(Interesting to see that both Kurds and Turcomans in turn are separated into Sunni and Shi'a Muslims...)
Equally interesting is that in both those groups, ethnic allegiance trumps sectarian difference.
To give you an idea how borders can change within one country within 150 years, here's a map of Germany with borders as of 150 years ago (1856).
The red-marked border is those of the Deutscher Bund or German Confederation (a merely diplomatic assembly of rulers or their representatives, created after 1815 as kind of successor to the Holy Roman Empire of German Nation), the black border is that since 1990:
.... and all those tiny and tiniest lines inside mark the borders of independent states resp. their land!
Walter Hinteler wrote:.... and all those tiny and tiniest lines inside mark the borders of independent states resp. their land!
Not sure what you mean by "resp. their land"
Territories that is: some states had sprankled their territory like ink over a sheet of paper.
(Interesting aside: where I live, Lippstadt [=actually only the town, not my suburbian village], was a 'condominium' [= joint sovereignty over a dependent territory] surrounded by the Dukedom of Westphalia [which was part of the secular trritory of the archdiocese of Cologne and Prussian at that time, by the Prussian part of the secular dioces of Münster plus two small, seperated hamlets, which belonged to the princedom of Lippe.)
OOOOOOOOKAAAAAAAAY...
(I used to know the Prince of Lippe, or at least someone who acted like it.)
And now a word from a real (as opposed to Bushido) conservative:
William F. Buckley 2/24/06
"I can tell you the main reason behind all our woes ?- it is America." The New York Times reporter is quoting the complaint of a clothing merchant in a Sunni stronghold in Iraq. "Everything that is going on between Sunni and Shiites, the troublemaker in the middle is America."
One can't doubt that the American objective in Iraq has failed. The same edition of the paper quotes a fellow of the American Enterprise Institute. Mr. Reuel Marc Gerecht backed the American intervention. He now speaks of the bombing of the especially sacred Shiite mosque in Samara and what that has precipitated in the way of revenge. He concludes that "The bombing has completely demolished" what was being attempted ?- to bring Sunnis into the defense and interior ministries.
Our mission has failed because Iraqi animosities have proved uncontainable by an invading army of 130,000 Americans. The great human reserves that call for civil life haven't proved strong enough. No doubt they are latently there, but they have not been able to contend against the ice men who move about in the shadows with bombs and grenades and pistols.
The Iraqis we hear about are first indignant, and then infuriated, that Americans aren't on the scene to protect them and to punish the aggressors. And so they join the clothing merchant who says that everything is the fault of the Americans.
The Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, elucidates on the complaint against Americans. It is not only that the invaders are American, it is that they are "Zionists." It would not be surprising to learn from an anonymously cited American soldier that he can understand why Saddam Hussein was needed to keep the Sunnis and the Shiites from each others' throats.
A problem for American policymakers ?- for President Bush, ultimately ?- is to cope with the postulates and decide how to proceed.
One of these postulates, from the beginning, was that the Iraqi people, whatever their tribal differences, would suspend internal divisions in order to get on with life in a political structure that guaranteed them religious freedom.
The accompanying postulate was that the invading American army would succeed in training Iraqi soldiers and policymkers to cope with insurgents bent on violence.
This last did not happen. And the administration has, now, to cope with failure. It can defend itself historically, standing by the inherent reasonableness of the postulates. After all, they govern our policies in Latin America, in Africa, and in much of Asia. The failure in Iraq does not force us to generalize that violence and antidemocratic movements always prevail. It does call on us to adjust to the question, What do we do when we see that the postulates do not prevail ?- in the absence of interventionist measures (we used these against Hirohito and Hitler) which we simply are not prepared to take? It is healthier for the disillusioned American to concede that in one theater in the Mideast, the postulates didn't work. The alternative would be to abandon the postulates. To do that would be to register a kind of philosophical despair. The killer insurgents are not entitled to blow up the shrine of American idealism.
Mr. Bush has a very difficult internal problem here because to make the kind of concession that is strategically appropriate requires a mitigation of policies he has several times affirmed in high-flown pronouncements. His challenge is to persuade himself that he can submit to a historical reality without forswearing basic commitments in foreign policy.
He will certainly face the current development as military leaders are expected to do: They are called upon to acknowledge a tactical setback, but to insist on the survival of strategic policies.
Yes, but within their own counsels, different plans have to be made. And the kernel here is the acknowledgment of defeat.
(c) 2006 Universal Press Syndicate
Interesting map, Walter. It's always a challenge when doing genealogy work to determine where someone born in the 1800's was born. Was it Poland then or Germany or Austria? If it was Austria then but not now, what do you put in the record?
