blatham wrote:The is/ought question does leap to the fore, but I'm compelled by DeWaal's statement here (which isn't necessarily accurately stated in the writer's preamble sentence).
I doubt that "oughts" float somewhere outside of us, pristine and unanchored in our biological and social natures. Our propensity to conceive in this manner seems surely a consequence of evolutionary processes and nothing else.
What do you make, then, of "oughts" that seem to be acting contrary to our biological imperatives? For instance, suppose a young woman of childbearing years sees an elderly woman drowning in a pond. I think we'd agree that it would be morally praiseworthy (although perhaps not morally obligatory) for the young woman to attempt to save the old woman, even at the risk of her own life. Yet, from a biological standpoint, risking young women to save old women doesn't make much sense, since young women have far more value to the continuation of the species than do post-menopausal women. So, in this case, would you agree with the ethicist who praises the young woman or the biologist who scolds her?
blatham wrote:My understanding of the is/ought question/fallacy is that it arose from Hume's analyses of the extant theology of his period and certain claims it made, rather in the manner that Voltaire satirized the set of assumptions lying beneath "the best of all possible worlds"...god is good, therefore what he has created must be good. Is that you fellas' understanding as well?
Hume's introduction of the "is-ought" problem arose in connection with his views on epistemology, not on theology (you may be thinking of Hume's views on miracles). Hume's point was that, just because something
is, that doesn't mean that it
ought to be. It is easy, however, to misinterpret Hume as saying that an "is" can
never be turned into an "ought." As I have
pointed out elsewhere, Hume certainly believed that as well, but only because he didn't think there were
any "oughts." For people who actually believe that there is such a thing as morality, on the other hand, there is no reason to accept this more radical interpretation of the "is-ought" problem.
As for Voltaire, he was making fun of Leibniz. I don't think Hume ever addressed Leibniz's philosophy, although I'm sure he would have been as dismissive of it as was Voltaire.