"Moral truths"...arising out of evolutionary mechanisms?

joefromchicago wrote:

blatham wrote:
Though instinct and emotion are not the same, I'm not sure how our differentiation is much helpful here. Again, if we consider language, it would certainly be the case that feral children wouldn't develop that either. In either case, propensity or capability would remain dormant and unrealized outside of a social context.

I think that's correct.

blatham and joe,

I am still interested in whether you believe a biologically based propensity for moral behavior has a stronger effect than moral behavior that is learned.

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joefromchicago

Quote:

It's quite possible that empathy is, in the grand scheme of things, more of a biological imperative than safeguarding the breeding stock. I offer no opinion on that, except to point out that it is relatively easy to come up with all sorts of rationalizations for concluding that what we accept as morally desirable is also a biologically advantageous. But then the danger is to argue that, because biologists say that biological imperatives give us the rules for morality, we can conclude that everything that is moral is also biologically imperative. That is a bootstrapping argument.

As a 'generalist' (translation: charming dilletante) I have never much cared for people who make me work.

I am trying, not very successfuly, to understand what 'danger' you see here (sentence in red). It appears to be that we might be at risk of considering the two things as being identical and through such simplification, denying the complexities of moral dilemmas? Help me, joe, in this hour of need.

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wandeljw wrote:

joefromchicago wrote:
blatham wrote:
Though instinct and emotion are not the same, I'm not sure how our differentiation is much helpful here. Again, if we consider language, it would certainly be the case that feral children wouldn't develop that either. In either case, propensity or capability would remain dormant and unrealized outside of a social context.

I think that's correct.

blatham and joe,

I am still interested in whether you believe a biologically based propensity for moral behavior has a stronger effect than moral behavior that is learned.

wande

Well, if the language analogy is in fact appropriate here as a measure or commparison, how would you answer a similar question using that as your frame of reference? Regardless of any propensity and capability for language use, it simply wouldn't arise outside of the social context. It seems, if one could imagine the situation, that if a human child was shut away in a lab with the phsical necessities of survival provided but without any slightest interaction with another sentient creature, moral issues just wouldn't arise, because they are social issues.

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In my opinion, blatham, learning has a stronger effect on both language ability and moral capability. I consider biological propensities for any behavior to be less significant. To me, the findings of sociobiology provide only a very limited explanation of behavior.

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wandeljw wrote:

In my opinion, blatham, learning has a stronger effect on both language ability and moral capability. I consider biological propensities for any behavior to be less significant. To me, the findings of sociobiology provide only a very limited explanation of behavior.

Well, I think that is so as well. Though an Xray of your body will show only a very limited picture of the total, but you'd be a pool of mush with that limited thing removed by, say, warty aliens or Barbara Bush.

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blatham,

I see the point that you are making. My hostility towards sociobiology comes from being a graduate student in the 1970's when sociobiologists were declaring how important their field is. One sociobiologist, perhaps Wilson or Dawkins, proclaimed that someday all academic disciplines will become only subfields within sociobiology.

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I continue to be amazed that people consider the behavior alluded to can reasonably be described as "moral behavior." Does anyone care to give what can be considered a plausible definition of "moral behavior" in this context?

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wandeljw wrote:

blatham and joe,

I am still interested in whether you believe a biologically based propensity for moral behavior has a stronger effect than moral behavior that is learned.

Not only do I think that learned behavior has a stronger effect than any biologically based propensity for behavior, but it is also the only thing that we can conceivably describe as "moral" behavior.

To illustrate: suppose all humans are born with a biological propensity to kill (which is certainly not very farfetched). In one particular instance, a person with that propensity (call him Darwin) murders someone else (call him Huxley). Given that Darwin had no control over that biological propensity which furnished the basis for his action, can we say that his murder of Huxley was morally blameworthy? And if we can call it morally blameworthy, is it because Darwin had the propensity or because he chose to act on that propensity?

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blatham wrote:

joefromchicago
Quote:
It's quite possible that empathy is, in the grand scheme of things, more of a biological imperative than safeguarding the breeding stock. I offer no opinion on that, except to point out that it is relatively easy to come up with all sorts of rationalizations for concluding that what we accept as morally desirable is also a biologically advantageous. But then the danger is to argue that, because biologists say that biological imperatives give us the rules for morality, we can conclude that everything that is moral is also biologically imperative. That is a bootstrapping argument.

As a 'generalist' (translation: charming dilletante) I have never much cared for people who make me work.

I am trying, not very successfuly, to understand what 'danger' you see here (sentence in red). It appears to be that we might be at risk of considering the two things as being identical and through such simplification, denying the complexities of moral dilemmas? Help me, joe, in this hour of need.

Suppose a biologist argued that all moral rules have a biological basis. He then cites a specific moral rule -- let's say the rule that it is wrong to lie. No doubt the biologist can fashion any number of reasons to explain why it is biologically advantageous for humans not to lie. The danger, though, is to argue backwards and to use that explanation as support for the assumption that all moral rules have a biological basis. The conclusion can't provide support for the assumption on which the conclusion is based. That's bootstrapping.

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The significance of Hauser's thesis lies it its use of the Chomsky model of "a universal grammar". Such a concept sees the propensity (competence) to acquire "rule structures" as "hard wired". Hauser extrapolates from "linguistic universals" to "moral universals". The implication for a major philosophical issue regarding morality is that it supports moral absolutism (whence "truth") rather than moral relativism and for this reason Hauser claims to "remove it" from the hands of philosophers. This appears to be similar to removing discussion of the formation of the earth from the hands of theologists. Hauser's claim is clearly within the paradigm of "structuralism" whereby all social phenomena from language to myths and customs are subjected to "universal elemental analysis".

It is therefore not merely particular pieces of biological or evolutionary evidence which support the claim, but the structuralist paradgm which directs the gathering of such evidence. The situation can be compared to the gathering of linguistic "data" pre and post Chomsky, where the Behaviourists had failed to "notice" certain aspects of children's speech which were indicative of the nature of "grammar".

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Setanta wrote:

Does anyone care to give what can be considered a plausible definition of "moral behavior" in this context?

That which tends to increase the potential for mankind's thrive-ability such as:

1) autonomous extraterrestrial colonies
2) small ecologically-unobtrusive earth-based human population
3) planetary meteor protection

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fresco wrote:

This appears to be similar to removing discussion of the formation of the earth from the hands of theologists. Hauser's claim is clearly within the paradigm of "structuralism" whereby all social phenomena from language to myths and customs are subjected to "universal elemental analysis".

I am not sure this is a good analogy. Geology used physical evidence to remove the discussion of earth's formation from theology.

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How could a linguistic expert (Chomsky) substantiate claims as to evolutionary predispositions presumably of a subjective moral capacity?

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Chomsky doesn't!..... Hauser does.

In "scientific method" this is an example of an attempt of "exploration ot neutral analogy". Hauser takes takes Chomsky's model for "grammatical rules" and applies it tho "moral rules", in the same way that the model of a heliocentric solar system was applied to sub-atomic particles.

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OK then blatham seems to have got it wrong:

blatham wrote:

Chomsky (and some others) have suggested that the moral capacity/propensity may be resident in us in much the same manner as language capabilities/propensities, that we are "hardwired" for it.

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Okay..... point taken!

Chomsky is making "general structuralist suggestions" but Hauser "does the work" on the substantiation.

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Thanks, I see now!

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BTW, I don't know if Hauser goes into this but it may be that Chomsky's "ambigious sentences" (Visiting relatives can be a bore)
are directly comparable to "moral dilemmas" (Old woman drowning)
Chomsky's solution is to appeal to separate "deep structures" triggered by surrounding context. In other words in performance there is no "ambiguity". The implication for "moralty" is that in the contextual moment there are "no moral dilemmas". i.e. philosophical analysis is an epiphenomenon of abstraction from social context.

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I have lots to learn and your posts are much appreciated!

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Chumly wrote:

How could a linguistic expert (Chomsky) substantiate claims as to evolutionary predispositions presumably of a subjective moral capacity?

First of all, it's not a claim at this point, it's a hypothesis. Second, most linguists are also experts on the neurological structures by which our brains support language. So the hypothesis that we have similar neurological features supporting our sense of justice, is not a terrible stretch of Chomsky's expertise. I don't support Chomsky's politics one bit. Nevertheless, I respect that he's one of the most outstanding linguists out there, so I'm willing to follow at least tentatively his hypothesis that something like his "universal grammar" applies to our morals.

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"Moral truths"...arising out of evolutionary mechanisms?

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