Vitalism vs. mechanism

THAT WAS ME, JLN

binny

Sorry for the delay.
What I meant was this: how can the Val 2 that has the memories of the "death" - as destruction of identity - of the former Val 1, be the same entity?

ok... I can follow that reasoning. But then would it matter in which state my brother reassembles me? If he put me back into the pre-memory stage, what do you think about it then?

Since "the self" is not ontologically real, this all comes down to its definition. Do you ascribe identity to a set of atoms, a blueprint of their position, or a mixture of both?

I find ascribing identity to the blueprint more intuitive, but its all a matter of preference anyway.

Einherjar, I intuitively see (define) the self as an experience, a perspective or orientation, but it is definitely not a THING; it has no substance. I do not define it materially, i.e., a set of atoms or a blueprint of some sort. If one carefully examines the experience of "self" one finds only a constantly changing and coming and going set of sensations. But there is no "me", only an experience that I am likely to feel of a "me." Sometimes I do not have that experience: actions, thoughts, aesthetic experience occur in and for themselves. That is a joyful perspective.

I'm going to sound like an idiot here but who decides to change?

Ray, I don't understand the question. Are you referring to my description of the self as a constantly changing set of sensations? In that case changing occurs of itself, not a result of decision, choice and effort. Notice how your question derives from a need to think in terms of an agent of change (i.e., WHO decides to change?).

sorry, binny, but I don't understand. What brother?

Einherjar

The self is the being. Is what I am and the reason I am "I" and not "it" - from my referencial point of view. It is not a matter of experience, since I cannot experience your "self", but it is the condition for all experience. I only interact with things from the reality of my being.
I cannot describe or define the "self" I am. It is impossible, because here we are facing something that is the subject and the object at same time. But I can "unveil" it - the words are from Heidegger - by following the ways I exist in the world, the ways my presence interacts with things.The self is not that spiritual essence we see in Descartes or Leibniz, is the condition of all my experience, since my being is always in its presence in the world. I interact with things from the self I am: that is, to me, the experience conditions of our existence (the care - sorge - the cure as concern, the time and the history, the inevitability of death - cessation of the self - the simple actions of dealing with objects - Heidegger's "circunvision".

JLN, Buddhism says to change, but in this case who decides to take in Buddhism and change?

Val, thanks for a very thoughtful and informed response. Let me suggest some qualifications.
Your first sentence describes the essence and function of "self"--
"The self is...what I am and the reason I am "I" and not "it" - from my referencial point of view."
I agree that without the "self" or ego as a point of reference, we humans would not have succeeded in the evolutionary struggle. It is essential that we objectify the world, that we define it as consisting of "objects" some of which we pursue and some of which we avoid. But most important is that we are able to think about and manipulate-exploit our world of objects. But I think that the subject that is "me" is no more than a necessary, a very functional, illusion, an essential ingredient in the objectification of the world--yet from a buddhist perspective, ego is also dysfunctional.
You add that the self "is not a matter of experience". I agree: it is an orientation, a perspective, a presupposition. You put that point well when you say that "it is the condition for all experience. I only interact with things from the reality of my being" [if by "being" you mean the illusory ego].
Nevertheless, most people tacitly believe they are substantial "selves", selves that are constantly vulnerable to dangers from the world of objects and candidates for the happiness and security that may come from the successful manipulation of objects. Meditation shows that "selves" are not substantial. When looking for the self (ego), it is realized that it is not "real." It is part of the grammar of experience, but not experienced in itself.
You say that "I cannot describe or define the "self" I am. It is impossible, because here we are facing something that is the subject and the object at same time." I say that we cannot point to the self that we perceive ourselves to be. But I don't think it is because we are both the subject and object at the same time; I think it is because we are neither the subject nor the object. We cannot find the object, as I said with regard to meditation. And we cannot find the subject; to attempt to do so is to attempt to objectify the self, in order to see it from the perspective of another self (behind the self). Twyvel has laid out this futile process of infinite regression in other threads.
I cannot comment on that most confounding of philosophers, Martin Heidegger except to note that the process of "unveiling" the self sounds a a bit like the mindfulness method of Theravadin meditation.

Vitalism is not a matter of believe but an awareness of the underlying forces of life.

Indeed, all -isms are some sort of limited , conditioned response.

Vitalim and mechanism are not necessarily contradictory. All life forms are conditioned by matter, material processes which makes them to some extend mechanical. This does not exclude the existence of a vital life energy.

Man is the measure of all things, but not of life itself. ¨ Purpose¨ is a very limited point of view and may not exists in life´s dictionary. Vitalism can be understood as implicit and not as some exterior priciple. Berson`s vitalism is conditioned by 19 th. century views of evolution. In actualty, Life´s energy may not be bound by such concepts of time.

Mechanism is a reality of life. Thought, thinking in itself is mechanical process.
Mechanism is not a matter of agreement or disagreement. Mechanism has its limited meaning and function. Vitalism can go beyond this.

Hypothetical questions have very little meaning. As Nietzsche pointed out, the vital life force is most likely to come into being when we are capable of remaining with the actual facts of living. ¨To remain loyal to the surface of the earth¨, neither indulging in metaphysical speculation, nor escaping in some sort of belief.

Scientists DO have a set of rules to distinguish living from non- living things.
Most scientists maintain that life as manifested biologically must be cellular.
To them the gaia priciple is merely a curious hypothesis.
The fact remains that the earth itself acts and behaves like a living organism.

I tend to think of everything as one living, conscious phenomenon. We and all things we percieve and think are expressions of this, and it is very hard, if not impossible, for us to escape our human relationships and percieve this phenomenon without a sense of ownership to the parts we concieve to be us, as opposed to not us.

(Even "living, conscious phenomenon" is an entirely human set of concepts combined in an attempt to shed light on something that is fundamentally beyond our ability to grasp by means of sensory perception.)

So...is "ownership" justified or not ?...