Is consciousness explicable by "science".

twyvel is correct.
I am not equating "consciousness" with "brain", since the first is "process" and the second is "structure".( I should not perhaps have used "dynamic structure" above.....maybe "schema"instead)

JLN, The systems approach may question whether we can distinguish between awareness and consciousness. It seems to me that what we call intentional looking or focusing can be equated to a bifurcation or "organizational shift" which has been "forced" (as in standing waves) as a result of two or more reinforcing "sub-cycles". In other words if we can visualise a sub-cycle as one that can "resonate" or be "tuned to" one level of external energy then the "organizational shift" is to a state attuned to a "more complex" input.
(Note there are now attempts at objective indices of "complexity").

The word "forced" above impinges on the intent/free will issue. It does not imply a mechanical or causal directive in a particular direction. The shift to a "higher level" implies no prediction of what that level may be, only that "lower level tensions" are transcended.[/b] Our "feelings" of actively coming to a decision could be illusory !

fresco wrote:
According to this view it not "consciousness" that is a priori to "brain", it is "life".

Much is made of the spontaneous occurence of "dissipative structures" in dynamic processes far from equilibrium. These structures (such as the hexagonal lattice observed in convection currents in a themally pumped liquid) are deemed to be the probable precursors of "life". the question remains as to "who" observes these "structures" other than an external "consciousness".

Fresco, I cannot keep up with you. The great list of ultra-provocative concepts you throw out slow me down considerably. But I'm glad to have the stimulation they confer.
If I had to choose between
"whether such a consciousness is indeed of a higher "dimensionality" than its objects of observation or whether it is merely of a higher "order" but essentially of the same nature as the processes it describes (second order cybernetics)" I would choose the latter. I see consciousness in the Cosmos as a type of Self-consciousness. It seems to me (and I cannot do more than intuit and profess) that the great achievement of nature is consciousness. It is as if the Universe seeks to be Self-aware, and the goal of human mystics is to assist in that effort.[/b]
Human beings have turned their world into a grand and dynamic symbolical schema. We cannot survive without the cultural systems that render the world symbolically manageable. We cannot interact except through the medium of symbols.
Yet the mystic who also shares in the symbolization of his society's world, seeks to transcend that necessarily pragmatic cultural enterprise and "de-symbolize" the world, in order to see it more as it is. To appreciate its "suchness", as Taoists and Zennists put it. Like the purely aesthetic experience in art, mystical consciousness is disinterested. It sees for its own sake, not for instrumental and extrinsic ends.

It seems to me (and I cannot do more than intuit and profess) that the great achievement of nature is consciousness.

one might be able to create consciousness by manipulating electical impulses on a mainframe computer someday, but such consciousness can no more be defined as simple electrical impulses than music can be defined as simple variations in sonic vibrations.

The problem is mine, not Capra's.

kuvasz & JLN,

Ironically the attempt at the "de-mystification of consciousness" which I report here is largely based on the work of Maturana, a researcher in color vision !

I can only say that when a taoist like Capra is prepared to discuss consciousness in "scientific terms", we nondualists need to take him seriously.
Irrespective of my unease at his ecological stance I can only find minor details which to take issue, and I have to examine my own vested interests in cosmic consciousness to do so. He certainly embraces "interactivity" and "observer-observed".He rejects reductionists such as Dennett and even provides the meta-language of mathematics as possible back-up for concepts of "order" and "pattern". He neatly sidesteps problems of ineffability by defining language in terms of behaviour co-ordination within social organisms.

The question I proposed initially depends of course on the definition of "science" , and I think what has taken place between us is concerned with the origins of that definition as "natural philosophy".