Is consciousness explicable by "science".

Fresco

In reading back over all your wonderful and brilliant snipets from well known philosophers and of course your own formulations, it occurs to me that you are arguing that the mind and all the wonderful creations of the mind are somehow separate from the simple and mundane neuronal processes of the brain. Am I wrong? Please clarify this point before I can go on.

Rayban 1,

I'm not sure what "mind" is. This is a diverse concept with both personal and social attributes. The possibilities extend from the reductionist view of some "fictitious" aspect of a physical systems (like the rejected "ether") to the quasi-mystical "embodiment of atemporal global consciousness". What does seem to be the case is that whereas "the brain" seems to be a necessary aspect of conscious awareness it may not be sufficient to account for the totality of experience. Tinkering with individual neurons or regions of the cortex seems to be "interesting" but no more likely to reveal the "essence of consciousness" than a layman would reveal the "essence of a computer" by poking it with a screwdriver. Of course, those who would reduce the brain to a computer remain undaunted.

A central issue is that "consciousness" has become a significant "factor" in particle physics such that the epistemological foundations of what we call "science" have come under scrutiny. Since Heisenberg, it is no longer obvious what "objectivity" means. At present all appear to be struggling for an overview (Capra being one such exponent). As I see it, we are like chess pieces who "know" how to move but not what the game is about. Only a referee with a raised vantage point above the board is likely to make "sense" of the game.

fresco

Perhaps the problem is in the fact that we observe and study our mind with our consciousness. We are "locked" within it.
Even a reductionist has to describe the physical system with a mental set of patterns, including language.
We are describing something without the possibility of a referential. It would be like explain the breath process by breathing.
I think science needs the perspective of an observer and an observed event. Even if the observer interacts with that event, there are ways - or we can expect there will be - to include that factor in the final result. But the study of mind is conditioned, from the beginning, by the fact that all expression of a possible experience is mental.
We can study the brain, as an organ, the same way we study a kidney or a heart. We can establish chemical patterns. We can conclude that without brain there is no consciousness.
But when we start to deal with the nature of the relation between an idea and a physical pattern, we must use ideas, only ideas. Sensorial stimulation, at this point, is useless.
That is why I feel that the question is more philosophical than scientific.

Val,

It may be that a mathematical model can be sufficiently removed from "reality" to act as the vantage point we seek. It is true that we are obliged ultimately to "hang our ideas" on such a model, but there is an internal cohesion within the mathematics itself which can both stand alone and "suggest" observables which in themselves would have gone unobserved. Such is the case in particle physics and cosmology, and may also be the case in "consciousness studies".

In terms of "scientificism" it has been traditionally important to distinguish between discursive and descriptive models.

(e.g. an equation like
self esteem=successes/pretensions
is discursive because it imples a "logic" rather than "measureables)

However since Heisenberg, "measurement" has become problematic. In the case of acoustic perception for example the uncertainty principle applied to the acoustic waveform involves a trade off between frequency and amplitude "information". This could be one reason why Dennett advocates "parallel processing circuitry" to cover simultaneous possiblities of signal structure. This seems to be an attempt at "the descriptive" and hence the "scientific", but it begs the question of the method of operation of any "ultimate decision procedure" regarding "signal acceptance". BTW Second Order Cybernetcists such as Von Foerster argue that we don't need any "ultimate observer" provided that the "goals of observation" can be specified....but this takes us into the philosophy of "control" etc which Capra (et al) attempts to avoid in his choice of potential models.
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Later Edit:

I note that although Dennett seems to deny ultimate or unified decision processes, he lies firmly in the "control camp" with his statement:

""...the fundamental function of representation in the brain is to control behavior in real time...." (page149 Penguin Edition).

fresco

But the mathematical model must follow axioms. And those axioms cannot be subjected to demonstration, as Tarsky theorem shows.

About discursive and descriptive models. It is said that the great difference between Aristotle Physic and modern physic is in the fact that the first was discursive and the second descriptive.
It is a very interesting question, but perhaps very far from the present subject. I will only say that modern physics express themselves in mathematical models - they are quantitative. But, when they become global theories, then they are discursive - see Newton, and his debate with Leibniz and Berkeley.

About the observer, I think the observer is there, even in von Foerster model. Because it is the observer who specifies "what is the object of observation" and the goals of it. And he gives the interpretation of the results.

Counsciousness is the set of brain patterns that observers notice, view from the perspective of the subject. Like a pain. The observer says: your pain is due to neural activity. But that is not your pain.

So it seems that we can (1) indirectly, and in a limited sense, learn "about" abstract characteristics of consciousness as an objective thing in the world, i.e., others' conscioiusness, but (2) we cannot scientifically study our own consciousness, for paradoxical reasons. The first situation involves the study of something we cannot experience (others' consciousness) and the second involves not studying something we can experience. A very difficult situation, indeed so difficult I suspect it's a non-problem. We can at best philosophically examine the reasons or ways it is meaningless.
I would not bet my house on the above statement. I just throw into the arena for lack of a better informed contribution.

Val and JLN

I agree that there is always a problem with origin of axioms, but according to Capra the paradigm shift he advocates in "science" has now taken "approximate knowledge" on board. In "systems thinking" the method of questioning has itself become part of the theory. It is the mathematics of "systems" which is needed to give both semantic coherence, and also to bring in the "observer relations" as an integral part of the system.

For Capra there are no "things", only "relationships within the flux". By extrapolation there is no "consciousness" but areas of discourse in which "consciousness" forms a significant node of inter-relationship. Such a node forms a semantic web with other nodes such as "sleep", "awareness" and "minds".
The "category mistake" (Ryle) that neuroscientists may accused of is to assume that such a web is at the "same level" as the biological. We cannot "point to" the brain and ask "where is consciousness ?" any more than we can point to some academic buildings and ask "where is the university ?"
"Consciousness" like "university" represents a meaningful node within interactions which transcend spatio-temporal restraints of "thingness". But note also so do "building" or "brain" at other levels of "process".

Reversing the analogy, neuroscientists might argue that the functions of a university specify its building requirements or its communications network, and they may claim likewise to be able to specify the functions of consciousness (like Dennett), which would imply that "information" is "objective". Capra argues that functionality is about static things, not dynamic process. i.e. The paradigm shift need to take on board the aphorism "analysis is murder by dissection".

But how can looking go looking for a looker?

It means, I think, that within visual awareness (which speaks for all other sensations, and hence consciousness) there cannot be found a seer or looker or that which is aware of the visual object, field or scene etc. So the search results in finding the visual field, as it always is, absent of any observer of that field.

And the conundrum is being a self in a situation in which it cannot find itself, that is visually. E.g. the searching self cannot find itself as a visual object. Meaning that whatever is looking is not a visual object. Which further means that whatever it is that is looking cannot look at itself.

Yet in lieu of not finding itself looking what does it find? Just the looking.

So this searching self cannot find itself searching, but only the searching. So there really is no searching self but only searching. Or the self is the searching.

Yet how can searching find searching, or looking find looking, if looking is nothing?

Maybe this is an indication that consciousness is aware of itself without an object. I.e. consciousness is aware of itself as a non object. That is, consciousness is aware or awake to itself as nothing. Consciousness knows its nothingness.

Yet, consciousness, in its amnesia keeps looking……....untill it, non-conceptually, non-intellectually knows,........Tat Tvam Asi.

Twyvel,

I had a dream just before waking this morning which as usual seemed "real" and "logical" , but in the light of full "wakefulness" the dream became nonsensical and unstructured. It is this qualitative shift of "mental operations" that we would normally call "becoming conscious".

Now I am prepared to concede that there may be higher levels of consciousness from which normal "wakefulness" itself becomes dreamlike or deconstructed, and it is this potential "equivalence" of "level shift" which may be of practical interest.
However, an ultimate shift to "Tat Tvam Asi" implies nothing but "silence" i.e. the cessation of relationship.

Fresco, Did you really, I mean REALLY understand what the moss man said? If so, explain it to me, please.

Letty,

Twyvel refers to an "ultimate" state of holistic consciousness which is ineffable (beyond language)but which provided the subject is in a state of "readiness", may sometimes be aided by the "koan" or semantic "shock" (such as the celebrated "what is the sound of one hand clapping") I understand twyvel in the form of an extended koan. It is the linguistic equivalent of providing a "cloud" in which we may "see the face". Once seen, the face or gestalt itself may fade, but the quality of the experience tends to persist and influence "lower levels". Esoteric masters usually warn against the futility of transmitting this "knowledge" through words . The subject cannot be taught to swim outside of the water, and Krishnamurti said "teaching" was impossible (hence my reference to silence). But swimming is healthy provided you can avoid drowning !

All right, Fresco. That is clearer, and I think I "see" what this entire dialogue is approaching. Science involves the semantic and the somatic, whereas consciousness just is:



I do not accept any absolute formulas for living. No preconceived code can see ahead to everything that can happen in a man's life. As we live, we grow and our beliefs change. They must change. So I think we should live with this constant discovery. We should be open to this adventure in heightened awareness of living. We should stake our whole existence on our willingness to explore and experience.

Martin Buber

I included this quote from Buber, because for the first time, I understand what he means by the "I it-I thou" relationship.

Reminds me of the philosophy I hold dearest in my heart, buddhism.

Wisdom can only be attained through experience. The wisdom in my heart is always transformed to knowledge if I share it, because it is impossible to convey wisdom in words, only knowledge.

Fresco's example with the water and swimming is a good one. It goes for everything in life. I can preach for hours on end about styles and techniques, but if you've never been in the water it will do you no good at all. You have no way of understanding it until you have been in the water.

It is what Buddha meant when he told his followers that they should not listen to anyone, not even him. They should always find out for themselves.
You sould always test the value of words, even when they came from an enlightened man. Espessially whan they come from an enlightened man. It is the only way you can take the knowldege given you and make it your own, your wisdom.

There has been so much wise commentary here that I feel there is no room for anything from me. Let me see if I can squeeze small additions and, perhaps, qualifications in here.
Fresco's contributions have been wonderful. They ring lots of bells for me. If his exigesis of Twevel is not precisely what Tywvel means, it is what he should have meant. My suspicion, however, is that I will not grasp Twyvel's contribution until I am in the right state of mind.
Letty's reference to Buber is relevant. My wife and I had a small argument yesterday stimulated by the Christian precept that we love others has we love ourselves. She asked if this applies to people who hate themselves. I was a bit flustered by this, feeling that at some level we all love ourselves. Merely being SUBJECTS, as opposed to "distant" objects, is a basis for self-love. G.B.Shaw's caveat that we should not treat others as we would wish to be treated beccause their tastes may be different, is witty but superficial. I ask: should we treat everyone as subjects or everyone as objects. We must do the former, because (as I think Twyvel would agree), we cannot include ourselves as objects among objects. We do behave as if this were so, but we are subjects that cannot be objectified, i.e., we cannot see ourselves, only the world, and that ultimately that world is us: tat tvam asi.
This entire discussion of the ability to SCIENTIFICALLY understand consciousness resides within a framework (a wittgenstienian "language game") in which certain axioms dominate. We might call this game a "metaphysical context", but one that rests in our heads, not in the world. For example, I see an "aesthetic metaphysic" in which beauty is the dominant value; I see a "scientific metaphysic" in which the verifiable (or falsifiable) proposition is the dominant value; I see a "social metaphysic" in which love is the dominant value; and I see a "mystical metaphysic" in which direct experience is the dominant value.
Ultimately these are all mere games, or more generosly, perspectives. We can take every one of them seriously so long as they are not permited to sit on the throne of an ontological pantheon.

fresco




Yes, a higher level of consciousness, as you say, or another mode of being, as others have said does not negate the lower level. The dream continues and sages continue with the ability to make distinctions.

JLNobody

Your comments about fresco's reply of Letty's question about my post is spot on.

I've been told before that I sound like I'm talking in koans on these issues, though I don't see it. Though I do understand.

you wrote:

"…but we are subjects that cannot be objectified, i.e., we cannot see ourselves, only the world, and that ultimately that world is us: tat tvam asi."

Yes, now if only val would grasp the implications of this which val agrees with.

"we cannot see ourselves"

That's Staggering.

twyvel, Would you cite the prose from which you took that observation of Tennyson?(the man whose heart would not burn) and I could look up koan, but I would rather you tell me.

Yes ....we arrive at the key issue of observation by various routes....and what we call "science" has only recently taken this on board but not by all "scientists".

Ramachandran for example in his introduction to his BBC lectures (cited above) makes the simplistic comment: "Even though its common knowledge these days, it never ceases to amaze me that all the richness of our mental life - all our feelings, our emotions, our thoughts, our ambitions, our love life, our religious sentiments and even what each of us regards us his own intimate private self - is simply the activity of these little specks of jelly in your head, in your brain. There is nothing else."

....nothing else except of course himself as an observer with a concept of jelly !

fresco


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I subscribe that! Some people speak about science and objectivity as if there was an universal observer - the expression is from Ray in another topic.
The description of a brain state is made by a consciousness entity, using a codified language common to other consciousness entities.
A brain state is not an idea, but without a brain state there are no ideas. In some way, I am always behind the experience. When I say: my consciousness is nothing but jelly, I am saying, "something that I call consciousness and belongs to ME is nothing but jelly". I think we cannot escape from that contradiction.