FOLLOWING THE EUROPEAN UNION

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Despite this deal, the road ahead remains rocky indeed

Turkey's bid for European membership is full of contradictions

Martin Woollacott
Saturday December 18, 2004
The Guardian

The European Union and Turkey took a fateful decision this week. Unease, pride, anger and an element of guile are evident on each side. The settlement which it brings over Cyprus - much as it is to be desired - should not conceal from us the collisions between different values, and between the aims of decision makers and the instincts of their peoples, that lie ahead.
Nothing illustrated so well the disjunction between carefully formulated common aspirations and the reality of divergent values than the situation earlier this year. A final assessment of Turkey's application was being undertaken at about the same time as the European parliament was revolting against Jose Manuel Barroso's choice of Rocco Buttiglione as justice commissioner. The objections to Buttiglione were that he held traditional Catholic views on homosexuality and the role of women. Can we imagine for a moment how a majority of Turkish MEPs, had they been present, would have voted on the issue?

The party from which most of them would have been drawn had just withdrawn a proposal to criminalise adultery because it had discovered to its surprise that the measure was offensive to the union. Tayyip Erdogan, the Turkish prime minister, nevertheless made it clear that Turkey had no intention of trading its social and cultural values for EU membership. And why should he not do so, as a conservative Muslim? Yet the same MEPs who were outraged by Buttiglione's views have now voted for accession negotiations with Turkey to begin. They are either oblivious to contradiction, or they conceive of the negotiations as a project to transform Turkey into a country happy to be in the close company of a Britain soon to abolish the blasphemy laws, or a Spain moving to endorse gay marriage.

That may happen. After all, 30 years ago Spain, Italy, and Ireland, to take just three examples, were societies that appeared to be deeply religious, and they appear much less so today. But that does not mean Turkey will go in the same direction, and it is not the direction in which Erdogan and his Justice and Development party, the AKP, wish to take their country.

When the AKP's predecessor, the Welfare party, came to power in 1996, a party journal declared: "For almost a century, the foes of Islam have governed Turkey. Now a new period begins." Erdogan clearly has no intention of confronting the Kemalist division between religion and the state, but a shift of power toward the religious and, in particular, toward the religiously educated has been obvious in Turkey for at least the past 10 years.

The irony is that the European political forces opposed to Turkey's entry because it is Muslim are precisely those likely to be in broad agreement with the conservative social views of Erdogan and his party, and with their conviction of the centrality of religious faith. Equally, the political forces in Europe most in favour of Turkish entry are the left and liberal groups least likely to share such views.

Surely there are grounds for trouble here. The stage is set for a struggle in which Turkey, at least as long as the AKP is in charge, tries to take from Europe what it wants in terms of economic and security advantage, and tries to change what it deems essential as little as possible - while Europe demands its pound of liberal flesh. It is not only religious values that will be at issue, but deeply established habits of Turkish nationalism, such as the denial that anything happened to the Armenians worse than the general suffering of all the peoples affected by the collapse of the Ottoman empire - a position that must surely change before Turks can claim to have purged themselves of past sins.

On the surface, there seems to be a sharp contrast between European public opinion, in the main dubious about Turkish entry, and Turkish public opinion, strongly in favour. But if you go deeper, the asymmetry is not so obvious. It can be argued that Europe is a curiously unifying factor in Turkey only because so many different, competing and sometimes mutually hostile groups see it as a solution to their problems, a way to move on the long game of modern Turkish politics in their favour.

For ethnic minorities such as the Kurds, and religious minorities such as Orthodox Christians, Europe could provide a guarantee of secure minority status, even autonomy. For the business class, at least the upper tier of it, the present arrangements with the union have already brought benefits, and more are in prospect. For those sections of the working class in western Turkey, which already have strong European connections, full EU membership would make easier the dual existence that is already a reality for their families.

For Turkish liberals Europe is a hedge against both religious extremism and secular authoritarianism. For the armed forces, uneasy about American policy in the Middle East, Europe may represent a way of reducing its US links. And, very important, for Turkey's decision-makers, who worry about population growth, unemployment and what will happen to the rural masses, Europe is the only visible answer.

For the Turkish political class, moreover, Europe was a policy that, pursued in the right way, could bring permanent advantage to the party that brought home the prize. Against the expectations of only a few years ago, it is the Islamic party that seems closest to this goal. Having for years opposed entry and talked about an Islamic common market as an alternative, it shrewdly stole the European clothes of the secular parties and presented itself to the electorate as able both to maintain traditional and religious values and to reel in what Europe had to offer. Its coup has, however, put it in an exposed position, for it must now deliver this contradictory package. It has also left the Turkish party system in a state of disarray, which is not often noted in discussions of Turkish democracy.

There are Turks who feel strongly European, and there is a true European sense in some classes in that country. But "If not Europe, what?" calculations, and a prickly "We're as good as you" sentiment also mark the Turkish approach. This latter feeling appears to have ruled out the halfway house of a special relationship. Thus Turkey is embracing Europe less in enthusiasm than with a mix of pride and desperation, while Europe is embracing Turkey with reluctance and a degree of fear. Not fear of Turkey, but of its own population, because there is no getting away from the fact that this will be another big thing the European elite has done that its peoples on the whole do not want.

The ways in which, through lost referendums and other national votes, this could damage the European project are clear enough. A rocky road indeed.

Should I start digging my bomb shelter now, for example?

I have read that the muslim proportion of the population of the EC is 3% and if Turkey joins it will be 20%.

Given that some American right-wingers have an enmity towards France now, and also the Franco-German axis if I can put it that way, the partnership between those countries within the EC, do you think that America, feeling threatened by this, and resenting the creation of a large and growing economy to rival theirs, will actually begin to see the EC as a threat, inimical to their interests, and an actual enemy of their republic?

That being so, how fast could that develop? Should I start digging my bomb shelter now, for example?

Turkey is a done deal. Albania will be the next one, probably in 10 to 20 years.

I guarantee that albania will come in at some time. Watch this space!

Romania and Bulgaria in the EU in 2007. No comment!!!!!