Rove was the source of the Plame leak... so it appears

timberlandko wrote:

Kuvasz, your voting record isn't at issue here, the issue in specific is

1a) Did a highly placed White House figure b) criminally leak information which c) compromised national security, and, if so,

To 1a, yes, according to Robert Novak. It is fact that Novak outed a covert operative. How he (and at least five other journalists) found out about Plame's covert status is the purpose of the investigation.

To 1b, that question of the investigation is obvious. The dichotomy arises upon on whoever told whomever that Plame was, in the words of Novak "a CIA operative."

Either someone in the government with knowledge of Plame's covert status told someone in the press of Plame's status or they told someone else in the government who then told the press.

If the former case is true then whoever knew of Plame's status did reveal the status of a covert agent directly to the press. In other words, he knew her status was a secret because of his own job, yet revealed this secret.

And that was a crime committed by that government official.

If however, as in the latter case, someone in the government with secret clearance and working knowledge of Plame's status told someone else in the government of Plame's status as a CIA covert operative and as Wilson's wife and, who then subsequently told the press, then the second party must be shown to also have known of her secret (covert) status, otherwise, the leak to the press was inadvertent (and not a crime under the US codes each of us has posted earlier).

But there's the rub, Novak wrote that Plame was a "CIA operative." Whoever told him (and five other journalists) knew Plame was covert.

Regardless of whether or not this information was gained by regular process of the leaker's job, or was told about it by someone who knew of this status is not relevant, because Plame's covert status had to be known by the leaker. Otherwise, Novak would not have written of it.

The proof that the leaker knew of Plame's covert status at CIA is the actual column by Novak.

There is much ballyhoo in the right wing press that it might be that whoever told Novak about Plame did not know she was a covert agent, that she was an "analyst" who sat at a desk at CIA. Actually, she was not an "analyst" for the CIA. Instead, she was a covert agent, a NOC whose covert cover was as an "analyst" in the area of nuclear materials.

And if one knew that, one knew her CIA job was a secret

To 1c, certainly so. The removal of an experienced, internationally well connected covert agent who was intimately involved in the international tracking of nuclear materials from the efforts of the US government in an era of terrorism obviously renders the US less effective than had Plame's identity not been compromised.

We got one of our eyes poked out.

timberlandko wrote:

2) Who was that figure?

See above, either Rove told the press (and someone told Rove), or someone else told Novak and other journalists that Plame was a "CIA operative."

timberlandko wrote:

3) What are the circumstances of that person's knowlege of and subsequent release of the information leaked?

The leaking of Plame's identity was a response to Wilson's assertions about the Niger presscake issue. It was an attempt to undermine him and thus his critricism of Bush. This was the narrative of Novak's column in July of 2003.

If no one knew of Plame's job at CIA there was no reason to out her, because in outing her as CIA the allegation could be made that she got Wilson the Niger assignment. This was an attempt to attack Wilson, first by making him look incompetent to question the Bush White House vis-à-vis Niger, and as a method to undermine Wilson's statements in his June 2003 NYT essay.

Addtitionally, It was clearly an act of vengeance and employed to set an example of Wilson for future criticisms of the White House.

timberlandko wrote:

This is where it
and, though marginal,
4) To whom was the information leaked, and when.

There are at least six journalists who were given information by highly placed Bush administration officials. Three are widely known; Novak, Chris Cooper of Time Magazine, and Judith Miller of the NY Times. There are three others, one of whom is likely Chris Mathews, one of the others is likely a Washington Post journalist.

There would was no reason to leak the Plame identity before Wilson's NY Times essay in June 2003. The leak was in response to his essay casting the Bush administration as having lied about the Niger press cakes. Again, attacking Wilson's credentials was the narrative of Novak's column in July of 2003.

timberlandko wrote:

The issue is not Wilson's veracity. It is not any role Plame may or may not have had in Wilson's assignment. It is not what was or was not the evidence gathered by Wilson. It is not who may have said or done what in any report, analysis, or summation other than the yet-to-be-issued grand jury statement of investigation findings and conclusions. All the rest is side show, irrelevant, or of at most tangential relationship to the issue at hand.

Actually, the reason the information was leaked was to undermine Wilson's veracity and cast doubt about his criticism of Bush and the leak dealt directly with Plame's role in Wilson's CIA assignment in Niger.

All of these things ARE a part of the issue, because in actions like this motive is understood as a priori to action. And understanding motive produces hypotheses as to process. The leak did not JUST happen, there was a reason and the reason was to hurt Wilson. Once that is understood, the investigation moves to who had a motive to harm Wilson.

Plane was outed in effort to hurt Wilson. Plame was just the weapon used to do it.

timberlandko wrote:

As to that issue, a negative finding in the case of any of item 1) as cited above essentially moots the rest, though a finding of complicity involving someone other than a White House official still leaves items 2) through 4) to be addressed, but removes the White House from the equation, a circumstance which would be much to the inconvenience of the Rove-ophobes.

Portray the issue however you find convenient and comforting. The Grand Jury is dealing with items 1) through 4) as listed above, and will, when Fitzcerald deems it appropriate, release its findings and conclusions pertinent thereto.

I am trained as a scientist, so let us run the experiment and see what happens.

However, the fact remains that this Bush administration attacked Joe Wilson through his wife, did it for political purposes, and no national security advantage was gained by doing so. In fact, it hurt the efforts of the US to reign in rogue efforts to acquire nuclear materials.

It is the sheer venality of this episode that is most disheartening. One can look at the Busheviks and decry their visions for a Pax Americana and the methods to achieve it by invading countries who pose little direct threat to America. This criticism is based upon a diagreement with that vision, the ideology and/or the means to achieve this Pax Americana, but the leakings to attack Wilson in this affair is just so sleazy, so junior high school crap that any semblance of this being a contest of ideologies is thrown out the window once the pettiness of this affair is revealed.

The Busheviks could not debate the issues that Wilson (and the Intelligence commission) addressed. Instead, they used personal attacks as a proxy to debate the legitamacy of the actual issue of the Niger press cakes.

That is what is so disappointing here, again, the venality of it. Its so school yard. We should expect better from our government.

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kuvasz, your central thesis is founded on a number of as-yet-unvalidated assumptions - you presume to know what the Grand Jury has found. I presume to postulate that what is anounced by the Grand Jury will be counter to your core presumptions.

We shall see. Untill we see, untill the Grand Jury renders its report, we, all of us, merely guess.

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These statements do not lead to your conclusion.

Plame's covert status had to be known by the leaker. Otherwise, Novak would not have written of it.
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This is not true. They could have thought she was in an administrative position. Tenet was in an administrative position.
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The proof that the leaker knew of Plame's covert status at CIA is the actual column by Novak.
--------
Where?

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timberlandko wrote:

kuvasz, your central thesis is founded on a number of as-yet-unvalidated assumptions - you presume to know what the Grand Jury has found. I presume to postulate that what is anounced by the Grand Jury will be counter to your core presumptions.

We shall see. Untill we see, untill the Grand Jury renders its report, we, all of us, merely guess.

Lash wrote:

These statements do not lead to your conclusion.
Plame's covert status had to be known by the leaker. Otherwise, Novak would not have written of it.

This is not true. They could have thought she was in an administrative position. Tenet was in an administrative position.

The proof that the leaker knew of Plame's covert status at CIA is the actual column by Novak.
Where?

Shall we check the available facts on this?

Novak's column of July 13, linked below reprinted at townhall.com the next day

http://www.townhall.com/columnists/robertnovak/printrn20030714.shtml

Quote:

Wilson never worked for the CIA, but his wife, Valerie Plame, is an Agency operative on weapons of mass destruction. Two senior administration officials told me Wilson's wife suggested sending him to Niger to investigate the Italian report. The CIA says its counter-proliferation officials selected Wilson and asked his wife to contact him. "I will not answer any question about my wife," Wilson told me.

Novak's initial column identified Plame as "an Agency operative on weapons of mass destruction."

Quote:

Two government officials have told the FBI that conservative columnist Robert Novak was asked specifically not to publish the name of undercover CIA operative Valerie Plame in his now-famous July 14 newspaper column. The two officials told investigators they warned Novak that by naming Plame he might potentially jeopardize her ability to engage in covert work, stymie ongoing intelligence operations, and jeopardize sensitive overseas sources.

These new accounts, provided by a current and former administration official close to the situation, directly contradict public statements made by Novak. He has downplayed his own knowledge about the potential harm to Plame and ongoing intelligence operations by making that disclosure. He has also claimed in various public statements that intelligence officials falsely led him to believe that Plame was only an analyst, and the only potential consequences of her exposure as a CIA officer would be that she might be inconvenienced in her foreign travels.

The two administration officials questioned by the FBI characterized Novak's statements as untrue and misleading, according to a government official and an attorney official familiar with the FBI interviews.

One of the sources also asserted that the credibility of the administration officials who spoke to the FBI is enhanced by the fact that the officials made their statement to the federal law enforcement authorities. If the officials were found to be lying to the FBI, they could be potentially prosecuted for making false statements to federal investigators the sources pointed out.

The two officials say Novak was told, as one source put it, that Plame's work for the CIA "went much further than her being an analyst," and that publishing her name would be "hurtful" and could stymie ongoing intelligence operations and jeopardize her overseas sources.

"When [Novak] says that he was not told that he was 'endangering' someone, that statement might be technically true," this source says. "Nobody directly told him that she was going to be physically hurt. But that was implicit in that he was told what she did for a living."
"At best, he is parsing words," said the other official. "At worst, he is lying to his readers and the public. Journalists should not lie, I would think."

These new accounts, provided by two sources familiar to the investigation, contradict Novak's attempts to downplay his own knowledge about the potential harm to Plame.

Moreover, one of the government officials who has told federal investigators that Novak's account is false has also turned over to investigators contemporaneous notes he made of at least one conversation with Novak. Those notes, according to sources, appear to corroborate the official's version of events.

http://www.prospect.org/webfeatures/2004/02/waas-m-02-12.html

Novak claims of ignorance ring hollow. Novak's original column referred to Valerie Plame as an "Agency operative on weapons of mass destruction." Novak's use of the term "operative" - generally understood to imply she was a secret agent -- is important because Novak now claims he didn't know Plame was working undercover. Novak has stated (to Tim Russert during an October 5, 2003 appearance on NBC's "Meet the Press") that he "did not mean" to describe Plame as an "operative":

"The one thing I regret I wrote. I used the word 'operative,' and I think [David] Broder will agree that I use the word too much. I use it about hack politicians. I use it about people on the Hill. And if somebody did a Nexis search of my columns, they'd find an overuse of 'operative.' I did not mean it."

The Hill columnist Josh Marshall took the "Nexis" challenge to see how Novak has used the term in past columns and found that Novak knows exactly what the term "agency operative" means:

"I took Novak up on his Nexis challenge, and he does make frequent use of the word 'operative.' But the question is how he uses it in this context. I searched for all the times Novak has used the term 'agency operative' or 'CIA operative,' and I came up with six examples. In every case, Novak clearly used the phrase to refer to clandestine agents.... In other words, Novak knows the phrase 'agency operative' is a term of art with a very specific meaning.On December 3rd 2001 Novak reported on the surprise and even outrage among CIA veterans that Mike Spann's identity had been revealed even in death. Spann was the agent killed at the uprising at Mazar-i-Sharif Thus Novak: "Exposure of CIA [/u]operative[/u] Johnny (Mike) Spann's identity as the first American killed in Afghanistan is viewed by surprised intelligence insiders as an effort by Director George Tenet to boost the embattled CIA's prestige."

On November 1st, 2001 Novak described the Agency's handling of the late Afghan resistance commander Abdul Haq. Thus Novak: "the CIA was keeping in close touch with Haq's friends but providing more criticism than help. The Afghan freedom fighter who was honored by Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher during the war against the Soviets became "Hollywood Haq" to the CIA. He was described by the agency's operatives

This is the most ambiguous reference. But I think it's pretty clear here that Novak is referring to people in the field, i.e., operatives, not analysts back at Langley.

On September 23rd, 2001, Novak discussed the long decline of the CIA, particularly its human intelligence (HUMINT) and operational capacities. He made particular reference to the tenure of Stansfield Turner as DCI. Thus Novak: "Appalled by the CIA's operatives in Central America, he issued the now-famous order against hiring unsavory local agents. There went any serious effort at espionage." Again, that ain't a reference to analysts.

On July 5th, 1999, Novak reviewed Bill Buckley's new book on Joe McCarthy and in the course of that review he noted how Buckley had "honed his craft well in chronicling the fictional adventures of his CIA operative, Blackford Oakes." Now, the Blackford Oakes spy novels are well, spy novels. So this one's pretty clear.

On September 22nd, 1997 Novak noted to the role of "Bob," someone whom he referred to as an "undercover CIA agent" who got pulled into the Roger Tamraz phase of the campaign finance scandal. Later in the same column Novak referred to "Bob" as a "CIA operative." Ergo, "undercover CIA agent" equals "CIA operative."

On September 18th, 1997 Novak referred to this same "Bob" on CNN as an "an undercover CIA operative."[/u]

I also did a quick search for Novak's references to "CIA analyst" or "agency analyst" I found three --- each clearly referring to people who were in fact analysts. In an 1993 column, Novak used a precise phrasing to refer to "CIA briefer Brian Latell, a 30-year career officer." Again, no vague use of 'operative.'

I don't think this requires too much commentary, does it?

Clearly, Novak knows the meaning of the phrase 'CIA operative' and he uses it advisedly. In the last decade he's never used the phrase to mean anything but clandestine agents.

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"The one thing I regret I wrote. I used the word 'operative,' and I think [David] Broder will agree that I use the word too much. I use it about hack politicians. I use it about people on the Hill. And if somebody did a Nexis search of my columns, they'd find an overuse of 'operative.' I did not mean it."
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I have heard Republican and Democrat talking heads referred to as operatives. It's a bit of a slur.

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Sorry, Kuvasz, I believe there's no "There" there, either.

As referenced here, Novak indeed uses the term "operative" in manner other than you and Josh Marshall contend:

Quote:

(Novak) ... Rove was indeed fired by Mosbacher from Victory '92 but continued as a national Bush-for-president operative.

Source

Now, that's just one example, which happened to be conveniently handy, but I've listend to, watched, and read Novak for years. He uses the word to describe damned near any functionary to whom he might be referring, and always has.

The argument that Novak's use of the word "operative" in connection with Plame in any way conveys or even implies foreknowledge on Novak's part of Plame's purported national security status is as short of substance as the rest of the Bushophobia/Rove-ophobia comprising the entire silly affair.

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The White House apologists will continue to try to obfusate the issue and regurgitate the Republican spion right up until the time indictments are announced. Then, they will try to move the goalposts again and say "Ah-hah! But you will never comnvict them" And they will continue with their obfuscation until a conviction then they will move the goalposts.

Sure, no one knows for sure who perpetrated this foul act but the fact that any patriotic American would try to defend it is disturbing.

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OMFG and more obfuscation while I was typing my post.

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It has got to be the height of stupdity or perhaps dishonesty for anyone to calim that a Grand Jury has spent two years investgating an incident that is not a crime. It really boggles the mind.

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timberlandko wrote:

Sorry, Kuvasz, I believe there's no "There" there, either.

As referenced here, Novak indeed uses the term "operative" in manner other than you and Josh Marshall contend:

Quote:
(Novak) ... Rove was indeed fired by Mosbacher from Victory '92 but continued as a national Bush-for-president operative.

Source

Now, that's just one example, which happened to be conveniently handy, but I've listend to, watched, and read Novak for years. He uses the word to describe damned near any functionary to whom he might be referring, and always has.

The argument that Novak's use of the word "operative" in connection with Plame in any way conveys or even implies foreknowledge on Novak's part of Plame's purported national security status is as short of substance as the rest of the Bushophobia/Rove-ophobia comprising the entire silly affair.

You are grasping at straws. Your example is just laughable.

Novak was referring to a public political figure in your example. In each of the documented references above in his writings, whenever the person in question was in fact, a covert agent in the intelligence community (like Valerie Plame) it is clearly shown that he has consistently used the term "operative."

Novak did not expect anyone to check on his past writings and was, as most old people are, clueless about what a Lexis-Nexis search could reveal.

Josh Marshall caught him in a prevarication laden with canards.

When writing of people in the intelligence community who were publicly known to work for CIA as analysts, he consistently referred to them as an "analyst," but never as an "operative." To believe Novak now you must believe:

1. that he went against the entirety of his 40 years as a journalist and (as Josh Marshall showed) the entirety of his past usage of the word when describing members of the intelligence community.

or

2. that Novak was just sloppy the day he wrote about Plame.

AND NECESSARILY

3. the CIA officials he contacted for confirmation of Plame's status at CIA lied to the FBI about Novak knowing Plame was covert.

Plame was not a public political figure, she was as Novak wrote, an operative, viz., a covert agent, and the type of person in the intelligence community who Novak consistently referred to in his previous writings as an "operative."

According to a lexis-nexis search, Novak has not used the term "operative" to describe publically known CIA personnel, regardless of his protestations. He has consistently used the term "operative" only in reference to covert agents when reporting on intelligence matters

His excuse for calling Plame one now is not consistent with his past usage of the word "operative" in relation to intelligence personnel know by him to be covert.

He did not just have a brain fart that day, he knew exactly what he was doing by calling Plame an "operative," and those government officials in the CIA Novak contacted for confirmation and who spoke to the FBI about Novak indicated that Novak know Plame was covert too.

Sorry fella', that dog won't hunt.

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operative--any hack, not trusted to deal fairly.

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Chrissee, no one is defending anything - other than those who are defending the silly flap in the first place. It is unknown whether a crime was committed, it is unknown precisely what, if there was a crime, the nature of that crime might be, it is unkinown who and in what manner had which particular relationship to the commision of the yet-to-be-determined-crime-if-any. We know Wilson, who was not a supporter of The Administration, not a supporter of intervention in Iraq, not a trained investigator, not scientist, but a diplomat, went to Nigeria. He told us so himself, and its been reliably confirmed that happened. We know Novak wrote an article critical of Wilson's bona fides for the mission, and we know that article identified Wilson's wife as a CIA employee. We know Wilson reacted angrilly to Novak's article, and we know The Opposition took up the hue and cry for The Administration to investigate the matter. We know the investigation is under way, and we know that 2 reporters became involved in confidentiality issues arising from the investigation. We know the courts, all the way up to SCOTUS, did not shield those reporters from responsbility to cooperate fully with the investigation. We know that one of those reporters now has been jailed, the other has chosen to cooperate. We know there has been a whole lot of conjecture, posturing, and punditry surrounding the affair, and beyond that, we don't know much else about the affair. We can only guess. Untill the Grand Jury releases its report, all we can do is guess. My guess is there is much less to The Plame Game than some folks assume meets the eye.

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Lash wrote:

operative--any hack, not trusted to deal fairly.

op·er·a·tive
adj.
1. Being in effect; having force; operating: "Two major tendencies are operative in the American political system" Heinz Eulau.
2. Functioning effectively; efficient.
3. Engaged in or concerned with physical or mechanical activity.
4. Of, relating to, or resulting from a surgical operation.
5. Significant; most important; key: The operative word is "low-fat."

noun.
1. A skilled worker, especially in industry.
2.
a. A secret agent; a spy.
b. A private investigator

http://www.thefreedictionary.com/operative

Clearly the assumption is that Novak must be believed when asserting he was describing Valerie Plame as "a skilled worker?"

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And we know that the outing of Valerie Plame was a crime. Otherwise, there would be no Grand Jury investigation or, at the very least, it would have wrapped up shortly after convened.

The judge who ruled against Miller's appeal said there is substantial evidence that a crime involving a SERIOUS BREACH OF NATIONAL SECURITY occurred.

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timberlandko wrote:

Chrissee, no one is defending anything - other than those who are defending the silly flap in the first place. It is unknown whether a crime was committed, it is unknown precisely what, if there was a crime, the nature of that crime might be, it is unkinown who and in what manner had which particular relationship to the commision of the yet-to-be-determined-crime-if-any. We know Wilson, who was not a supporter of The Administration, not a supporter of intervention in Iraq, not a trained investigator, not scientist, but a diplomat, went to Nigeria. He told us so himself, and its been reliably confirmed that happened. We know Novak wrote an article critical of Wilson's bona fides for the mission, and we know that article identified Wilson's wife as a CIA employee. We know Wilson reacted angrilly to Novak's article, and we know The Opposition took up the hue and cry for The Administration to investigate the matter. We know the investigation is under way, and we know that 2 reporters became involved in confidentiality issues arising from the investigation. We know the courts, all the way up to SCOTUS, did not shield those reporters from responsbility to cooperate fully with the investigation. We know that one of those reporters now has been jailed, the other has chosen to cooperate. We know there has been a whole lot of conjecture, posturing, and punditry surrounding the affair, and beyond that, we don't know much else about the affair. We can only guess. Untill the Grand Jury releases its report, all we can do is guess. My guess is there is much less to The Plame Game than some folks assume meets the eye.

what the hell are you talking about?

your passage is full of prevarications too.

1. Novak did not "identifie(d) Wilson's wife as a CIA employee."

Novak outed a covert NOC and an important one in the war on terror.

I will not even stoop to accusing you of supporting people who weaken us in this war, because while it would be easy to do so considering your apparent support for or dismiss the consequences of Novak's actions, I know damn right well you and I are both patriots. But I would bet my soul if the sole was on the other foot and I supported a left wing journalist who did what Novak did, I would be accused by the right wingers around here that I was supporting those who weaken the war effort.

2. That the "The Opposition took up the hue and cry for The Administration to investigate the matter." is not what caused a Justice Department investigation in this matter. It was specifically requested by the Central Intelligence Agency.

For some unknown, godforesaken reason, they dont like it when their covert agents are revealed in the newspapers and decades of covert operations world-wide are blown.

Every single person Plame had business contacts with in the world for the past 15 years now is suspected by America's enemies of being a spy for the United States.

That is the affect on Novak's essay. Novak's revelation was a stab in the eye America uses to keep tabs on the rest of the world's use and manufacture of uranium and plutonium.

Are you old enought to recall the ex-CIA OPERATIVE Phillip Agee's public revelations of the names of CIA station chiefs world-wide back in the late '70's-early '80's? It got one murdered in Athens Greece.

We don't know the damage yet in this affair, but likely people who trusted us will die because of it.

maybe its not getting a lot of play in the right wing media, but the CIA is hoping mad at Novak and wants him or whoever outed Plame imprisoned.

If the CIA starting leaking things that make Bush look bad, you can bet your house its payback for Plame's outing by Bush administration officials.

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Jailed Journalist Reports NY Times Desecration
by Scott Ott
(2005-07-09) -- Law enforcement authorities in major U.S. cities put riot police on high alert today after recently-jailed journalist Judith Miller complained that prison guards had desecrated her copy of The New York Times.

"We know that journalists worship the Times," said one deputy police chief, "If they take to the streets in protest, things could get ugly fast."

Ms. Miller, who works for the Times' counter-intelligence department, told an unnamed visitor that her copy of the revered 'Gray Lady' had been carelessly tossed on the floor, handled by a conservative Republican jailer (who she called 'an infidel') and may have been used as a lining for a cat's litter box.

"They did everything but flush it down the toilet," she said. "They have no respect for the 'paper of record', may it publish forever, nor for the wise and powerful ones who create this daily miracle."

Wednesday, a judge sentenced Ms. Miller to jail for obstructing a federal investigation into who leaked the identity of a covert CIA operative, Valerie Plame, who also posed for pictures in a top-secret issue of Vanity Fair magazine.

http://www.scrappleface.com/

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thanks for sharing that JW, it makes my day. Have you got anything on Hillary being bi-sexual?

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Quote:

New Explosive Rove Revelation To Come? Time to Frog-March?

Time to get ready for the Karl Rove frog-march?

David Corn July 9, 2005

I don't usually log on Saturday evenings. But I've received information too good not to share immediately. It was only yesterday that I was bemoaning the probability that--after a week of apparent Rove-related revelations--it might be a while before any more news emerged about the Plame/CIA leak. Yet tonight I received this as-solid-as-it-gets tip: on Sunday Newsweek is posting a story that nails Rove.

CONTINUED AT,

http://www.davidcorn.com/

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kuvasz, I offer for your consideration this:

First, it is a matter of routine policy for the CIA to forward to DOJ for investigation any incident involving the potential disclosure of privileged information which come to its attention. There's no reason for it, its just policy, as the saying goes. Next, the routine investigation request remained routinely obscure until questions began to attach to Wilson's junket. Democrat Senators Durbin and Schumer, staunch Administration critics and noted foes of the Iraq intervention, were the champions of pursuing the investigation, pressing the matter with considerable vigor. Of course, once The Media got wind of it, the flap began in earnest ... and was well received among the opponents of The Current Administration, which folks largely have kept the wind beneath its wings. And next, no finding of crime, or indictment of individual has been announced by the Grand Jury, which exists because the Democrats insisted on it.

What follows, quoted below, is directly from the main body of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence July 7, 2004 report (Download Note: 30MB Zipped .pdf file - 524 pages), as unanimously agreed to by all members of the comnmittee. The section quoted is from the Niger chapter, and is subchaptered as "Former Ambassador". It begins on page 39 of the report.

Quote:

B. Former Ambassador
(REDACTED) Officials from the CIA's DO Counterproliferation Division (CPD) told Committee staff that in response to questions from the Vice President's Office and the Departments of State and Defense on the alleged Iraq-Niger uranium deal, CPD officials discussed ways to obtain additional information. (REDACTED) who could make immediate inquiries into the reporting, CPD decided to contact a former ambassabor to Gabon who had a posting early in his career in Niger.

(REDACTED) Some CPD officials could not recall how the office decided to contact the former ambassador, however, interviews and documents provided to the Committee indicate that his wife, a CPD employee, suggested his name for the trip. The CPD reports officer told Committee staff that the former ambassador's wife "offered up his name" and a memorandum to the Deputy Chief of the CPD on February 12, 2002, from the former ambassador's wife says, "my husband has good relations with both the PM [Prime Minister] and the former Minister of Mines (not to mention lots of French contacts), both of whom could possibly shed light on this sort of activity." This was just one day before CPD sent a cable (REDACTED) requesting concurrence with CPD's idea to send the former ambassador to Niger and requesting any additional information from the foreign government service on their uranium reports. The former ambassador's wife told Committee staff that when CPD decided it would like to send the former ambassador to Niger, she approached her husband on behalf of the CIA and told him "there's this crazy report " on a purported deal for Niger to sell uranium to Iraq.

(REDACTED) The former ambassador had travelled previously to Niger on the CIA's behalf (REDACTED) . The former ambassador was selected for the 1999 trip after his wife mentioned to her supervisors that her husband was planning a business trip to Niger in the near future and might be willing to use his contacts in the region (REDACTED) . Because the former ambassador did not uncover any information about (REDACTED) during this visit to Niger, CPD did not distribute an intelligence report on the visit.

On February 19, 2002, the embassy in Niger disseminated a cable which reported the alleged Iraq-Niger uranium deal "provides sufficient detail to warrant another hard look at Niger's uranium sales. The names of GON [government of Niger] officials cited in the re[port track closely with those we know to be in those . or closely-related positions. However, the purported 4,000 ton annual production listed is fully 1,000 tons more than the miming companies claim to have produced in 2001." The report indicated that the ambassador had met with the Nigerien Foreign Minister to ask for unequivocal assurance that Niger had stuck to its commitment not to sell uranium to rogue states. The cable also noted that in September 2001 the Nigerien Prime Minister had told embassy officials that there were "buyers like Iraq" that would pay more for Niger's uranium than France, but the Prime Minister added, "of course Niger cannot sell to them." The cable concluded that despite previous assurances from Nigerien officials that no uranium would be sold to rogue nations. "we should not dismiss out of hand the possibility that some scheme could be, or has been, underway to supply Iraq with yellowcake from here." The cable also suggested raising the issue with the French, who control the uranium mines in Niger, despite France's solid assurances that no uranium could be diverted to rogue states.

On February 19, 2002, CPD hosted a meeting with the former ambassador, intelligence analysats from both the CIA and INR, and several individuals from the DO's Africa and CPD divisions. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the merits of the former ambassador travelling to Niger. An INR analyst's notes indicate that the meeting was "apparently convened by [the former ambassador's wife] who had the idea to dispatch [him] to use his contacts to sort out the Iraq-Niger uranium issue. The former ambassador's wife told Committee staff that she only attended the meeting to introduce her husband and left after about three minutes.

(U) The INR analyst's meeting notes and electronic mail (e-mail) from other participants indicate that the INR explained its skepticism that the alleged uranium contract could possibly be carried out due to the fact that it would be very difficult to hide such a large shipment of yellowcake and because "the French appear to have control of the uranium mining, milling, transport process, and would seem to have little interest in selling uranium to the Iraqis." The notes also indicate that INR believed the embassy in Niger had good contacts and would be able to get to the truth on the uranium issue, suggesting a visit from the ambassodor would be redundant. Other meeting participants argued that the trip would do little to clarify the story on the alleged uranium deaql because the Nigerians would be unlikely to admit to a uranium sales agreement with Iraq, even if one had been negotiated. An e-mail from a WINPAC analyst to CPD following the meewting noted "it appears that the results from this source will be suspect at best, and not believable under most scenarios"

Now, the above are findings, official Senate Committee findings. They are not conclusions, granted, but they are findings - by definition. They are findings unanimously endorsed by the Committee as a whole. They are Official, Published, Senate Committee Findings, like it or not.

Plenty of fascinating reading follows over the next few dozen pages, doing no good at all for Wilson's widely publicized assertions. Don't take my word for it, download the report and actually read it. I did so when it was released, and there is much in the Media's appraisal and characterization of the report to which I take exception - great exception. Rereading it for this excercize makes me even more upset with The Mainstream Media - but thats another issue - forget it for now.

Anyhow, back to the report. Skipping to the subsection titled "Niger Conclusions", we come to Conclusion 13, which reads

Quote:

The report on the former ambassador's trip to Niger, disseminated in March 2002, did not change any analyst's assessment of the Iraq-Niger uranium deal. For most analysts, the information in the report lent more credibility to the original Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reports on the uranium deal, but the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) analysts believed that the report supported their assessment that Niger was unlikely to be willing or able to sell uranium to Iraq

Skipping along a lot further, we come, some 400 pages later, to Senator Robert's comments.

Quote:

ADDITIONAL VIEWS
Additional Views
of
Chairman Pat Roberts
joined by
Senator Christopher S. Bond, Senator Orrin G. Hatch

I have no doubt that the debate over many aspects of the U.S. liberation of Iraq will continue for decades, but one fact is now clear, the U.S. Intelligence Community told the President, the Congress, and the American people before the war that Saddam had stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons, and if left unchecked, would probably have a nuclear weapon during this decade. More than a year after Saddam's fall, it also seems clear that no stockpiles are going to be found, the Iraqi nuclear program was dormant, and the President, the Congress and American people deserve an explanation.

In short, the Intelligence Community's prewar assessments were wrong. This report seeks to explain how that happened. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence was formed in 1976 during a crisis of confidence in the country and in response to a need to rebuild the public's trust in government institutions including its intelligence agencies. The Senate created this Committee to conduct, for the first time, on behalf of the American people, vigorous oversight of the intelligence activities of the United States. While the underlying premise of legislative oversight is the need for "public" accountability, the Intelligence Committee's oversight usually occurs behind closed doors. This is a conundrum the Committee deals with on a daily basis. With the vast majority of our oversight being conducted out of sight, it is exceedingly difficult to assure the American people that we are doing our jobs. What may appear to be little to no Committee activity, often belies an intense and probing examination the result of which will never be made known to the public because the nation's security interests are paramount. However, the shear gravity of certain unique issues can raise the public's interest to a level that requires a public
accounting. This is such an issue.

The scope of the Committee's 12 month inquiry into the U.S. Intelligence Community's prewar assessments regarding Iraq is without precedent in the history of the Committee. The Committee has looked behind the Community's assessments to evaluate not only the quantity and quality of intelligence upon which it based its judgments, but also the reasonableness of the judgments themselves. The result is a detailed and meticulous recitation of the intelligence reporting and the concomitant evolution of the analyses. From the details emerges a report that is very critical of the Intelligence Community's performance. Some have expressed concern that such criticism is not only unnecessary, but will also engender excessive risk aversion. I believe that, although that
is possible, we should not underestimate the character of the hard-working men and women of the Intelligence Community. While criticism is never easy to accept, professionals understand the need for self-examination and the men and women of the Intelligence Community are, first and foremost, true and dedicated professionals.

In order to begin the process of self-examination, however, one must recognize or admit that one has a problem. Unfortunately, many in the Intelligence Community are finding it difficult to recognize the full extent of this significant intelligence failure. It is my hope that this report will facilitate that process. The painstaking detail and harsh criticisms in this report are necessary not only because the democratic process demands it, but also to ensure that there is an honest accounting of the mistakes that were made so that they are not repeated. It is the constitutional responsibility of the Legislature to conduct such an accounting.

It was my hope from the outset of this inquiry that the Committee could handle this important matter in a responsible manner untainted by politics. Despite early setbacks and differences of opinion, I believe we achieved that goal. A clear measure of our success is the fact that this report was approved by a unanimous vote. However, this achievement did not come without very hard work and perseverance. The Committee's Vice Chairman and I have worked in full consultation throughout this process. I long ago lost count of the many meetings I have had with the Vice Chairman and Democrat and Republican members to hear and discuss their concerns about the inquiry. In response to Minority concerns and suggestions, we made many adjustments along the way. We conducted additional interviews, and most important, we expanded the scope of the review and made more than 200 changes to this report at the request of Democrat members. I am confident that every member of this committee has had ample opportunity to involve themselves to whatever extent they wished throughout the process.

Despite our hard and successful work to deliver a unanimous report, however, there were two issues on which the Republicans and Democrats could not agree: 1)
whether the Committee should conclude that former Ambassador Joseph Wilson's public statements were not based on knowledge he actually possessed,
and 2) whether the Committee should conclude that it was the former ambassador's wife who recommended
him for his trip to Niger.

Niger
The Committee began its review of prewar intelligence on Iraq by examining the Intelligence Community's sharing of intelligence information with the UNMOVIC inspection teams. (The Committee's findings on that topic can be found in the section of the report titled, "The Intelligence Community's Sharing of Intelligence on Iraqi Suspect WMD Sites with UN Inspectors.") Shortly thereafter, we expanded the review when former Ambassador Joseph Wilson began speaking publicly about his role in exploring the possibility that Iraq was seeking or may have acquired uranium yellowcake from Africa. Ambassador Wilson's emergence was precipitated by a passage in President Bush's January 2003 State of the Union address which is now referred to as "the sixteen words." President Bush stated, " . . . the British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa." The details of the Committee's findings and conclusions on this issue can be found in the Niger section of the report. What cannot be found, however, are two conclusions upon which the Committee's Democrats would not agree. While there was no dispute with the underlying facts, my Democrat colleagues refused to allow the following conclusions to appear in the report:

Conclusion: The plan to send the former ambassador to Niger was suggested by the former ambassador's wife, a CIA employee.
The former ambassador's wife suggested her husband for the trip to Niger in February 2002. The former ambassador had traveled
previously to Niger on behalf of the CIA, also at the suggestion of his wife, to look into another matter not related to Iraq. On February 12,
2002, the former ambassador's wife sent a memorandum to a Deputy Chief of a division in the CIA's Directorate of Operations which said,
"[m]y husband has good relations with both the PM [prime minister] and the former Minister of Mines (not to mention lots of French contacts), both of whom could possibly shed light on this sort of activity." This was just one day before the same Directorate of Operations division sent a cable to one of its overseas stations requesting concurrence with the division's idea to send the former ambassador to Niger.

Conclusion: Rather than speaking publicly about his actual experiences during his inquiry of the Niger issue, the former ambassador seems to have included information he learned from press accounts and from his beliefs about how the Intelligence Community would have or should have handled the information he provided. At the time the former ambassador traveled to Niger, the Intelligence Community did not have in its possession any actual documents on the alleged Niger-Iraq uranium deal, only second hand reporting of the deal. The former ambassador's comments to reporters that the Niger-Iraq uranium documents "may have been forged because 'the dates were wrong and the names were wrong,'" could not have been based on the former ambassador's actual experiences because the Intelligence Community did not have the documents at the time of the ambassador's trip. In addition, nothing in the report from the former ambassador's trip said anything about documents having been forged or the names or dates in the reports having been incorrect. The former ambassador told Committee staff that he, in fact, did not have access to any of the names and dates in the CIA's reports and said he may have become confused about his own recollection after the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported in March 2003 that the names and dates on the documents were not correct. Of note, the names and dates in the documents that the IAEA found to be incorrect were not names or dates included in the CIA reports.

Following the Vice President's review of an intelligence report regarding a possible uranium deal, he asked his briefer for the CIA's analysis of the issue. It was this request which generated Mr. Wilson's trip to Niger. The former ambassador's public comments suggesting that the Vice President had been briefed on the information gathered during his trip is not correct, however. While the CIA responded to the Vice President's request for the Agency's analysis, they never provided the information gathered by the former Ambassador. The former ambassador, in an NBC Meet the Press interview on July 6, 2003, said, "The office of the Vice President, I am absolutely convinced, received a very specific response to the question it asked and that response was based upon my trip out there." The former ambassador was speaking on the basis of what he believed should have happened based on his former government experience, but he had no knowledge that this did happen.

These and other public comments from the former ambassador, such as comments that his report "debunked" the Niger-Iraq uranium story, were incorrect and have led to a distortion in the press and in the public's understanding of the facts surrounding the Niger-Iraq uranium story. The Committee found that, for most analysts, the former ambassador's report lent more credibility, not less, to the reported Niger-Iraq uranium deal.

During Mr. Wilson's media blitz, he appeared on more than thirty television shows including entertainment venues. Time and again, Joe Wilson told anyone who would listen that the President had lied to the American people, that the Vice President had lied, and that he had "debunked" the claim that Iraq was seeking uranium from Africa. As discussed in the Niger section of the report, not only did he NOT "debunk" the claim, he actually gave some intelligence analysts even more reason to believe that it may be true.

I believed very strongly that it was important for the Committee to conclude publicly that many of the statements made by Ambassador Wilson were not only incorrect, but had no basis in fact. In an interview with Committee staff, Mr. Wilson was asked how he knew some of the things he was stating publicly with such confidence. On at least two occasions he admitted that he had no direct knowledge to support some of his claims and that he was drawing on either unrelated past experiences or no information at all. For example, when asked how he "knew" that the Intelligence Community had rejected the possibility of a Niger-Iraq uranium deal, as he wrote in his book, he told Committee staff that his assertion may have involved "a little literary flair." The former Ambassador, either by design or through ignorance, gave the American people and, for that matter, the world a version of events that was inaccurate, unsubstantiated, and misleading. Surely, the Senate Intelligence Committee, which has unique access to all of the facts, should have been able to agree on a conclusion that would correct the public record. Unfortunately, we were unable to do so.

So ... along party lines, and despite the evidence, the unanimously endorsed findings, the Democrats on the Committee, the minority, did not endorse 2 (out of over 100) conclusions: 1) that Plame set up Wilson's junket, and 2) that Wilson made uip "facts" to suit his agenda. The rest of the conclusions, including the aforementioned Niger Conclusion 13, stand unanimously endorsed. The 2 disputed conclusions are not the impressions of 3 dissidents, as you allege, they were witheld from the report on party lines ... the Democrats on the Committee, the minority, disagreed with the Republicans, the majority, all of whom endorsed the 2 disputed conclusions, based on the findings.

I don't believe the foregoing jibes very well with your take on Wilson, his role, and the role of his wife, kuvasz. To my mind, the only reasonable conclusion that may be drawn from this is that the Democrats of the Committee, the Committee's minority, politicized the report, overriding the majority opinion, thereby tarnishing the report and discrediting themselves. Your mileage may vary, but I figure the whole deal is an attempt at a partisan hatchet job, and I expect its going to backfire on its Democratic Party champions.

0 Replies

Oh, hell, JTT, why tease? The Newsweek story has been online for hours.
Matt Cooper's Source
What Karl Rove told Time magazine's reporter

While no doubt Newsweek is ready to swear on the Kuran that they've nailed Rove, they haven't. Yhjey have nothing, really, that isn't already known. The story is no bombshell, its no smoking gun; its mostly a rehash.

0 Replies

Rove was the source of the Plame leak... so it appears

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