June 10, 2007
Inquiry into sailors capture uncovers breakdown of communications
AN inquiry into the capture by Iran of 15 British sailors and marines has uncovered a series of errors ranging from a breakdown of communications between commanders to a complete lack of understanding of the threat posed by Tehran.
The failure to appreciate the menace, despite a specific warning of the likelihood of the kind of ambush which occurred, meant the helicopter supporting the 15 was withdrawn at a critical moment and no back-up forces were available when the Iranians pounced.
The report has been written by Lieutenant-General Sir Rob Fulton and is now being considered by Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup, the chief of the defence staff, sources said.
It is analytical rather than judgmental in tone but is nevertheless damning in its assessment of events leading up to the incident, the sources added.
Fulton's report is expected to form the basis for a board of inquiry into the incident in March in which the group were held for more than a week by the Iranians.
The boarding party of 15, including one woman, Faye Turney, had been sent out in two rigid inflatable boats from HMS Cornwall, a Type 22 frigate, which was on patrol in the northern Gulf.
They were searching a cargo ship for smuggled goods when they were ambushed and arrested by Iranian fast patrol boats for allegedly being in Iran's territorial waters.
Fulton's report focuses on "training, tactics and procedures" and is understood to have found a breakdown in communication, not just between the Cornwall and the boarding party but also between those planning and controlling search operations.
Fulton's report says those in charge appeared to lack any understanding of the threat posed by Iran despite an incident in June 2004 when eight marines and sailors were detained by the country's forces on the Shatt al-Arab waterway, which separates it from Iraq.
Recommendations drawn up in the wake of that incident ?- which concluded that both helicopter cover and a quick reaction force should always be in place ?- appear not to have been followed.
The failure to make a satisfactory "appreciation" resulted in the lack of any quick reaction force being available and a decision to allow the helicopter to return to Cornwall when the boarding party was most at risk.
Fulton was given access to the post-operational report written by the commander of the Cornwall, the boarding operations plan written by the ship's operations officer and a dossier of the ship's daily routine.
The underlying thrust of Fulton's report is that the Royal Navy personnel were not prepared for their task, the sources said.
"It is clear the personnel involved were not prepared for the incident in which they were captured," said one. "The weak link appears to have been poor planning and poor communication, combined with a poor appreciation of the volatile environment they were working in and the dangers they faced."
Fulton's report does not examine the media-handling operations of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and in particular the decision to allow the captured personnel to sell their stories.
That is the subject of a separate inquiry by Tony Hall, the chief executive of the Royal Opera House and a former head of BBC news.
The MoD confirmed Stirrup was considering Fulton's report. A spokesman said the Hall review would be completed soon and the results of both inquiries announced in Parliament on June 19.
The Times
