Has the Schiavo case Become a Political Football?

Unfortunately the only alternative here is to forbid contributions and fund elections from tax money...something that people here aren't ready for.

So all we can see from the appeal process is that Judge Greer did not act improperly or illegally in the opinion of higher courts.

I'm wondering:

Do neoconservatives on this thread honestly believe that Terry Shiavo was "murdered" by the courts, her husband, and the majority of Americans who agree with Michael in putting Terry out of her misery?

New Laws Ahead

Legal analysts said to expect legislatures across the country to examine their end-of-life laws.

"In my view, the most material question is the status of a guardian," said Jonathan Turley, a professor at George Washington University who has followed Schiavo's case closely.

"I personally believe that the Schindlers had good ground to question whether Michael Schiavo should have continued as the guardian after he formed a new family with another woman and ultimately had two children by that individual," Turley told FOXNews.com.

Michael Schiavo has repeatedly refused to give up legal guardianship of his wife despite her parents' pleas. Schiavo has always said, and the courts have affirmed, that his wife did not want to be kept alive artificially. But the Schindlers have insisted that Terri Schiavo wanted to be kept alive, and have even disputed the consensus of court-appointed doctors that she would never recover.

FOX News' Judge Napolitano said even if it turned out Schiavo was not in a persistent vegetative state, her husband could not legally be held liable because the courts have consistently sided with him.

Napolitano also predicted that legislatures would lay down specific guidelines for courts in ruling on such cases, pointing to the fact that Judge Greer, who has presided over the Schiavo case from the beginning, has never gone to see her himself.

"I insist on going to the bedside" in cases like this, Napolitano said. "I want to see this person. There is no rule of law telling me to do so, just as there was none telling Judge Greer to do so.

"Had he done that, there would have been a little more acceptance of his decisions. I think you'll find the legislature making judges perform these visitations," Napolitano said.

George Washington's Turley also said the extraordinary measures Congress took two weekends ago to prolong Schiavo's life hurt the Schindlers' case.

"Congress' political intervention shifted attention away from the merits of the [Schindlers'] case to a constitutional controversy. It essentially poisoned the well for later legal arguments, and goes into the category of how the best of intentions can produce the worst of results," Turley told FOXNews.com.

Because of a 1990 Supreme Court ruling on which most right-to-die legislation was built, courts are tasked with determining what the patient's wishes would be, most often based on the spouse's testimony absent written instructions. The parents' wishes or the wishes of the government cannot override what the patient would have wanted.

The Schindlers' attorneys may have known what they were up against, hence some of the more novel arguments they made as time ran out, including that Schiavo was speaking but only in the family's presence, and that her husband was abusive, an allegation that did not surface until well after the two sides of the family stopped speaking.

Napolitano predicted that the battle over Schiavo would cause legislatures and courts to re-examine the issue of self-determination to prevent more such contentious cases.

"Where it is not crystal clear what the patient would have wanted, or where there is great dispute over what she would have wanted, or where the patient inarticulately or imprecisely expressed her wishes, then courts should err on side of life," Napolitano said, adding that most people, if given the choice, would want to live in all but the most extreme instances.

But everytime I checked into the legal allegations made by the opponents of judge Greer, they dissolved into hot air. And that's not because I first decided what outcome I want, then looked for a reason why the legal system, working as specified, must necessarily produce it.

You don't have the legal expertise necessary to declare that all "legal" opinions that run contrary to your opinions have "dissolved into hot air."

All red herring statements to suggest there were evil motives for Michael. Fox would condemn somebody on innuendos with no proof.

Perhaps American law in general, and Florida law in particular, treats euthanasia too leniently. In this case, maybe you should direct your anger at your legislature and petition them to make euthanasia laws more like Germany's and the Romantic European Countries'.

. . . Dear Majority Leader DeLay,

I was stunned to read the threatening comments you made yesterday against Federal judges and our nation’s courts of law in general. In reference to certain Federal judges, you stated: “The time will come for the men responsible for this to answer for their behavior.”

* * *

You should be aware that your comments yesterday may violate a Federal criminal statute, 18 U.S.C. §115 (a)(1)(B). That law states:

“Whoever threatens to assault…. or murder, a United States judge… with intent to retaliate against such… judge…. on account of the performance of official duties, shall be punished ”

Threats against specific Federal judges are not only a serious crime, but also beneath a Member of Congress. . . .

Sincerely,

Frank R. Lautenberg

The Florida woman, who suffered severe brain damage after a heart attack 15 years ago, died Thursday. The feeding tube that had been keeping her alive was removed with a judge's approval on March 18.

DeLay condemned the judges who at both the state and federal level declined to order that Schiavo be kept alive artificially.

"This loss happened because our legal system did not protect the people who need protection most, and that will change," the Texas Republican said. "The time will come for the men responsible for this to answer for their behavior, but not today. Today we grieve, we pray, and we hope to God this fate never befalls another."

Speaking with reporters later in Houston, DeLay said lawmakers "will look at an arrogant and out of control judiciary that thumbs its nose at Congress and the President."

Asked if that included the possibility of the House bringing impeachment charges against judges involved in the Schiavo case, DeLay said, "There's plenty of time to look into that."

"I never thought I'd see the day when a U.S. judge stopped feeding a living American so that they took 14 days to die," he added.

WATTS v. UNITED STATES, 394 U.S. 705 (1969)
394 U.S. 705
WATTS v. UNITED STATES.
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT. No. 1107, Misc.
Decided April 21, 1969.



Petitioner's remark during political debate at small public gathering that if inducted into Army (which he vowed would never occur) and made to carry a rifle "the first man I want to get in my sights is L. B. J.," held to be crude political hyperbole which in light of its context and conditional nature did not constitute a knowing and willful threat against the President within the coverage of 18 U.S.C. 871 (a).

Certiorari granted; 131 U.S. App. D.C. 125, 402 F.2d 676, reversed and remanded.

Joseph Forer for petitioner.

Solicitor General Griswold for the United States.

Ralph J. Temple, Melvin L. Wulf, and Lawrence Speiser for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as amici curiae.


PER CURIAM.

After a jury trial in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, petitioner was convicted of violating a 1917 statute which prohibits any person from "knowingly and willfully . . . [making] any threat to take the life of or to inflict bodily harm upon the President of the United States . . . ." * The incident [394 U.S. 705, 706] which led to petitioner's arrest occurred on August 27, 1966, during a public rally on the Washington Monument grounds. The crowd present broke up into small discussion groups and petitioner joined a gathering scheduled to discuss police brutality. Most of those in the group were quite young, either in their teens or early twenties. Petitioner, who himself was 18 years old, entered into the discussion after one member of the group suggested that the young people present should get more education before expressing their views. According to an investigator for the Army Counter Intelligence Corps who was present, petitioner responded: "They always holler at us to get an education. And now I have already received my draft classification as 1-A and I have got to report for my physical this Monday coming. I am not going. If they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L. B. J." "They are not going to make me kill my black brothers." On the basis of this statement, the jury found that petitioner had committed a felony by knowingly and willfully threatening the President. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed by a two-to-one vote. 131 U.S. App. D.C. 125, 402 F.2d 676 (1968). We reverse.

At the close of the Government's case, petitioner's trial counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal. He contended that there was "absolutely no evidence on the basis of which the jury would be entitled to find that [petitioner] made a threat against the life of the President." [394 U.S. 705, 707] He stressed the fact that petitioner's statement was made during a political debate, that it was expressly made conditional upon an event - induction into the Armed Forces - which petitioner vowed would never occur, and that both petitioner and the crowd laughed after the statement was made. He concluded, "Now actually what happened here in all this was a kind of very crude offensive method of stating a political opposition to the President. What he was saying, he says, I don't want to shoot black people because I don't consider them my enemy, and if they put a rifle in my hand it is the people that put the rifle in my hand, as symbolized by the President, who are my real enemy." We hold that the trial judge erred in denying this motion.

Certainly the statute under which petitioner was convicted is constitutional on its face. The Nation undoubtedly has a valid, even an overwhelming, interest in protecting the safety of its Chief Executive and in allowing him to perform his duties without interference from threats of physical violence. See H. R. Rep. No. 652, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. (1916). Nevertheless, a statute such as this one, which makes criminal a form of pure speech, must be interpreted with the commands of the First Amendment clearly in mind. What is a threat must be distinguished from what is constitutionally protected speech.

The judges in the Court of Appeals differed over whether or not the "willfullness" requirement of the statute implied that a defendant must have intended to carry out his "threat." Some early cases found the willfullness requirement met if the speaker voluntarily uttered the charged words with "an apparent determination to carry them into execution." Ragansky v. United States, 253 F. 643, 645 (C. A. 7th Cir. 1918) (emphasis supplied); cf. Pierce v. United States, 365 F.2d 292 (C. A. [394 U.S. 705, 708] 10th Cir. 1966). The majority below seemed to agree. Perhaps this interpretation is correct, although we have grave doubts about it. See the dissenting opinion below, 131 U.S. App. D.C., at 135-142, 402 F.2d, at 686-693 (Wright, J.). But whatever the "willfullness" requirement implies, the statute initially requires the Government to prove a true "threat." We do not believe that the kind of political hyperbole indulged in by petitioner fits within that statutory term. For we must interpret the language Congress chose "against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). The language of the political arena, like the language used in labor disputes, see Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of America, 383 U.S. 53, 58 (1966), is often vituperative, abusive, and inexact. We agree with petitioner that his only offense here was "a kind of very crude offensive method of stating a political opposition to the President." Taken in context, and regarding the expressly conditional nature of the statement and the reaction of the listeners, we do not see how it could be interpreted otherwise.

The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari are granted and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The case is remanded with instructions that it be returned to the District Court for entry of a judgment of acquittal.


It is so ordered.