Trenchard to take control of Iraq? This would entail *the provision of some kind of asphyxiating bombs calculated to cause disablement of some kind but not death...for use in preliminary operations against turbulent tribes.*
Churchill was in no doubt that gas could be profitably employed against the Kurds and Iraqis (as well as against other peoples in the Empire): *I do not understand this sqeamishness about the use of gas. I am strongly in favour of using poison gas against uncivilised tribes.* Henry Wilson shared Churchills enthusiasm for gas as an instrument of colonial control but the British cabinet was reluctant to sanction the use of a weapon that had caused such misery and revulsion in the First World War. Churchill himself was keen to argue that gas, fired from ground-based guns or dropped from aircraft, would cause *only discomfort or illness, but not death* to dissident tribespeople; but his optimistic view of the effects of gas were mistaken. It was likely that the suggested gas would permanently damage eyesight and *kill children and sickly persons, more especially as the people against whom we intend to use it have no medical knowledge with which to supply antidotes.*
Churchill remained unimpressed by such considerations, arguing that the use of gas, a *scientific expedient,* should not be prevented *by the prejudices of those who do not think clearly*. In the event, gas was used against the Iraqi rebels with excellent moral effect* though gas shells were not dropped from aircraft because of practical difficulties [.....]
Today in 1993 there are still Iraqis and Kurds who remember being bombed and machine-gunned by the RAF in the 1920s. A Kurd from the Korak mountains commented, seventy years after the event: *They were bombing here in the Kaniya Khoran...Sometimes they raided three times a day.* Wing Commander Lewis, then of 30 Squadron (RAF), Iraq, recalls how quite often *one would get a signal that a certain Kurdish village would have to be bombed...*, the RAF pilots being ordered to bomb any Kurd who looked hostile. In the same vein, Squadron-Leader Kendal of 30 Squadron recalls that if the tribespeople were doing something they ought not be doing then you shot them.*