Past, Present and Future - do they exist?

fresco wrote:

You may be familiar with Einsteins analysis of "simultaneity" being a function of the observers frame of reference. It follows that "simultaneous events" are necessarily connected through an observer who names them as such. From a nondualistic point of view neither observer nor observed have independent existence. Twyvel tends to take the extreme position in this that "nothing changes"...that change may be an illusion whereby we mistake flickering images from the webcam of consciousness as "the truth".... but I take the view that for all practical purposes "acts of naming" and other "communications" reflect the dynamic nature of "social reality".

Irrespective of whether you take up nondualistic position or not there are still major philosophical problems with the concept of "causality" and its relationship to "time". One example is how to account for teleological explanation...how a prior event may happen in order to cause a future event. It may be that the epistemological resolution of these problems involves the collapse of the timeline.

Thank you for the welcome. With these subjects in the air, I might find it very enjoyable.

I am afraid that I am not familiar with Einstein's views on this. That simultaneity is fixed by the reference point of the observer, by the state of affairs in the naming? That, furthermore, it is this point- in which the observer lies, of course- through which such events are related necessarily?

Last evening I spotted this, and I found the problem intriguing:

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In order for there to be a relation between a past event and a present one they would both have to occur simultaneously, i.e. atemporally, which would contradict the distinction between past and future.

That an observer is a necessary condition of simultaneity? And what is more, that the observer's state of affairs is the primary factor of the existence of such events? That it must be so: in a word, that a property of affairs in the world is to be fixed by a particular point of observation?

The quote above is making the statement that simultaneity is a necessary condition of any existence of a relation between one past event and one present event, or set of events. This condition, in turn, is given the status of "contradicting force" in this property of affairs in the world. In short, I find this severe; not brutal, but only strong.

So, I wish to know from where this is derived; from where does it follow this be a necessary condition of such events? An answer to this could lead us to the ontological status of 'simultaneity' apart from the observer's space and duration.

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quex144

Einstein showed (on the basis that the speed of light is constant) that "time" is relative to the speed of the observer. In the celebrated "observer on train example" he showed that "simultaneous" flashing lights for an observer on the ground would not be simultaneous for the observer on the train. Since neither has priority "simultaneity" is relative.

Also from a nondualistic perspective the observer also defines "the event". This is a direct rejection of "naive realism". i.e. There is no such thing as an unobserved event. There are no "objective facts".(There are no trees falling in distant forests making "unobserved noise"...those who think there are are merely forgetting that they themselves are "observing in the minds eye") Indeed without "tree-ers" there would be no "trees".

From my point of view communication between observers sets up a provisional common reference frame within which "events" might be agreed. Within this frame it may make sense to talk about "causality" and "time" in as much that they serve to co-ordinate mutual action.
We can extend "communication" to "internal dialogue" within an individual decision making process. In the cases where all communicating observers agree, we have "a fact".

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Also from a nondualistic perspective the observer also defines "the event". This is a direct rejection of "naive realism". i.e. There is no such thing as an unobserved event. There are no "objective facts".(There are no trees falling in distant forests making "unobserved noise"...those who think there are are merely forgetting that they themselves are "observing in the minds eye") Indeed without "tree-ers" there would be no "trees".

Is this not akin to immaterialism wrapped in direct realism? And for there to be no such thing as an "unobserved" event? That all states of affairs in the world are to be a function of some sort of observer? As above, that "...without "tree-ers there would be no trees?" Tell me why this is so. How is it that a "notice" of certain relations turns to a "definition?" By placing the observer as the necessary condition, as in the previous examples?

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Einstein showed (on the basis that the speed of light is constant) that "time" is relative to the speed of the observer. In the celebrated "observer on train example" he showed that "simultaneous" flashing lights for an observer on the ground would not be simultaneous for the observer on the train. Since neither has priority "simultaneity" is relative.

Once more, I am afraid that I am mot familiar with this; more, I have not researched this proof. I am quite poor in maths, and physics, therefore, instills a certain fear in me given that I am not versed in its language. Nevertheless, I mean to say that the above proof seems to demonstrate the "relativity" of the observer either in motion or at rest in reference to events that occur simultaneously. It seems to me that relative position in reference (or in relation to) such events certainly can derive a property of simultaneity in the instance of two observers in different states, but not that the notion of simultaneity is itself relative. This would require the observation to be placed as a necessary condition within this state of affairs; or else, one fact (the set of events) would entail another (the set of observers at distinct points and in relation to the first state), and so simultaneity would not be defined in the absence of these two states. We must, in a word, capture the definition of all such occurences for every member of this type of set of events- that is, we must explain those trees that are observed and those that are not under examination.

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quex144

The answer to your first question lies in part with the set of "linguistic spectacles" which are acquired during upbringing. A "horse" is initially a broad category with undefined boundaries. Young children include dogs and other animals within the boundaries until further communication delimits them. The abstraction of the "word" as a phonetic symbol for the category assigns "permanence" or "thingness" to the category such that future interactions with "the thing" can be predicted. Indeed any "thing" is essence set of predicted interactions. "Properties" of things are details of the set.

For the second I can only refer you to Google references on "Einstein and Simultaneity", which will illustrate the result that time frames are relative to the observer.

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"Properties" of things are details of the set.

I was under the impression that properties define the set; that, particularly, it is the set of properties of the prospective members that is used as the criterion either for membership in the set or for their exclusion. If the criterion for membership or exclusion to a set is a "detail" of the set, the rule as it were would be from within and not from without; or, the property of the thing would be a member of the set and not of the item under consideration.

Let us draw up a set and name it A1. The rule for membership is this: the natural numbers from 1 to 4, inclusive. So we use the roster method and place it as A1={1,2,3,4}. Here we note that these numbers, apart from our project, have the same property as that named by the rule; they have been included as members of this set because they satisfy the only criterion of the set.

So, then, from where have we obtained this property? Is this property a property of the set or one of the members?

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Is it possible- no, probable- that two events occur simultaneously in the absence of any observer?

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The answer to your first question lies in part with the set of "linguistic spectacles" which are acquired during upbringing. A "horse" is initially a broad category with undefined boundaries. Young children include dogs and other animals within the boundaries until further communication delimits them. The abstraction of the "word" as a phonetic symbol for the category assigns "permanence" or "thingness" to the category such that future interactions with "the thing" can be predicted. Indeed any "thing" is essence set of predicted interactions.

I agree, on the condition that we both agree a child with the notion of 'horse' is only unaware of those boundaries which define the idea; the notion itself contains an explication of itself, though the child is unaware of this within the idea. It is true that further communication about the idea delimits the child category of 'horse', but I would say that such communication explicates the idea through an awareness of the properties of 'horse', contained, to be sure, in the notion the child holds in his or her mind.

Very interesting. We would be well advised not to leave this subject. Idea

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quex,

1. No observer...no event.

2. Set membership is a function of context (purpose)

T/-\E C/-\T

You have no problem in assigning the symbol /-\ to the disjoint sets {H} and then {A}. This implies that set membership is observer dependent.

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fresco wrote:

quex,

1. No observer...no event.

2. Set membership is a function of context (purpose)

T/-\E C/-\T

1. Berkeley's idealism/direct realism.

2. If set membership is a function of purpose, or context, then membership or exclusion to the set is itself a relation, or function, in addition to the set of relations named by the primary set; and, as above, membership or exclusion is fixed by the purpose. But the purpose of an assignment in naming certain members of a set is intimately related to those properties that include or exclude those members from the set. So perhaps it would be best to say that set membership (or exclusion) is a function of contextual properties of the prospective members within the particular assignment.

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Quote:

T/-\E C/-\T

You have no problem in assigning the symbol /-\ to the disjoint sets {H} and then {A}. This implies that set membership is observer dependent.

Could you please amplify on the above notation? Your last statement above is quite complicated, and I would like to think it through.

Thank you fresco.

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Do I exist? Do you exist? Does the moon exist? Does anything exist? Can one exist if they exist? Can one exist if they do not exist?

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Yes I agree with Berkeley but not with his evocation of "God" as an ultimate observer.

On properties (See my later edit) I am arguing that they are species/person/social group/zeittgest specific. The word "tree" on its own has no meaning. The listing of all potential properties of "tree" is a list of all possible interactions between an observer and his tree. As soon as I say "That tree is too close to the house" I am delimiting the meaning of "tree" to its potentially damaging or landscape ones. The other properties in essence cease to exist at that moment. Subjective properties are even better illustrated if we consider a birds perception of "tree"....there may be no "trees"...only "perchings" (with no differentiation by the bird between "roofs", "trees", or "pylons")

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Sturgis,

Try "existence" is "relationship".

"I" is to "Moon" as "Left" is to "Right"....not opposites but mutually dependent.

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quex

T*E C*T example is taken from a celebrated problem in pattern perception where * stands for a potentially ambiguous symbol between "A" and "H"
The point is that in dynamic context as opposed static mathematics there is NO ambiguity. The observer resolves set membership by reference to
the "word" level as opposed to the "letter" level. (Computer recognition devices find this difficult).

The implication is that static sets of properties which define "things" may be mathematical significant for binary logic, but in the real world of semantics binary logic may be a subsidiary process. Piaget pointed out that "logic" is a late development in the maturation process, hence the acquisition of meaning cannot point to logic or mathematical set theory as a necessary component.

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quex144

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Is simultaneity a necessary condition for a relation between two or more events?

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fresco wrote:

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"I" is to "Moon" as "Left" is to "Right"....not opposites but mutually dependent.

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The word "tree" on its own has no meaning. The listing of all potential properties of "tree" is a list of all possible interactions between an observer and his tree.

The problem is there is no I. No observer or I-observer can be established.

Only (apparent) objects can (appear to) interact and have relations. The observer or observing is transparent.

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fresco wrote:

The implication is that static sets of properties which define "things" may be mathematical significant for binary logic, but in the real world of semantics binary logic may be a subsidiary process. Piaget pointed out that "logic" is a late development in the maturation process, hence the acquisition of meaning cannot point to logic or mathematical set theory as a necessary component.

Do this basically mean:
Logic is not necessary for there to be meaning
?

Thanx.

Interesting thread.

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flushd wrote:
Do this basically mean:
Logic is not necessary for there to be meaning
?

Good question.

I think meaning is prior to logic and language, which are an attempt to convey the transcendent nature of meaning.

Meaning is not inherent in things, thoughts, events, language or logic.

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fresco wrote:

Yes I agree with Berkeley but not with his evocation of "God" as an ultimate observer.

On properties (See my later edit) I am arguing that they are species/person/social group/zeittgest specific. The word "tree" on its own has no meaning. The listing of all potential properties of "tree" is a list of all possible interactions between an observer and his tree. As soon as I say "That tree is too close to the house" I am delimiting the meaning of "tree" to its potentially damaging or landscape ones. The other properties in essence cease to exist at that moment. Subjective properties are even better illustrated if we consider a birds perception of "tree"....there may be no "trees"...only "perchings" (with no differentiation by the bird between "roofs", "trees", or "pylons")

On its own, or in a vacuum as it were, and without a reference to those properties ascribed to the word, the term 'tree' is meaningless; to this I agree. Though, may I ask, what is meant precisely by 'potential properties'?

It is correct to say- notwithstanding my first impression of 'potential property'- that any complete list of such properties (of the term) is, in turn, a complete list of the possible interactions between the object the term denotes and the observer.

But it is not unreasonable to say that I am not certain that particular and actual properties of a thing come into and out of existence in such a fashion, as yours above; or, to put it mildly, that a predicate delimits the meaning of a term to its potentialities. 'The tree is too close to the house' does not, to me at least, suggest additional properties- or, for that matter, a subtraction of a set of properties- not inherent in 'tree'; the predicate 'x is too close' ascribes a property to 'x' though does not delimit the meaning of 'tree'- rather, it delimits the boundaries of the states of affairs comprising the terms and functions as a criterion to what is permissable in that state. What is more, if the case is that the tree is, in fact, too close to the house, we have not affixed a new property to the original term, but have placed a property of this state of affairs, that includes the term of course, as a conditional characteristic on the term- for the moment. Someone might walk by and say that the house is too close to the tree. Shocked

Very interesting!

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Past, Present and Future - do they exist?

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