Saddam is probably the only person capable of restoring order in Iraq. I think he should be allowed to stand as a candidate in the January elections.
Thomas wrote:This may be true as a matter of rich-country immigration policies, which tend to court rich, educated immigrants and try to repel the poor ones. But as a matter of poor-country preferences, your claim is inconsistent with what I see when I look around. It isn't the Polish elite that comes and picks strawberries in German fields every summer. It isn't the Maroccan elite that harvests the grapes for Spanish wine. It isn't the Mexican elite that sits Texan babies and wipes Californian toilets. It isn't the Lithuanian elite that prostitutes itself on the streets of Munich.
Just because they fulfill lowly-paid, lowly-qualified jobs here, doesnt mean they are themselves actually lowly-educated or lowly-qualified.
Yes, many of the Ukrainians and Bulgarians who work in the greenhouses here are educated much better than for picking strawberries - they were educated to be nurses or teachers for example, but those jobs couldnt be found (or lived on) at home.
Emigrants are habitually young. Emigrants are habitually those who think they'd actually stand a chance of succeeding in the West. They are habitually those who are frustrated by the lack of opportunities to get on in life in their home count(r)y - i.e., those who
do want to get on in life still. They might not necessarily be the exact cream of the crop a Western headhunter would go harvesting for, but they're definitely not those with the least opportunities. How many 50-year-old laid-off GDR miners have you seen migrate to Munich? Those stay, creating an ever more stagnant economy and overburdened social system at home.
Same when it comes to international migration. Asylum-seekers (the only foreigners that, apart from family reunificators and those particularly sought out from abroad by companies here, actually stand a chance of getting in) are on average quite highly-educated. That makes sense, because it costs money, skill and effort to get here as an asylum-seeker: you've got to have saved up money (or collected from family, fellow villagers etc) to pay off the smugglers, to pay for the travel, it helps if you speak a word or two in another language - it's not the least-qualified who succeed in making it all the way here, even
if they do eventually end up doing shitty jobs near you. It is actually even used by some as an argument against freeer asylum-rules: they would basically rob the developing countries of their best and brightest.
Now it's true that there
is a certain financial flow back to the out-migration country, of course, in terms of emigrants sending money back. The amount actually already supercedes what is given in development aid. Of course, it doesn't go into new industrial or transport infrastructure or anything - if things go well, it heps family members at home set up another new market stand or grocery store. Less favourably, it merely maintains them like Social Security maintains the unemployed. It also holds true much more for certain countries (Arab and African countries) than for others (Eastern Europe). And I very strongly doubt it goes at all for the former GDR (migrants from Mecklenburg FedExing back a third of their montly wage to family back in Rostock? I doubt it ...).
Steve (as 41oo) wrote:Saddam is probably the only person capable of restoring order in Iraq. I think he should be allowed to stand as a candidate in the January elections.
The Shi'ites would absolutely sh*t themselves, of course, but that would be hilarious . . . i would suggest that the bulk of the organized insurgency is perpetrated by Ba'atists. The dimmer bulbs among the conservatives like to contend that "it is better to fight them there than here." This assumes, of course, that the Iraqis love us for having liberated them, and that the insurgency is the product of Islamo-facists (favorite term of one of our dearly loved members--Chuckypoo) coming in from outside the country.
I rather doubt that the genie can be put back in the bottle. I am thoroughly disgusted by the lack of any coherent plan for the occupation of Iraq. It is particularly disgusting given that the PNAC envisions basing our military in southwest Asia. Under the circumstance, Rumsfeld, Cheney and Wolfowitz--all founding members of PNAC--certainly don't inspire confidence in their agenda, having demonstrated no capacity for intelligently implementing that loony program.
I think we should continue this elsewhere Set as its not exactly following the Europena Union, although as it expands to take in Turkey, another step south east would include Iraq....
When will the Iraquis apply for membership?
Makes as much sense to me as Turkish membership if you ask me. I was always taught Turkey was Asia Minor. So its going to be the European and Asia Minor Union. So why not the European Asia Minor and Mesopotamia Union, including bits of Russia? Does geography play no part in the EU?
nimh wrote: Just because they fulfill lowly-paid, lowly-qualified jobs here, doesnt mean they are themselves actually lowly-educated or lowly-qualified.
As a matter of logic, that's true. But I'm afraid neither you nor I know every immigrant and his status in his home country, and press reports cannot be relied on to provide a representative sample. With this in mind, do you have actual statistics on the wage distribution of emigrants compared to the stay-at-homers?
nimh wrote:It is actually even used by some as an argument against freeer asylum-rules: they would basically rob the developing countries of their best and brightest.
Do you agree? Do you think this is a good argument for overriding the emigrants' choices?
nimh wrote:And I very strongly doubt it goes at all for the former GDR (migrants from Mecklenburg FedExing back a third of their montly wage to family back in Rostock? I doubt it ...).
So do I, but the most important equilbrating mechanism isn't that emigrants send money home. It's that emigration reduces the supply of labor in the home country, causing the laws of supply and demand to raise its price -- also known as the wages of those who stayed at home. As I said, I haven't yet looked at the statistical evidence on whether it works that way for modern migration, but there's good statistical evidence that it did work that way during first wave of globalization, circa 1860-1914. And the laws of supply and demand haven't changed since then.
We have a saying here, forgive the crudity . . . "Money talks, bullsh*t walks." I rather suspect that to be the motivating factor in such arrangements, for whatever nonsense the politicos spew at us . . .
nimh wrote: How many 50-year-old laid-off GDR miners have you seen migrate to Munich?
No miners so far. The Munich mining industry is such a well-kept secret that even we in Munich don't know it exists. But I did see plenty of 50-year-old East German construction workers. Do they count by your standards?
nimh wrote:Same when it comes to international migration. Asylum-seekers (the only foreigners that, apart from family reunificators and those particularly sought out from abroad by companies here, actually stand a chance of getting in) are on average quite highly-educated. That makes sense, because it costs money, skill and effort to get here as an asylum-seeker:
That's true because rich-country (anti-)immigration policies
make it expensive -- which is a point I conceded in, and you quoted from, my earlier post.
Thomas wrote:As a matter of logic, that's true. But I'm afraid neither you nor I know every immigrant and his status in his home country, and press reports cannot be relied on to provide a representative sample. With this in mind, do you have actual statistics on the wage distribution of emigrants compared to the stay-at-homers?
Statistics on what the emigrants earned at home compared to what those who did not emigrate earn? No, I don't have them and I doubt they exist. But although it's true that press reports provide anecdotal evidence, it's the best we have and from everything I've read it surely points in a specific direction. Barring the odd category (girls who let themselves be lured into prostitution set-ups, for example), it most certainly does not seem to be the lumpen proletariat that's coming here, not even to the greenhouse work. The odd Pole or two I spoke to here was much better educated than the busking they did here suggested, and as for asylum-seekers and their level of education, you can ask anyone who works for Refugee Work (two of my friends worked there).
Thomas wrote:nimh wrote:It is actually even used by some as an argument against freeer asylum-rules: they would basically rob the developing countries of their best and brightest.
Do you agree? Do you think this is a good argument for overriding the emigrants' choices?
Yes, I agree, no, I don't think it should be used to override their choice to emigrate anyway. It signals a problem, and the solution is not to forbid them from emigrating but to make it less necessary for them to do so. (Yes, a daunting task).
Thomas wrote:nimh wrote:And I very strongly doubt it goes at all for the former GDR (migrants from Mecklenburg FedExing back a third of their montly wage to family back in Rostock? I doubt it ...).
So do I, but the most important equilbrating mechanism isn't that emigrants send money home. It's that emigration reduces the supply of labor in the home country, causing the laws of supply and demand to raise its price -- also known as the wages of those who stayed at home.
All depends on who's leaving though, doesn't it? The problem in the former GDR is twofold: there is a lack of demand, period - and there is a mismatch between the demand and the supply. Those jobs that
are available, or that reconstructed or newly established businesses have to offer, are mostly services, mostly mid- or hi-tech. Supply for those jobs still outweighs demand, and the departure of some of exactly the people who would meet these demands will make it easier for the remaining limited selection of people who do to get those jobs. But the overwhelming number of people currently un- or underemployed in the GDR do not fit in this category anyway, which is also why they see little sense in trying their luck in Munich or Freiburg either. To solve that, you need serious retraining and labour reintegration projects, which, yes, cost money and thus require regional development funds.
Thomas wrote:As I said, I haven't yet looked at the statistical evidence on whether it works that way for modern migration, but there's good statistical evidence that it did work that way during first wave of globalization, circa 1860-1914. And the laws of supply and demand haven't changed since then.
I would say they have. The basic underlying principle, perhaps, not, but the nature of what demand and supply is of and for and who would thus react to it how and where should all have changed.
Still, it's an interesting point, for me. I know little of that historical era, but as far as I remember the main countries of out-migration at the time were the less developed areas of the Habsburg Empire, Southern Italy, perhaps Greece and Ireland. You say that the wages in those regions actually went up (more than the average growth would have had it grow, migration or not), in 1860-1914?
Big nations 'examine’ Russian’s proposals; others are critical
BERLIN President Vladimir Putin's decision to give sweeping powers to the Kremlin has led to fresh divisions inside the 25-member European Union over how to forge a long-term policy toward its big eastern neighbor, senior diplomats said Tuesday..
Diplomats from the large EU countries, led by Germany, France, Britain and Italy, said they were "examining" Putin's speech..
"We want to look at it in more detail," a British official said..
"This was an internal speech," said a German official..
But smaller EU countries, particularly those that joined the EU in May, were openly critical of Putin's proposals, which, if enacted, would strengthen his control over Russia's legislative branch and regional governments. These former Communist countries said they wanted the EU to establish a clearer, more united - if not tougher - policy toward Russia. That meant challenging Putin on his erosion of civil liberties..
"We can't be like ostriches and put our heads in the sand," said Artis Pabriks, foreign minister of Latvia. "If the EU wants a strategic partnership with Russia, this means we have to trust our partner. That means exchanging information and frank talking," he said in an interview..
Berlin, Paris, London and Rome speak about the EU establishing a "strategic partnership" that would entail closer cooperation on issues concerning terrorism, immigration, trade and, particularly, energy at a time when Europe is becoming increasingly dependent on Russian natural gas..
But some senior German politicians say Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and Joschka Fischer, the foreign minister, are not taking a tough enough stance against Putin's anti-democratic policies..
"We all want a strategic partnership with Russia. We stand shoulder to shoulder with Russia over the fight against Islamic terrorism," said Friedbert Pflüger, foreign affairs spokesman for Germany's opposition conservative Christian Democrats and its Christian Social Union sister party. "But Putin's speech is a very serious development. It is the end of checks and balances." He added, in reference to the Russian Parliament, "We already have a one-party Duma. Schröder and Fischer should speak out.".
The East Europeans also support such a strategic relationship, but as neighbors of Russia, they want the larger EU countries to be more outspoken. "In our relations with Russia, we should establish the same criteria and values we have for other non-EU countries, such as protecting civil liberties, the rule of law and a free press," Pabriks said..
He was not convinced that Putin's decision to centralize power "had a direct connection with the recent terrorist attacks in the Caucasus.".
"I am not sure I can answer that positively." And if Putin's new policies do not work, he added, "They could bring more instability to the northern Caucasus. That could lead to more terrorism that could affect us because we are a neighbor of Russia.".
Latvia's neighbors, including Poland, the largest of the 10 new EU entrants, share this view of Russia..
"Putin wants to keep Russia monolithic and in this framework handle the problem of Chechnya," said Janusz Onyszkiewicz, a former Polish defense minister and recently elected to the European Parliament, where he serves on the foreign affairs subcommittee on security and defense. "When Yeltsin was in power, Poland worried that Russia was too weak. But with Putin, we are worried that Russia is too centralized and too undemocratic. Putin is not a democrat.".
Indeed, a prevalent view by East European politicians is that Putin is using the wave of terrorist attacks as a pretext for transforming the political system..
"His speech amounts to a 'retro' reform" said George Schöpflin, a Hungarian member of the European Parliament who serves on the foreign affairs committee. "This means that more power will be taken away from the citizen and moved into the hands of the state. If Europe wants a strategic partnership with Russia, then it has to decide if it is in its interests that Russia will develop into a democratic system. As it stands, Russia will become a more difficult partner for the EU.".
The new EU countries have some support from some of the 15 older members, especially from Scandinavian countries, Ireland and the Netherlands, which have been critical of Putin's human rights record in Chechnya and his crackdown on the media..
But Putin and his foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, are less and less willing to accept public criticism, as Bernard Bot, the Dutch foreign minister, recently discovered when he played host to a meeting of EU foreign ministers. Bot called on Putin to explain why so many civilians had been killed during the terrorist siege of Beslan. Lavrov lashed out at Bot and protested to Brussels..
"It's true, the timing of Bot's comments was terrible," said an EU diplomat, adding that it could explain why Russia was not included on a recent agenda of EU foreign ministers. "We didn't feel we could discuss Beslan because there are so many differences among us and between the old and new members over how to deal with Putin.".
International Herald Tribune
nimh wrote: Thomas wrote: So do I, but the most important equilbrating mechanism isn't that emigrants send money home. It's that emigration reduces the supply of labor in the home country, causing the laws of supply and demand to raise its price -- also known as the wages of those who stayed at home.
All depends on who's leaving though, doesn't it?
Not really, for two reasons. 1) While the emigrants can take their capacity to work abroad with them, they must leave their factories and their land at home. 2) In a reasonably free economy, wages reflect the marginal productivity of labor, which rises with the amounts of capital and land available per worker. As a consequence of 1) and 2), emigration inevitably raises the capital/labor and land/labor ratios, which in turn increases wages. In a less than reasonably free economy, wages may be set above their market-clearing level, in which case emigration reduces unemployment instead of raising wages. But in either case, the effect is independent of whether the workers in question are skilled or unskilled.
nimh wrote:The problem in the former GDR is twofold: there is a lack of demand, period - and there is a mismatch between the demand and the supply.
Yes, because faith-based economics have driven the average East German wage up to 90% of the average West German wage, even though the average East German worker is only about 70% as productive as the average West Germany worker. In other words, East German wages are above their market-clearing level, demand for East German jobs exceeds supply, and unemployment makes up the difference. East-West migration is a symptom, not a cause of the East German unemployment problem, and it ameliorates, not worsens it.
nimh wrote:Thomas wrote:As I said, I haven't yet looked at the statistical evidence on whether it works that way for modern migration, but there's good statistical evidence that it did work that way during first wave of globalization, circa 1860-1914. And the laws of supply and demand haven't changed since then.
I would say they have. The basic underlying principle, perhaps, not, but the nature of what demand and supply is of and for and who would thus react to it how and where should all have changed.
If you are correct on this, you can win a Nobel prize in economics for proving it. At present, you will find it extremely hard to find any card-carrying economist who agrees with you on this.
nimh wrote:Still, it's an interesting point, for me. I know little of that historical era, but as far as I remember the main countries of out-migration at the time were the less developed areas of the Habsburg Empire, Southern Italy, perhaps Greece and Ireland. You say that the wages in those regions actually went up (more than the average growth would have had it grow, migration or not), in 1860-1914?
Yes. Granted, the finding depends on multi-regression analysis, and you can always quibble with these if you want to. But the consensus among the economic historians who work on this question -- including liberals like O'Rouke and Williamson -- seems to be that emigration clearly raised the wages of those who stayed home.
Nimh, Thomas,
Very interesting dialogue. Thanks. I don't have the right or wish to defelect you from your current conversation, but it would be interesting eventually to know how you see the likely future behavior of the EU with respect to the collection and allocation of its development funds, particularly with respect to the new members. Certainly the German experience of the last few years has major elements that will be instructive and applicable to EU decision-making.
Ireland may also offer an instructive case for examination. Certainly Ireland has seen a very significant rise in GDP per capita and a concurrent drop in emigration over the last 20 years. It is easy to list the factors that likely contributed to this, but very difficult (for me) to assess their relative importance. My list - in no particular order - would include (1) EU development funds; (2) Improved political and physical security. (3) Low taxes generally. (4) Tax and Government policies that reward work, investment, and the creation of intellectual property. (5) A well-educated and young population. (6) A relatively unspoiled physical environment.
Are there any instructive lessons here that may suggest wise policies with respect to the new EU members? The German federal experience may well, as you have already illustrated, provided as good or better models.
In general I endorse Thomas' views in economics matters. Over the long term government cannot deliver equal economic outcomes for all (on either an individual or regional basis) without both taxing some and significantly lowering the average standards for all. The game (in just its economic aspects) is not zero sum - it is negative sum.
georgeob1 wrote: Certainly the German experience of the last few years has major elements that will be instructive and applicable to EU decision-making.
One lesson I would draw is that there is a tradeoff between the generosity of your country's welfare state and your country's openness to foreigners. Even if you support a German-style welfare state, you have to acknowlege that it collapses when immigrants come to Germany to go on welfare here. This is why Germany has become much less inviting to immigrants and has enormously tightened its policies towards seekers of political asylum.
More dramatically, in East Germany, where the amount of transfer payments is highest, the (very modest) welfare reforms by the Schroeder administration are driving young East Germans into the ranks of the Neo-Nazis, and their political arm, the NPD, will probably become a player in East German state parliaments.
For libertarians like me, the consequence is clear: dismantle the welfare state, open the border to immigrants, and damn the Neo-Nazis. For conservatives, who tend to be xenophobic in Europe and whose views I disagree with, the consequence is also clear: Curb immigration and be in denial about the constructive role foreign-born people are already playing in our society.
But for Social Democrats and Greens, who claim to support both immigration and the welfare state, I see tough choices and a real stress-test ahead. I hope they follow the example of responsible leaders like Bill Clinton, Tony Blair, and Gerhardt Schroeder, not the example of some xenophobic populist who might surface.
I agree with your analysis of Ireland's success, George, and I think the lesson here is to support countries like Slovakia and Estonia whose governments try to follow this path of development. I think France and Germany are making a tragic mistake by pushing for "limits to tax competition" and trying to mandate minimum taxes in each country.
I'm sure Walter and nimh disagree, and I'm looking forward to seing what lessons
they draw.
I agree re Lafontaine.
I partly agree to that "young East Germans [are driven] into the ranks of the Neo-Nazis".
Not only young East Germans, and not only to the right, but to the left as well. In Brandenburg, where there is a coalistion government by the conservative CDU and left SPD, it seems that the (former) communistist (PDS) will became the biggest party and extreme right DVU will get some seats in the state government.
Open the borders is okay, too.
I agree that changes have to be done re finacing our social system[s].
I don't think, any politician is able to do the splits, as all are saying.
I fear, populistic views will get the most votes .... and the winners will become the gravediggers of the complete system (now, and especially at the Federal elections), until someone gets a really good idea :wink:
I'm rather sure, you want to hear different/more, Thomas, but ... :wink:
Sorry Walter, I deleted Lafontaine while you responded. I despise him for many reasons, but he hasn't turned into a xenophobic populist -- yet. (I wouldn't put it beneath him in the future though.)
Very interesting to see that it is the political side effects of these policies, and not the real social and economic direct effects that most affect the forces that influence politicians and the choices they make.
The same process occurs in the states. Public resistance to immigration (particularly the undocumented kind) rose here rapidly after legislative and judicial decisions mandated the award of all social and economic benefits to immigrants, regardless of their legal status. We also have poured Federal Government funds into certain low GDP states (West Virginia, most notably), for many years, without any detectable improvement in labor productivity or standards of living there.
It is interesting to note the persistent wide variations that exist here in the social and tax policies of the various states. (I have considered moving to Vancouver Washington, a pleasant town on the Columbia River, just across the bridge from Oregon. Washington State has no income tax, but very high sales and use taxes. Oregon has no sales tax, but high income taxes. The more I think about it, however, the more I am attracted to the Nevada side of Lake Tahoe.)
Excessive social welfare systems, however bad their economic effects, are very difficult for politicians anywhere to remove or reform. Each breeds a group of dependents who can be readily mobilized to keep the "benefits" flowing.
Thomas wrote:nimh wrote:Thomas wrote:As I said, I haven't yet looked at the statistical evidence on whether it works that way for modern migration, but there's good statistical evidence that it did work that way during first wave of globalization, circa 1860-1914. And the laws of supply and demand haven't changed since then.
I would say they have. The basic underlying principle, perhaps, not, but the nature of what demand and supply is of and for and who would thus react to it how and where should all have changed.
If you are correct on this, you can win a Nobel prize in economics for proving it. At present, you will find it extremely hard to find any card-carrying economist who agrees with you on this.
Now you're just being petty. All I said here was that nowadays, demand is for different things, and supply is of different things, than they used to be 100 years ago, just like they were different then from what they were 200 years before that. Which means that the demand and supply flows, though their underlying 'laws' remain the same, flow in different directions. Your sarcasm on such a relatively straightforward point just kinda turns me off, to be honest.
Thomas wrote:Yes. Granted, the finding depends on multi-regression analysis, and you can always quibble with these if you want to. But the consensus among the economic historians who work on this question -- including liberals like O'Rouke and Williamson -- seems to be that emigration clearly raised the wages of those who stayed home.
You're obviously better read than I am, so I'll have to accept your assertion as the better-informed one. I'm having serious trouble wrapping my mind around it though. Whether Ireland or Galicia, it was the young who emigrated, those who'd finished school and went off for better workplace or educational pastures. How can their mass-departure, leaving the home villages predominantly inhabited by the elderly, the unadventurous and those who saw no reasonable opportunity elsewhere for someone with their skills, somehow have benefited the economic vibracy of these places? Outmigration-prone places like Galicia or South-Italy sure were not particularly known for their economic bullishness early this century, as far as I know.
Even now, small and medium-sized towns in the north of our country are desperately trying to attract new businesses to their communities because they are suffering from economic regression afflicted by out-migration. The lack of local employment or higher education opportunities drives out the high school graduates, and thus the exact people who might have started something new, might have infused new investment or ideas into the stagnant local economy. The result is a population with a high proportion of (state pension/benefit-dependent) elderly and un(der)educated unemployed, which drains the city council of funds so they in turn have less left to fund new business incentives or infrastructure with, etc.
The one thing that helped in the last decade in at least the provinces' biggest cities was the national government's policy of moving the head offices of certain branches there and according business investors lucrative breaks for investing there. That did help, but of course the new right-wing government is cancelling all that in the course of its latest round of budget cuts.
georgeob1 wrote:Ireland may also offer an instructive case for examination. Certainly Ireland has seen a very significant rise in GDP per capita and a concurrent drop in emigration over the last 20 years. It is easy to list the factors that likely contributed to this, but very difficult (for me) to assess their relative importance. My list - in no particular order - would include (1) EU development funds; (2) Improved political and physical security. (3) Low taxes generally. (4) Tax and Government policies that reward work, investment, and the creation of intellectual property. (5) A well-educated and young population. (6) A relatively unspoiled physical environment.
I think that's probably a pretty fair summary of it, yes. Which is actually partly what I'm going on, here.
Of course, there's a degree of chicken-and-egg; did emigration drop because the local economy got better (obviously) or did the local economy get an extra boost because finally, the most talented ones of the new generation did not leave anymore to invest their talents in the American economy instead? (Also obviously, I'd say).
Something cyclical in any case has been going on there, with the two elements (emigration and lacking dynamics vs. offering one's own youth opportunities at home and booming dynamics) either pressuring each other down, or pushing each other up.
In my view, 1), 4) and 5) definitively go together here, and to some extent relied on each other for all falling into place and working.
nimh wrote:Thomas wrote: If you are correct on this, you can win a Nobel prize in economics for proving it. At present, you will find it extremely hard to find any card-carrying economist who agrees with you on this.
Now you're just being petty. All I said here was that nowadays, demand is for different things, and supply is of different things, than they used to be 100 years ago, just like they were different then from what they were 200 years before that. Which means that the demand and supply flows, though their underlying 'laws' remain the same, flow in different directions. Your sarcasm on such a relatively straightforward point just kinda turns me off, to be honest.
I'm sorry I came across to you as overly sarcastic. Let's take a step back to where this started. We were talking about migration and its effect on employment and wages; I had used the first wave of globalization as evidence for my point, which was about the
present wave of globalization. This was only meaningful if the relevant dynamics of the problem hadn't changed between 1900 and 2000, so I thought it important to stress that they hadn't.
You kind of disagreed, and I took this to mean that you thought the dynamics had changed in a way that made the 1900 precedent meaningless for the situation of our present. If that was indeed your point, it was not only
not straightforward, it was grossly false in the judgment of those who research these issues. Hence my sarcasm. But apparently this was based on a misunderstanding on my part, so I apologize.
nimh wrote: I'm having serious trouble wrapping my mind around it though. Whether Ireland or Galicia, it was the young who emigrated, those who'd finished school and went off for better workplace or educational pastures. How can their mass-departure, leaving the home villages predominantly inhabited by the elderly, the unadventurous and those who saw no reasonable opportunity elsewhere for someone with their skills, somehow have benefited the economic vibracy of these places?
Because the capital and the land used by the young emigrants remained in the home country after their emigration. This meant that for each of those old people who stayed, there was more land available to farm, more machinery available to farm it with, more factories available to work in, more houses available to live in, in short: more opportunities to take. I wouldn't call this situation "economic vibrancy", but it did raise the standard of living for those who stayed at home.
nimh wrote:Even now, small and medium-sized towns in the north of our country are desperately trying to attract new businesses to their communities because they are suffering from economic regression afflicted by out-migration.
I'm not familiar with the economic situation inside the Netherlands, so I can't comment on it in any qualified way. I would guess that a closer look would reveal that the hen and egg of it is mostly the other way round: that a relative lack of opportunities caused the out-migration, not vice versa. But it's really just a guess on my part.
