SerSo wrote:At first sight the conflict in Transdniestria has nothing to do with the current situation in the Ukraine. But it is a good illustration of what may happen (Lord forbid!) if political opponents are too determined to achieve their goals. Unfortunately your words only prove how biased information can simplify and misinterpret complex and dangerous situations.
SerSo
It is your take on Moldova/Transnistria that exemplifies as well as any how biased information can indeed, to lend your phrase, "simplify and misinterpret complex and dangerous situations".
It is rife with misinformation, but as such I assume it merely represents the take that was generally presented on the situation in Russian media. Yet that lends a certain irony to your off-hand dismissal that takes from outside Russia that you don't agree with (about a country that's as close to Austria as it is to Russia), must just be "biased".
The 14th army had "leaked" arms, many thousands of them, quite specifically - and logically enough - to the side in the conflict that was explicitly sympathetic to the Russian state and the region's Russian minorities. It assisted in instructing the Transnistrian troops. Hell - in December 1991, the 14th army's chief commander, General Gennadi Iakolev, accepted the position of Transnistrian defense minister! The 14th army actually involved itself in the fighting in Bendery in 1992, with witnesses testifying it to have sided unequivocally with the Transnistrian militias when the Moldovan army appeared to take back the city, instantly reversing the course of the fight and ensuring Transnistrian victory.
The 14th army also continued to provide the Transnistrian regime with logistical support after Lebed installed himself there. Lebed himself, who used his position in that outpost bulwark of the Russian army to make a name for himself as one of Russia's most prolific nationalist politicians, made it no secret whose side he was on.
Without the support of the Russian bases, the forces that took over Transnistria in name of a Russian and Ukrainian population that even on the Dnyestr's leftbank only ever constituted just the barest of majorities, would never have succeeded in doing so.
You fail to mention that "the central government in Chisinau [which] was then controlled by the Popular Front of Moldova" was also the first democratically elected government of the republic. Unlike Smirnov's regime in Transnistria, which never in its existence held demoratic elections and has in fact consistently and violently repressed its dissenters, imprisoning and torturing several.
Where you write that "The first thing [the Popular Front government] did was a ban on the use of the Russian language", you are plainly wrong. The PF government never "banned" the Russian language. The whole issue focused on declaring Romanian/Moldovan the state language. This did indeed make the Russian minority, which of course in Soviet times was never granted much opportunity or incentive to learn the majority language of the republic, very uneasy - the same it did in Latvia or Estonia. But by speaking of Russian being "banned" you conjure up scenarios in which people were no longer allowed to speak or use it. That's nonsense. The "worst" that was done was the resolution that in ten years time, all civil servants would need to be able to speak Romanian.
Your representation of the maverick General Lebed (who was long considered one of the main figureheads of nationalist opposition to Yeltsin, before his 11th hour sell-out in the 1996 presidential elections) as some sort of neutral, fair broker in the conflict is hard to imagine for any non-Russian. He defied both the Russian government and the various international diplomatic solutions that were in fact negotiated with great trouble by his refusal to live by their rules.
(In spite of your assertion that nothing was done but the "exchange of ultimatums", different diplomatic solutions were in fact arrived at, thanks to eg OSCE involvement. But one of the things they time and again eventually collapsed upon is the consistent refusal of the Russian government to withdraw its troops according to the agreements it had previously committed itself to.)
The current communist government of Moldova does indeed reject the idea of unification with Romania, as does, indeed, most of the opposition now (barring the Christian-Democrats). In fact, the idea of reunification (even if it was a natural enough one to come up in the wake of independence, since Moldova had after all simply been occupied and annexed by the Soviet Union in WW2) was shelved long before. You fail to mention how there were goverments in between the Popular Front one and the current Communist one, of centrist hues, which had already long made clear that unification was off the agenda. In fact, already in 1994, voters in Moldova proper overwhelmingly voted to retain an independent Moldova in its 1990 borders in a referendum. The same year, the Constitution was adapted in order to reinstate the notion, formulated in Stalin's times, that "Moldovan" is a separate language from Romanian. The "threat of unification" card was thus invalidated a long time ago as a justification for Smirnov's Transnistrian fiefdom.
The current communist government of Moldova proper is hardly "rather liberal" itself - it is one of the most frequent offenders of European human rights agreements. "Liberal" it would only be in comparison with Byelorussia or, of course, the Transnistrian outlaw regime, a dictatorially ruled enclave recognized by not a single country in the world.
Quote:Who has won? Hotheads in the Ukraine and everywhere, behold and beware!
Basically, you are here blaming a democratically elected government that, in the wake of independence, decided that the majority language rather than that of the erstwhile occupiers should be the language of government, for a violent, separatist insurrection, facilitated by the Russian army's covert support.
You are blaming the "hotheads" who dared want to realise the political programme they were elected in on by a persuasive majority for what, on the Dnyestr's left bank, rapidly devolved into a insurrectionist gangster's paradise.
In this, you - unconsciously perhaps - neatly represent the Russian state's strategy on what it likes to call "the near abroad" since the Soviet Union's dissolution. Destabilise nascent democratic, independent-minded governments by encouraging or arming rebel separatist groups (eg Abchazia), then insist on keeping an extensive military presence in the country to guarantee "stability".