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"Moral truths"...arising out of evolutionary mechanisms?

 
 
Thomas
 
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Reply Wed 21 Mar, 2007 02:47 pm
wandeljw wrote:
I would describe the phenomenon of ant heaps and beehives as "instinctive" behavior.

But the societies arising from this behavior are pretty complex and interesting. I don''t see why you have to carve out a dichtonomy between "social" and "instinctive".

wandeljw wrote:
If biologists call it social behavior, I only hope that they do not extend such an explanation to human society.

Again, I don't see the contradiction between "social" and "instinctive". Our social behavior as humans would be impossible without instincts such as love, hate, pride, shame, guilt, envy, and many others. Our social behavior is, to a very large degree, driven by instincts. Don't take my word on this, ask any marriage counselor. I think you are setting up a false choice here.
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wandeljw
 
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Reply Wed 21 Mar, 2007 03:06 pm
Thomas wrote:
Again, I don't see the contradiction between "social" and "instinctive". Our social behavior as humans would be impossible without instincts such as love, hate, pride, shame, guilt, envy, and many others. Our social behavior is, to a very large degree, driven by instincts. Don't take my word on this, ask any marriage counselor. I think you are setting up a false choice here.


I like your explanation, Thomas. It does make sociobiology sound more credible. However, an epistemologist might see distinctions between social and instinctive. (I hope that Fresco will post on this thread.)
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Setanta
 
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Reply Wed 21 Mar, 2007 03:29 pm
Chomsky, as usual, is far to taken up with the excellence of his own understanding--and to such an extent, that the simplest matters escape his attention. That value judgments might be inherent in people, and that other primates may provide evidence of such an evolutionary propensity, is not an unreasonable thing about which to speculate. But that is a matter of "i like"= good, and "i don't like"=bad (or evil, in the more perverse thinkers among us). That is not at all to say that there is any "moral" capacity in us, bu rather only points to a preference in recognized patterns. Morality is a dangerous term, because it has been hi-jacked by holy rollers for thousands of years, and is almost always inferred to refer to an absolute, eternal value. This is only value judgment based on preference.

The lions kills your child, you think "bad, evil lion!" The lion thinks (in whatever manner thought processes proceed in the leonine brain) "child, food, good!" It's a matter of subjective judgment, not absolutes.
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joefromchicago
 
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Reply Wed 21 Mar, 2007 03:52 pm
blatham wrote:
The is/ought question does leap to the fore, but I'm compelled by DeWaal's statement here (which isn't necessarily accurately stated in the writer's preamble sentence).
Quote:

I doubt that "oughts" float somewhere outside of us, pristine and unanchored in our biological and social natures. Our propensity to conceive in this manner seems surely a consequence of evolutionary processes and nothing else.

What do you make, then, of "oughts" that seem to be acting contrary to our biological imperatives? For instance, suppose a young woman of childbearing years sees an elderly woman drowning in a pond. I think we'd agree that it would be morally praiseworthy (although perhaps not morally obligatory) for the young woman to attempt to save the old woman, even at the risk of her own life. Yet, from a biological standpoint, risking young women to save old women doesn't make much sense, since young women have far more value to the continuation of the species than do post-menopausal women. So, in this case, would you agree with the ethicist who praises the young woman or the biologist who scolds her?

blatham wrote:
My understanding of the is/ought question/fallacy is that it arose from Hume's analyses of the extant theology of his period and certain claims it made, rather in the manner that Voltaire satirized the set of assumptions lying beneath "the best of all possible worlds"...god is good, therefore what he has created must be good. Is that you fellas' understanding as well?

Hume's introduction of the "is-ought" problem arose in connection with his views on epistemology, not on theology (you may be thinking of Hume's views on miracles). Hume's point was that, just because something is, that doesn't mean that it ought to be. It is easy, however, to misinterpret Hume as saying that an "is" can never be turned into an "ought." As I have pointed out elsewhere, Hume certainly believed that as well, but only because he didn't think there were any "oughts." For people who actually believe that there is such a thing as morality, on the other hand, there is no reason to accept this more radical interpretation of the "is-ought" problem.

As for Voltaire, he was making fun of Leibniz. I don't think Hume ever addressed Leibniz's philosophy, although I'm sure he would have been as dismissive of it as was Voltaire.
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joefromchicago
 
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Reply Wed 21 Mar, 2007 04:02 pm
Thomas wrote:
Again, I don't see the contradiction between "social" and "instinctive". Our social behavior as humans would be impossible without instincts such as love, hate, pride, shame, guilt, envy, and many others.

Those aren't instincts, they're emotions. Instinct is an unlearned behavior. Humans may have some instincts (fear of heights, for instance, might be one of them), but not many. Emotions, on the other hand, are most definitely learned behaviors. "Feral children," for instance, seldom exhibit what we would recognize as love, hate, pride, shame, guilt, or envy.
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stuh505
 
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Reply Wed 21 Mar, 2007 04:25 pm
joefromchicago wrote:
Thomas wrote:
Again, I don't see the contradiction between "social" and "instinctive". Our social behavior as humans would be impossible without instincts such as love, hate, pride, shame, guilt, envy, and many others.

Those aren't instincts, they're emotions. Instinct is an unlearned behavior. Humans may have some instincts (fear of heights, for instance, might be one of them), but not many. Emotions, on the other hand, are most definitely learned behaviors. "Feral children," for instance, seldom exhibit what we would recognize as love, hate, pride, shame, guilt, or envy.


Emotions aren't instincts, but we have instincts to feel emotions under certain situations. I'm surprised that anyone would disagree with that...
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fresco
 
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Reply Wed 21 Mar, 2007 06:17 pm
http://www.able2know.com/forums/viewtopic.php?t=85338&highlight=
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joefromchicago
 
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Reply Wed 21 Mar, 2007 06:44 pm
stuh505 wrote:
Emotions aren't instincts, but we have instincts to feel emotions under certain situations. I'm surprised that anyone would disagree with that...

I'm surprised anyone would say something so inane.
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stuh505
 
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Reply Wed 21 Mar, 2007 08:14 pm
joefromchicago wrote:
stuh505 wrote:
Emotions aren't instincts, but we have instincts to feel emotions under certain situations. I'm surprised that anyone would disagree with that...

I'm surprised anyone would say something so inane.


I'm not surprised you would be so inane.
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fresco
 
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Reply Thu 22 Mar, 2007 08:22 am
Blatham,

I'm just drawing your attention to my link above to the original kuvasz thread on this issue.
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fresco
 
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Reply Thu 22 Mar, 2007 08:31 am
From "Do Cats Have Emotions ?" Sarah Hartwell.

Quote:
"Emotion" is the term we use for feelings, some of which are instinctive and some of which are learned from those around us as we conform to society's expectations and norms. Human emotions range from "primitive" feelings such as disgust, rage, fear and lust to "complex" emotions compassion and jealousy.

Recent studies, especially in fields such as neuropsychology, show that the more "primitive" or basic emotions have a physiological basis and may be caused by chemical stimuli (such as sexual attractant scents called pheromones) or visual stimuli. Basic emotions appear to cause chemical changes in the body in response to a stimulus.
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wandeljw
 
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Reply Thu 22 Mar, 2007 08:56 am
fresco wrote:
From "Do Cats Have Emotions ?" Sarah Hartwell.

Quote:
"Emotion" is the term we use for feelings, some of which are instinctive and some of which are learned from those around us as we conform to society's expectations and norms. Human emotions range from "primitive" feelings such as disgust, rage, fear and lust to "complex" emotions compassion and jealousy.

Recent studies, especially in fields such as neuropsychology, show that the more "primitive" or basic emotions have a physiological basis and may be caused by chemical stimuli (such as sexual attractant scents called pheromones) or visual stimuli. Basic emotions appear to cause chemical changes in the body in response to a stimulus.


This is a helpful distinction, fresco. What is your opinion on whether morality can have a biological, neurological, or genetic basis?
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stuh505
 
  1  
Reply Thu 22 Mar, 2007 09:00 am
http://www.able2know.com/forums/viewtopic.php?t=93418
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fresco
 
  1  
Reply Thu 22 Mar, 2007 09:15 am
wandeljw

I think that the evidence from primates implies that some aspects of "morality" are genetic. In particular differential behaviour to "in-group" and "out-group" individuals by primates is reflected in differential degrees of empathy exhibited by humans with respect to a "social distance scale". However since humans can simultaneously be members of different groups (e.g. family and citizen) we can envisage "moral dilemmas" of the sort suggested by Joe's "Old Woman Drowning" scenario, where responsibilities as "family carer" are weighed against responsibilities as "caring citizen". In essence however "the dilemma" rests on the assumption of a single coherent "self in turmoil" yet in in reality we seem to posses "multi-faceted selves" which can jump either way in the event.
The fallacy is to assume both "morality" and "self" are fixed.
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wandeljw
 
  1  
Reply Thu 22 Mar, 2007 09:59 am
I agree that there is evidence that some aspects of morality and maybe some aspects of social behavior can be attributed to genetic inheritance. In my opinion, the findings are few and offer only a very limited explanation. I wonder if an entire discipline for sociobiology is justified. Edward O. Wilson's claim that "the time has come for ethics to be removed temporarily from the hands of the philosophers and biologicized" sounds ridiculous to me.
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fresco
 
  1  
Reply Thu 22 Mar, 2007 11:01 am
wandeljw

I agree that straight reductionism is philosophically suspect. However we might bear in mind that "the life sciences" have moved on somewhat from reductionism relying on linear causal models towards "systems behaviour" which is modelled on holistic functionalism involving nested telelogical mechanisms serving different levels of "structure" (cell, individual organism, group etc).
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blatham
 
  1  
Reply Thu 22 Mar, 2007 03:44 pm
joefromchicago said
Quote:
What do you make, then, of "oughts" that seem to be acting contrary to our biological imperatives? For instance, suppose a young woman of childbearing years sees an elderly woman drowning in a pond. I think we'd agree that it would be morally praiseworthy (although perhaps not morally obligatory) for the young woman to attempt to save the old woman, even at the risk of her own life. Yet, from a biological standpoint, risking young women to save old women doesn't make much sense, since young women have far more value to the continuation of the species than do post-menopausal women. So, in this case, would you agree with the ethicist who praises the young woman or the biologist who scolds her?


The "seem" in your first sentence is the kicker. It is by no means a given that the biologist would have reason, in the context of the presumed argument, to so scold. All we need to assume is that evolutionary advantages accrue (generally, but that's what counts). If empathy for those around one, even when personal risk or risk to offspring is involved, works out better than "selfishness" for survival of individual and offspring more often than not, then you are there. And that's clearly not difficult to imagine.

Re Hume...I'll defer to your and thomas' knowledge of what the fellow was up to at the time but surely epistemological inquiry at that period (and because it was Hume) would run smack into the contemporary theological monopoly on what was 'true' and how that might be established.
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blatham
 
  1  
Reply Thu 22 Mar, 2007 03:47 pm
fresco wrote:
Blatham,

I'm just drawing your attention to my link above to the original kuvasz thread on this issue.


fresco

Very nice to bump into you after all this time. I don't have so much time as previously, given circumstance and my mission from god to kneecap a contemporary political leader, so I don't hang out on the religion/philosophy threads like I once did. Thanks for the link to kuv's thread.
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blatham
 
  1  
Reply Thu 22 Mar, 2007 04:08 pm
joefromchicago wrote:
Thomas wrote:
Again, I don't see the contradiction between "social" and "instinctive". Our social behavior as humans would be impossible without instincts such as love, hate, pride, shame, guilt, envy, and many others.

Those aren't instincts, they're emotions. Instinct is an unlearned behavior. Humans may have some instincts (fear of heights, for instance, might be one of them), but not many. Emotions, on the other hand, are most definitely learned behaviors. "Feral children," for instance, seldom exhibit what we would recognize as love, hate, pride, shame, guilt, or envy.


As to fear of heights...there seems to be no maybe about that one. There was a wonderful experiment done some years back where infants were placed on one spot on the floor and had to crawl across a clear glass plate with a significant fall visible below, to get to mommy. They skitter merrily across until a specific and narrow pre-verbal age range, then they balk and show other signs of fearfulness.

Though instinct and emotion are not the same, I'm not sure how our differentiation is much helpful here. Again, if we consider language, it would certainly be the case that feral children wouldn't develop that either. In either case, propensity or capability would remain dormant and unrealized outside of a social context.
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joefromchicago
 
  1  
Reply Thu 22 Mar, 2007 06:08 pm
blatham wrote:
The "seem" in your first sentence is the kicker. It is by no means a given that the biologist would have reason, in the context of the presumed argument, to so scold. All we need to assume is that evolutionary advantages accrue (generally, but that's what counts). If empathy for those around one, even when personal risk or risk to offspring is involved, works out better than "selfishness" for survival of individual and offspring more often than not, then you are there. And that's clearly not difficult to imagine.

It's quite possible that empathy is, in the grand scheme of things, more of a biological imperative than safeguarding the breeding stock. I offer no opinion on that, except to point out that it is relatively easy to come up with all sorts of rationalizations for concluding that what we accept as morally desirable is also a biologically advantageous. But then the danger is to argue that, because biologists say that biological imperatives give us the rules for morality, we can conclude that everything that is moral is also biologically imperative. That is a bootstrapping argument.

blatham wrote:
Re Hume...I'll defer to your and thomas' knowledge of what the fellow was up to at the time but surely epistemological inquiry at that period (and because it was Hume) would run smack into the contemporary theological monopoly on what was 'true' and how that might be established.

Hume was a rather notorious atheist, and so he wasn't terribly concerned about theology or theologically based epistemologies. He was much more interested in countering Descartes and Berkeley.

blatham wrote:
As to fear of heights...there seems to be no maybe about that one. There was a wonderful experiment done some years back where infants were placed on one spot on the floor and had to crawl across a clear glass plate with a significant fall visible below, to get to mommy. They skitter merrily across until a specific and narrow pre-verbal age range, then they balk and show other signs of fearfulness.

I'm familiar with that experiment.

blatham wrote:
Though instinct and emotion are not the same, I'm not sure how our differentiation is much helpful here. Again, if we consider language, it would certainly be the case that feral children wouldn't develop that either. In either case, propensity or capability would remain dormant and unrealized outside of a social context.

I think that's correct.
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