Republicans Love Activist Judges
We’ve always known that the Right’s outrage against activist judges is yet another example of Lakovian framing. Republicans use the term “activist” to designate judges whose opinions they don’t like, not those who are “making legislation”, as they claim. In fact, as this study published in the NY Times shows, Republican judges are far more activist than Democratic ones, at least by one very clear measure:
Since the Supreme Court assumed its current composition in 1994, by our count it has upheld or struck down 64 Congressional provisions. That legislation has concerned Social Security, church and state, and campaign finance, among many other issues. We examined the court’s decisions in these cases and looked at how each justice voted, regardless of whether he or she concurred with the majority or dissented.
We found that justices vary widely in their inclination to strike down Congressional laws. Justice Clarence Thomas, appointed by President George H. W. Bush, was the most inclined, voting to invalidate 65.63 percent of those laws; Justice Stephen Breyer, appointed by President Bill Clinton, was the least, voting to invalidate 28.13 percent. The tally for all the justices appears below.
Thomas 65.63%
Kennedy 64.06%
Scalia 56.25%
Rehnquist 46.88%
O’Connor 46.77%
Souter 42.19%
Stevens 39.34%
Ginsburg 39.06%
Breyer 28.13%
One conclusion our data suggests is that those justices often considered more “liberal” - Justices Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, David Souter and John Paul Stevens - vote least frequently to overturn Congressional statutes, while those often labeled “conservative” vote more frequently to do so. At least by this measure (others are possible, of course), the latter group is the most activist.
Republicans actually love activist judges but understand the political advantages of claiming otherwise. Just as they claim to love “local control” while working as hard as they can to extend the strong arm of government…
An "activist" judge is one who reaches decisions that are disagreeable to me.
An activist judge is any judge whose interpretation of a statute or provision of the U.S. Constitution is not supported by the language of the statute or constitutional provision.
Let's use a familiar example.
The Due Process Clause of the 14th amendment reads as follows.
"No state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."
Now the U.S. Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade held the word "liberty" in this clause protected a womans right to an abortion.
But this is an interpretation which the plain language of the text does not support. The clause does not guarantee any additional liberties or rights. The plain language guarantees only one thing, "PROCESS". In fact the plain language guarantees only "DUE PROCESS".
Due Process is the only thing being guaranteed in the 14th amendment Due Process clause. The clause does not guarantee anything else.
So the state can take away your life, liberty, and property so long as "due process" is given. The clause only guarantees due process.
So Roe v. Wade is a great example where the majority on the U.S. Supreme Court put on their "activist" robes.
So what is meant by "activist" judges is when a judge while interperting a statute or constitutional provision arrives at an interpretation the plain language of the text cannot bear.
. . . So, regarding the 14th Amendment and the decision in Roe v Wade, I think the Supreme Court in fact was limiting the legal ability of government to interfere in the lives of individuals in finding that the Texas statute being examined was unconstitutional because it sought to break the limits on governmental authority sety by the said 14th Amendment.
Constitutional protection of the woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy derives from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It declares that no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." The controlling word in the cases before us is "liberty." Although a literal reading of the Clause might suggest that it governs only the procedures by which a State may deprive persons of liberty, for at least 105 years, since Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 660 -661 (1887), the Clause has been understood to contain a substantive component as well, one "barring certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them." Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986). As Justice Brandeis (joined by Justice Holmes) observed, [d]espite arguments to the contrary which had seemed to me persuasive, it is settled that the due process clause of the Fourteenth [505 U.S. 833, 847] Amendment applies to matters of substantive law as well as to matters of procedure. Thus all fundamental rights comprised within the term liberty are protected by the Federal Constitution from invasion by the States. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (concurring opinion). [T]he guaranties of due process, though having their roots in Magna Carta's "per legem terrae" and considered as procedural safeguards "against executive usurpation and tyranny," have in this country "become bulwarks also against arbitrary legislation." Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 541 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting from dismissal on jurisdictional grounds) (quoting Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 532 (1884)).
The most familiar of the substantive liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment are those recognized by the Bill of Rights. We have held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates most of the Bill of Rights against the States. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147 -148 (1968). It is tempting, as a means of curbing the discretion of federal judges, to suppose that liberty encompasses no more than those rights already guaranteed to the individual against federal interference by the express provisions of the first eight amendments to the Constitution. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 -92 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). But of course this Court has never accepted that view.
It is also tempting, for the same reason, to suppose that the Due Process Clause protects only those practices, defined at the most specific level, that were protected against government interference by other rules of law when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 -128, n. 6 (1989) (opinion of SCALIA, J.). But such a view would be inconsistent with our law. It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty which the government may not enter. We have vindicated this principle before. Marriage is mentioned nowhere in the Bill of Rights, and interracial marriage was illegal [505 U.S. 833, 848] in most States in the 19th century, but the Court was no doubt correct in finding it to be an aspect of liberty protected against state interference by the substantive component of the Due Process Clause in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (relying, in an opinion for eight Justices, on the Due Process Clause). Similar examples may be found in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 94 -99 (1987); in Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 684 -686 (1977); in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 -482 (1965), as well as in the separate opinions of a majority of the Members of the Court in that case, id. at 486-488 (Goldberg, J., joined by Warren, C.J., and Brennan, J., concurring) (expressly relying on due process), id. at 500-502 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment) (same), id. at 502-507, (WHITE, J., concurring in judgment) (same); in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 -535 (1925); and in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 -403 (1923).
Neither the Bill of Rights nor the specific practices of States at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment marks the outer limits of the substantive sphere of liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment protects. See U.S. Const., Amdt. 9. As the second Justice Harlan recognized:
[T]he full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause cannot be found in or limited by the precise terms of the specific guarantees elsewhere provided in the Constitution. This "liberty" is not a series of isolated points pricked out in terms of the taking of property; the freedom of speech, press, and religion; the right to keep and bear arms; the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures; and so on. It is a rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints, . . . and which also recognizes, what a reasonable and sensitive judgment must, that certain interests require particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their abridgment. Poe v. [505 U.S. 833, 849] Ullman, supra, 367 U.S., at 543 (dissenting from dismissal on jurisdictional grounds). . . .
The ability of women to participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives. . . .
. . . As we described in [505 U.S. 833, 859] Carey v. Population Services International, supra, the liberty which encompasses those decisions
"includes "the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions." While the outer limits of this aspect of [protected liberty] have not been marked by the Court, it is clear that among the decisions that an individual may make without unjustified government interference are personal decisions "`relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and childrearing and education.'" 431 U.S., at 684 -685 (citations omitted).
The soundness of this prong of the Roe analysis is apparent from a consideration of the alternative. If indeed the woman's interest in deciding whether to bear and beget a child had not been recognized as in Roe, the State might as readily restrict a woman's right to choose to carry a pregnancy to term as to terminate it, to further asserted state interests in population control, or eugenics, for example. Yet Roe has been sensibly relied upon to counter any such suggestions. E.g., Arnold v. Board of Education of Escambia County, Ala., 880 F.2d 305, 311 (CA11 1989) (relying upon Roe and concluding that government officials violate the Constitution by coercing a minor to have an abortion); Avery v. County of Burke, 660 F.2d 111, 115 (CA4 1981) (county agency inducing teenage girl to undergo unwanted sterilization on the basis of misrepresentation that she had sickle cell trait); see also In re Quinlan, 70 N. J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976) (relying on Roe in finding a right to terminate medical treatment).
I shall now wait for my answer to be graded![]()
. . . I would have thought that the framers of a constitution written in the 18th century would think their descendants quite strange to think that the principles of the constitution would be seen to be ossified. How else can any constitutional document be relevant to a society in the 21st century unless it is interpreted in a contemporary fashion?
Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the components of liberty in its manifold possibilities, they might have been more specific. They did not presume to have this insight. They knew times can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their own search for greater freedom.
Goodfielder - What a Teachers Pet!
. . . Even family court has activist judges in our neck of the woods, with decisions being made based on attorneys they have drinks with in the Capital Club, or basic beliefs about male / female roles within the family rather than a strict reading of the law.
An example would be that North Carolina still has laws pertaining to Alimony. The current trend is for alimony to not be awarded since woman, for the most part, are no longer at home tending to the needs of their husband and family. Most woman now work and have income they contribute to the household, negating alimony. However, North Carolina still has laws that regulate and determine alimony, but the Court tends to interpret those laws rather loosely giving rather varied results totally dependant on the judge hearing the case. The attorneys know which judge they want to hear their case depending on which client (husband or wife) they have.
You're wrong. You're so wrong that you're not just standing in left field, you're in OUTER SPACE. Your statements have absolutely no basis in fact or law. When you have researched the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and educated yourself appropriately, come back and try again.
You're wrong. You're so wrong that you're not just standing in left field, you're in OUTER SPACE. Your statements have absolutely no basis in fact or law. When you have researched the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and educated yourself appropriately, come back and try again.
Due Process embodies the "law of the land" which protects individuals from arbitrary use of governmental power. See DEN EX DEM. MURRAY v. HOBOKEN LAND & IMP. CO., 59 U.S. 272 (1855) (The article [the due process clause] is a restraint on the legislative as well as on the executive and judicial powers of the government, and cannot be so construed as to leave congress free to make any process 'due process of law,' by its mere will).
The law of the land never remains stagnant or frozen in time.
Since the Constitution doesn't "give" any rights how can it be interpreted as taking any away?