blatham wrote: Quote:Your insight on Republican unity shouldn't go unnoticed, though, as that is pretty solid. Too much public infighting is obviously bad, but what the Left really needs to do is provide some form of a contract with America, instead of relying almost exclusively on not being Bush. That didn't work two years ago and the man isn't even running next time.
That's a notion held by others too, Nimh for example, and I've argued it myself. But it's not a certainty. Gingrich had an uphill battle to make headway against Clinton's popularity and it worked in that instance (along with a number of corresponding strategies). So the same factors aren't in place now. I also consider the Contract a gimmick which depends upon a deceitful simplicity so I'm not happy with such a move, but again, we ought to play to win.
If the Contract is a gimmick (perhaps), then what do you make of any campaign promise? Surely you'd prefer some clue as to what a power shift may bring?
blatham wrote:Quote:Soz is also right about the Bill/Hillary equation. Unless the man dies (that would probably get her elected), she will always look like a dull clod in his shadow.
Perhaps. Again, not a certainty. He's smart enough to figure this out, as will be the case with other advisors, and act accordingly. But I also don't rule out a re-perceiving of her as an autonomous and capable figure, which she is. The difference in charisma is unfortunate, but folks like Bill Clinton don't come along that often.
Take a closer look (listen) to Obama, and you'll see he plays a different game, too. While I don't think he can match last year's DNC Bill Clinton in terms of charisma, I think he's got the 1991 version beat. More important is Hillary's startling lack of same, while standing next to a beacon.
blatham wrote:Quote:Look for Biden to gain ground. The man clearly likes the sound of his own voice more than most, but at least he has a plan that doesn't rely on being ambiguously "better". The Reagan campaign was probably the best run campaign in my lifetime. He sold his plan. This strategy only works if you a) have a plan, b) talk about it and c) people like it. Ambiguously better is a much tougher sell.
If trends continue (in Iraq, Afghanistan and the ME generally plus domestic matters) then it is quite possible that a rubber duck would look good in contrast to Bush. Plans, like the Contract, aren't difficult to nail up to a door. We'll see.
Plans like the Contract should neither be underestimated nor delayed much longer. It's been too easy for too long to paint Democrats as rudderless. Worse, the loudest, best covered speakers
do sound like extemists.
It's also high time you stop thinking "contrast to Bush" is the answer, because if necessary, the Republican candidates can play that card too. I would agree that Americans will likely not want "more of the same", but that doesn't mean they'll reach for ambiguously better ABB candidates. Neither Rudy Giuliani nor John McCain would be easy to paint as Bush Clones or Cronies, so such a campaign will likely be less effective than they were 2 years ago (during the least popular re-election in history). A campaign that couldn't beat Bush, would be torched against the likes of Giuliani or McCain.
Perhaps Obama should capitalize on his popularity and author the next "Contract"? It would certainly put him front and center without requiring a commitment to run. And other than the possible exception of Bill Clinton; who better to sell it? I for one would love to read it and I assure you I'd consider it before casting my next vote.
You know, what's so frustrating is I could lead them to victory.
Bill could.
All it takes is one person with an idea, an abiding conviction about the spirit of the party--and the decision to frame their party positively, rather than relying on framing the other party negatively--and they would roll over the opposition, because of current stressors.
Democrat Party motto-- No one can beat us more soundly than we can!!
Lash got that right! The democrats can only defeat themselve.
Dizzy Delicious wrote:nimh wrote:THE single most popular Senator, yes.
See
this table here on the approval rates of Senators amongst their own constituents.
I checked out the Table and I noticed, no comments were posted about who the individuals were, who participated in the POLL. My comment specifically said the people of Cook County.
Ah, OK. Yes, the poll was of Illinois residents, not specifically of the one County.
Dizzy Delicious wrote:Were the voters in the Poll from Cook County or where they the rich white folks from the nearby Chicago suburbs, who departed CHicago to avoid the problem of diversity?
To get the kind of approval rating he has, you must have succeeded at appealing across a range of constituencies. Eg - neither only the rich white suburbian folks, nor the Cook County residents would alone be enough. His chart-topping approval rating suggests he is popular across the board.
The pollster actually
provides the details, though: in Illinois, the job Barack Obama is doing as Senator is approved by
67% of men
77% of women
68% of whites
88% of blacks
82% of hispanics
54% of Republicans
69% of independents
86% of Democrats
48% of conservatives
82% of moderates
80% of liberals
72% of those who never attend church
71% of those who regularly attend church
83% of those in Chicago
72% of the suburbanites
65% of those downstate
Just to mention a few categories.
Dizzy Delicious wrote:But of course, perhaps the only voters were the 400,000+ illegals scattered throughout Illinois? Was the Poll conducted in bothe English and Spanish?

Respondents were selected by random, as in most any poll; a "Random Digit Dialed (RDD) sample" was used (see
methodology).
Responses "were weighted according to age, gender, ethnic origin, geographical area and number of adults and number of voice telephone lines in the household, so that the sample would reflect the actual demographic proportions in the population, using most recent U.S.Census estimates."
Ergo: no, you cant blame the outcome of the poll on that they must just have asked lots of illegals, or just the white rich folk. See also above.
Lash wrote:All it takes is one person with an idea, an abiding conviction about the spirit of the party--and the decision to frame their party positively, rather than relying on framing the other party negatively--and they would roll over the opposition, because of current stressors.
Gee, that reminds me of somebody!
They also have to run for office....
<She is a woman on a mission>
Bernard I am so fond of you....
Dizzy Delicious- Please read the evidence below--IT CLEARLY SHOWS THAT EVEN THOUGH PEOPLE WILL NAME AFRICAN-AMERICANS IN A POLL AS VIABLE CANDIDATES A LARGE NUMBER OF THOSE WILL NOT DO SO WHEN THEY ARE IN THE POLLING BOOTH!
Mr. Nimh has not responded to the evidence I offered. I will repeat.
THE 72% approval rating gained by Obama is ephemeral( Read evidence below). He would drag down a national ticket( Read evidence below)
Possible Consequences of Non-Response for Pre-Election Surveys
RACE AND RELUCTANT RESPONDENTS
Survey Findings
Pre-election polling is tricky work. A number of unknown factors can stand in the way of accurate predictions -- problems with identifying registered and likely voters, uncertainties about voter turnout, and last-minute shifts in candidate preference. But estimating voter preferences in biracial elections has been especially difficult. Pre-election surveys, even those taken just days before voters go to the polls, often substantially underestimate support for white candidates in races where the other candidate is African-American.
This phenomenon, which some pollsters call "racial slippage," was a factor in at least four highly-competitive biracial contests during the 1980s and 1990. In three of the four elections, independent media polls consistently over-predicted the margin of victory for the black candidates. And in the Helms-Gantt 1990 Senate race, the polls under-predicted the margin of victory for the white candidate. The main cause of these errors seems to have been the difficulty of measuring support for the white candidates. Two separate polls of likely voters taken in the final week of the 1989 campaign for governor in Virginia, for example, showed Democrat L. Douglas Wilder leading by 9 to 11 percentage points. Days later, Wilder won the election by less than 7,000 votes -- a margin of four-tenths of a percentage point.
ccc
Non-Response Bias in Survey Research
Survey non-response is widely recognized as a potential source of error that can reduce the accuracy of all types of polls. Most non-response in telephone surveys is attributable to two factors. First, some of the people (or households) in a sample are never reached, most likely because they are not at home or do not answer the telephone during the period when a poll is being conducted. Second, other people are reached but refuse to participate in the poll. All surveys are hampered by non-response. Even the National Elections Studies and the General Social Survey -- academic surveys that are based on in-person interviewing -- tend to have non-response rates of 25 to 35 percent, and non-response in telephone surveys can, by several estimates, be at least 10 percentage points higher (Brehm 1993, pp. 16-17).(2)
There are several ways to lower the non-response rates in surveys. Polls can be conducted over a longer time period, which provides more opportunities to place calls to hard-to-reach people. In addition, survey organizations can attempt refusal conversions by calling back people who initially declined to participate in a poll and trying to gain their cooperation. Both of these measures not only increase the cost of conducting a survey, but are especially difficult for polls conducted over the course of only a few days, as many pre-election polls are.(3)
Non-response can bias survey estimates if those who do not participate in a survey hold substantially different attitudes than those who do participate.(4) Since those who are truly "non-respondents" are never interviewed, it is difficult to measure the extent to which the opinions of respondents and non-respondents actually differ. It is possible, however, to compare those who readily agreed to participate in a poll with those who at first refused -- people who are most likely to be left out in surveys that do not have either the time or resources required to attempt refusal conversions. That is the approach taken here.
The following analysis is based on polling conducted in the Summer of 1997 by the Pew Research Center as part of a comparison of various survey methodologies. One component of the experiment was an extended refusal-conversion effort. All interview breakoffs and refusals were contacted again -- and in many cases twice, if necessary -- to attempt to complete the interview. In addition, many of those who refused to be interviewed after two calls were sent a conversion letter by priority mail before they were called a third time.
The results presented here offer new insights into a challenge that confronts all survey research -- especially quickly-conducted pre-election polls that may not have either the time or financial resources required to gain the cooperation of those who at first refuse to participate in telephone surveys. We compare the attitudes of two groups of respondents: "amenable respondents" who agreed to participate in the poll the first time they were contacted, and "reluctant respondents" who initially refused to participate and cooperated only after one or more callbacks.(5) Because the largest differences between the two groups emerge on racial attitudes, the following analysis is restricted to white respondents only.
Comparing Amenable and Reluctant Respondents
In most respects, amenable respondents and reluctant respondents are remarkably similar to one another.(6) The group of reluctant respondents does not contain disproportionately more or less men, minorities, or younger people (see Table 1). There were also no notable differences in level of education between the two groups, and responses to three knowledge questions do not offer consistent evidence that reluctant respondents are significantly less informed about current events. A slightly greater number of amenable respondents knew that former Senator Bob Dole had recently loaned Newt Gingrich money to pay off the House Speaker's ethics fines (39% among amenable respondents, compared to 32% among reluctant respondents). But two other knowledge questions -- concerning majority control of the House of Representatives and identification of Microsoft CEO Bill Gates -- did not reveal any statistically significant differences between the two groups.
Amenable and reluctant respondents did differ on one demographic measure: income. Nearly one-third (31%) of the reluctant respondents had family incomes of $50,000 or more, compared to 24 percent of amenable respondents.
Reluctant respondents do not appear to be more suspicious than amenable respondents in how they view other people. There are no significant differences between the proportion in each group who agree that people can be trusted, are likely to take advantage of others, or are likely to be helpful. Nor do amenable and reluctant respondents differ significantly in their views toward public opinion polls. Roughly two-thirds in each group said that polls work for -- rather than against -- the "best interests of the general public" (66% among amenable respondents compared to 65% among reluctant respondents), although as many in each group (65% and 68%, respectively) doubted that a random sample of 1,500 people can "accurately reflect the views" of the American public.
Critics of media polls have argued that surveys overstate support for Democratic candidates and underestimate conservative opinions -- possibly because conservatives are more likely to refuse to participate in polls.(7) But a number of measures give no indication that reluctant respondents are significantly more conservative than amenable respondents. Both groups of respondents include comparable percentages of Democrats and Republicans, and of self-described liberals and conservatives. Questions on a range of political values also revealed no differences between amenable and reluctant respondents.
Sharp Differences on Racial Attitudes
The two groups hold strikingly different views, however, on several race-related questions, with reluctant respondents significantly less sympathetic than amenable respondents toward African-Americans. Three of four questions measuring racial attitudes revealed statistically significant differences of nine percentage points or more between the two groups. Just 15% of reluctant respondents said they hold a "very favorable" opinion of blacks, for example, compared to 24% of amenable respondents. Similarly, fully 70% of reluctant respondents agreed with the statement that blacks who "can't get ahead in this country are mostly responsible for their own condition," while just 21% agreed that racial discrimination is the "main reason why many black people can't get ahead". This compares with a much narrower 54%33% margin among amenable respondents.
The differences between amenable and reluctant respondents are equally large on a proposed national apology for slavery, an idea floated by President Clinton in the summer of 1997. Fully 68% of reluctant respondents said they opposed a national apology, compared to just 53% of amenable respondents.(8)
Race-of-interviewer effects seem to explain some -- but not all -- of the differences between amenable and reluctant respondents. Most of those who initially agreed to participate in the survey were called and interviewed by African-American interviewers (69%). In contrast, most of the reluctant respondents (66%), who were called back one or more times for a refusal conversion attempt, were called and ultimately interviewed by a non-black interviewer. Clearly, the way some white respondents answer questions about racial issues may vary, depending on the race of the person conducting the interview. Even in telephone surveys, white respondents have been found to be much less likely to reveal racially-biased attitudes when being interviewed by a black person (Cotter, Cohen, and Coulter 1982; Hatchett and Schuman 1975-76). Consequently, the differences in racial attitudes between amenable and reluctant respondents might reasonably be explained by the differences in the race of the interviewers between the two groups.
There are substantial race-of-interviewer effects on questions concerning racial issues, and these effects can be seen among both amenable and reluctant respondents. Amenable respondents who were interviewed by a non-black interviewer were more likely than those interviewed by a black interviewer to blame blacks for their own condition, and less likely to favor a national apology for slavery. Similarly, reluctant respondents who were interviewed by a non-black interviewer expressed less favorable views of blacks and were more strongly opposed to a slavery apology than those interviewed by a black interviewer.
Nonetheless, when comparing only those respondents who were interviewed by a non-black interviewer, thus controlling for any interviewer effects, reluctant respondents remain consistently less sympathetic toward blacks. The largest gap can be seen on the issue of a national apology for slavery. Reluctant respondents who were interviewed by a non-black interviewer opposed an apology by a margin of 74% to 21%, while amenable respondents interviewed by a non-black opposed it by a much more narrow 59% to 33% margin. Statistically significant gaps are also apparent on two other race measures. On favorability toward blacks, 12% of reluctant respondents characterize their opinion as "very favorable" compared to 23% of amenable respondents. Fully 72% of reluctant respondents say blacks are responsible for their own condition, compared to 61% of amenable respondents.
Remarkably, on this same measure, there is a significant difference in opinion even between respondents who were interviewed by black interviewers. Two-thirds (66%) of the reluctant respondents blame blacks for their own circumstances compared to 51% of amenable respondents.
In fact, the differences between amenable and reluctant respondents on race questions are statistically significant even when a number of attitudinal and methodological factors are taken into account. The evidence for this is in Table 2, which presents the results of two multiple regression equations. Respondents' overall opinion toward blacks is the dependent variable in one equation, and their views concerning why "many black people can't get ahead" is the dependent variable in the other.
Both equations include variables controlling for a range of differences across respondents. As noted above, the survey data used in this analysis were collected as part of a broader comparison of methodologies. The "amenable respondents" analyzed here come from the standard, five-day survey which used a systematic but non-random selection procedure within households, while roughly 40% of the "reluctant respondents" analyzed here come from the more rigorous survey, which used a random-selection procedure. Therefore, the estimations include a dichotomous variable controlling for whether respondents were polled as part of the standard or rigorous survey. In addition, another variable is included to account for any race-of-interviewer effects. The estimations include several other controls, including variables for sex, age, education, income, region (a dummy variable for respondents from Southern states), and a measure of political ideology. Finally, a dummy variable is included to estimate the differences between amenable and reluctant respondents.
Though the regression models have little predictive power, they provide further evidence for the main conclusions drawn here: as a group, reluctant respondents are significantly less sympathetic than amenable respondents toward blacks, even when political ideology, level of education, race of interviewer, and other factors are taken into account. On the question of why many blacks can't get ahead, being a reluctant respondent is strongly and significantly (p < .01) related to seeing blacks themselves, rather than racial discrimination, as responsible for their current situation. This pattern is evident even when controlling for a number of other statistically significant predictors, including education, region, ideology, and race of interviewer. Similarly, reluctant respondents are on average less likely to hold a favorable opinion of blacks, although the results based on this question are somewhat weaker. In this estimation fewer variables are significantly related to favorability toward blacks, but the coefficient for those who initially refused to participate in the poll remains statistically significant (p < .01).
Conclusion
The sharp differences between amenable and reluctant respondents on race-related questions may offer new insights into the difficulties involved in pre-election polling in biracial elections. In a number of competitive biracial contests in recent decades, surveys conducted even a few days before voters went to the polls have substantially underestimated support for the white candidate. The results presented here suggest that this phenomenon, sometimes called "racial slippage", may be due in part to the inability of quickly-conducted pre-election polls to reach reluctant respondents -- people who are less likely to participate in polls and, just as important, much less sympathetic toward African-Americans. Significant differences between amenable and reluctant respondents are evident on three of four questions involving race relations, even when race-of-interviewer effects and a number of other attitudinal factors are taken into account.
Nonetheless, the evidence presented here is only suggestive. The surveys used for this analysis were not themselves pre-election polls -- rather, they were conducted during the summer of 1997 as part of a broader comparison of survey methodologies. Consequently, there is no direct evidence that the differences between amenable and reluctant respondents on racial issues would translate into similar differences in the voting behavior of these two groups in biracial elections. At the same time, the significant gaps between amenable and reluctant respondents on race-related questions are consistent with the pattern of underestimating support for white candidates in biracial contests. This suggests non-response may be an especially important concern for pre-election polling in these biracial elections.
END NOTES
1. See, for example, "An Underdog Forces Helms Into a Surprisingly Tight Race," The New York Times, October 31, 1990, p.1; "Helms, Gantt Take Off the Gloves," Chicago Tribune, October 31, 1990, p.1; "Race Is Getting Closer, Mayoral Candidates Agree", The New York Times, October 24, 1989, p. 1; Associated Press report on Chicago mayor's race, April 6, 1983.
2. A recent study by the Council for Marketing and Opinion Research, for example, found that throughout the 1990s refusal rates in telephone surveys have exceeded 50% of potential respondents who were contacted. See "Respondent Cooperation and Industry Image Survey", June 1996.
3. One survey of polling organizations found that more than 80% of the polls did not conduct refusal conversions in pre-election polls (Crespi 1988, pp. 47-48).
4. Most polling organizations use weighting techniques, typically based on the demographic characteristics of a sample, to compensate for the known underrepresentation of some groups.
5. Technically, the comparisons are between amenable households (those with no refusals) and reluctant households (those where one or more refusals occurred), since for all cases except one-person households it is impossible to know whether the same person refused and later granted an interview. The Pew Research Center experiment involved two identical national telephone surveys that differed only in their administration. One survey, designed to represent a standard media poll, was conducted over a five-day period. At least five attempts were made to reach a potential respondent at every sampled telephone number. All interview breakoffs and refusals were contacted at least once in an attempt to convert them to completed interviews. The second survey was conducted over an eight-week period and involved a more rigorous approach in several ways. There was no limit on the number of attempts to reach a potential respondent at sampled telephone numbers. All interview breakoffs and refusals were contacted up to two additional times, if necessary, in an attempt to convert them to completed interviews. Moreover, for households with a known mailing address, respondents who refused to be interviewed after two calls were sent a conversion letter by priority mail before they were called a third time. The analysis in this paper is based on two groups of respondents. Amenable respondents are defined as those contacted for the standard, five-day survey who participated in the poll the first time they were contacted. Reluctant respondents are defined as those who were contacted in either survey who initially refused to be interviewed and agreed to participate only after one or more callbacks. There were additional methodological differences between the standard five-day survey and the more rigorous survey, as well (see Appendix 1). However, as noted below, the results presented here concerning the differences in racial attitudes between amenable respondents and reluctant respondents are evident even when the additional methodological differences between the two surveys are taken into account.
6. All of the results presented in this paper, except for the demographic profile in Table 1 and the regression results in Table 2, are based on weighted data. The results are the same when based on unweighted data.
7. For example, political analyst Michael Barone notes: "One theory -- and it is no more than a theory so far -- is that conservatives are more likely than others to refuse to respond to polls, particularly those polls taken by media outlets that conservatives consider biased. If so, they're hurting their own cause." (See "The GOP: Winners Who Act Like Losers", The Weekly Standard, March 10, 1997.)
8. Public support for a national apology for slavery appeared to weaken over the course of the summer of 1997. Separate polls conducted by the Gallup Organization in late June and by the Pew Research Center in August found roughly 60% of Americans opposing an apology. However, the differences between amenable and reluctant respondents on the apology question cannot be explained entirely by the fact that many reluctant respondents were interviewed later in the summer, while all amenable respondents analyzed here were interviewed between June 18 and 22. Even among respondents interviewed during this initial five-day field period, reluctant respondents are significantly more likely than amenable respondents to oppose a national apology for slavery.
Lash wrote:They also have to run for office....
... and he won't. Osama said he wouldn't run, and he's a man of his word. It's pointless to even discuss the possibility in this thread.
Instead, let's continue O'Bill's train of thought about Monica and Bill C., and whether Bill C. should've been impeached or not. I can't believe how many years I have managed to live without heated debates about the affair. Which reminds me of something else: Has O.J. found the murderer of his wife yet? The last I remember is that he pledged the rest of his life to the project.
Mr.Nimh- I await your response to my post showing evidence that US voters give African-American office holders( like Obama) good polling numbers but, subsequently numbers that are much lower when those same voters who have been polled vote in elections!
Thomas wrote: Which reminds me of something else: Has O.J. found the murderer of his wife yet? The last I remember is that he pledged the rest of his life to the project.

Well, a look in today's (Sunday) paper might find some remedy :wink:
I really must remind one and all that this thread is entitled OBAMA. Therefore--
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr.Nimh- I await your response to my post showing evidence that US voters give African-American office holders( like Obama) good polling numbers but, subsequently numbers that are much lower when those same voters who have been polled vote in elections!
BernardR wrote:I really must remind one and all that this thread is entitled OBAMA. !
Sorry, sozobe, for the derailing.
Thank you, Mr. Walter Hinteler- so back on the tracks--
Mr.Nimh- I await your response to my post showing evidence that US voters give African-American office holders( like Obama) good polling numbers but, subsequently numbers that are much lower when those same voters who have been polled vote in elections!
BernardR wrote:I really must remind one and all that this thread is entitled OBAMA. Therefore--
Good point, BernardR
Will Obama do anything to stop the efflux of "high end" stores from
the Chicago Loop?
If so, when?
BernardR wrote:Thank you, Mr. Walter Hinteler- so back on the tracks--
Mr.Nimh- I await your response to my post showing evidence that US voters give African-American office holders( like Obama) good polling numbers but, subsequently numbers that are much lower when those same voters who have been polled vote in elections!
Perhaps those who vote in Polls don't vote. They probably don't serve when called up for Jury Duty.
Thomas wrote:...said he wouldn't run, and he's a man of his word.
Obama , a man of hie word? No one in or from Illinois has ever known any POL from Illinois to be a "man of his word". Crooks run the state and every Illinois voter knows it.
BernardR wrote:Mr. Nimh has not responded to the evidence I offered. I will repeat.
BernardR wrote:Mr.Nimh- I await your response to my post showing evidence that US voters give African-American office holders( like Obama) good polling numbers but, subsequently numbers that are much lower when those same voters who have been polled vote in elections!
Bernard, do you actually ever read my responses to you?
I
have already addressed your point, twice;
I
have specifically, at length, and in this very thread, responded to the Pew article that you just re-posted;
Plus, I have, thereafter, given you the
link to that response at least twice already, when you kept saying that your post had remained unanswered.
And yet now, while I was asleep, you repeated the same question about when I am finally going to answer to your article another FOUR times? (Four times
within one hour, at that?)
Now, I am going to repeat myself ONE final time, and give you the link to the post in which I responded to your Pew article ONE final time, OK? Let me just copy/paste the last time I responded to your question:
nimh wrote:I
did already respond to that very article, when you posted it the previous time, in the Obama thread:
here.
And that was the
second time I responded to your point on this count - see also
here.
NOTE: you have to click the blue, bolded words, to find my posts in question.
Note also that I actually considered your Pew article a valuable contribution to the thread, the first time round; and that my answer to some degree (though not fully) agreed with you; yet you just ignored it, and preferred to keep repeating that I hadnt ever replied; even after I posted the link to that post time and again. What is up with that?
Thomas, that's actually something I was thinking the other day -- that another strike against Hillary is that a candidacy by her IS going to start that whole debate again. In the form J_B raised it, or another form.
That is one of those things that we'd certainly prefer it wasn't true, and that if she's qualified et al it shouldn't be an issue, but it's a factor.
Note, that's just ONE OF my objections to her candidacy, one of many.
The idea of her becoming president seems positively third-worldian -- two dynasties, two names, 24 years (if she served one term, 28 if she served two).
Lash, you betcha. :-D