thethinkfactory wrote:Debra - I think you have falsley reduced liberty and freedom to the same thing. Liberty is the freedom from undue persecution from authority - it does not encompass the concept of freedom.
Absolute freedom has no one around you to consider or abridge those rights - i.e. a state of nature as considered by Hobbed and Locke. This would lead us to an anarchy - but in the philosophical definition of the term - people are generally good and can govern themselves (as opposed to the popular conception of total chaos). This freedom is the same as anarchy - just not chaos.
(I and other posters were seeking to seperate this sort of freedom from absolute freedom - which is the freedom to do whatever you wanted whenever you wanted. This concept of freedom needs justice to protect others from themselves.)
Again, you are wrong. Locke taught, even in the "state of nature," there is not absolute freedom to do what you wish and without regard to other people's rights. Justice does not tolerate absolute freedom to harm others--not even in the natural state. In the natural state where there is no central government to secure the rights of all, every man is still created equal and every man has the right to demand justice and the power to punish others who would violate the laws of nature.
Second Treatise on Government
Chapter II
Of the State of Nature
Sect. 3. POLITICAL POWER, then, I take to be a RIGHT of
making laws with penalties of death, and consequently all less
penalties, for the regulating and preserving of property, and of
employing the force of the community, in the execution of such
laws, and in the defence of the common-wealth from foreign
injury; and all this only for the public good.
C H A P. I I.
Of the State of Nature.
Sect. 4. TO understand political power right, and derive it
from its original, we must consider, what state all men are
naturally in, and that is,
a state of perfect freedom to order
their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons, as
they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature, without
asking leave, or depending upon the will of any other man.
A state also of equality, wherein all the power and
jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another;
there being nothing more evident, than that creatures of the same
species and rank, promiscuously born to all the same advantages
of nature, and the use of the same faculties, should also be
equal one amongst another without subordination or subjection,
unless the lord and master of them all should, by any manifest
declaration of his will, set one above another, and confer on
him, by an evident and clear appointment, an undoubted right to
dominion and sovereignty.
Sect. 5. This equality of men by nature, the judicious
Hooker looks upon as so evident in itself, and beyond all
question, that he makes it the foundation of that obligation to
mutual love amongst men, on which he builds the duties they owe
one another, and from whence he derives the great maxims of
justice and charity. His words are,
The like natural inducement hath brought men to know
that it is no less their duty, to love others than
themselves; for seeing those things which are equal, must
needs all have one measure; if I cannot but wish to
receive good, even as much at every man's hands, as any
man can wish unto his own soul, how should I look to have
any part of my desire herein satisfied, unless myself be
careful to satisfy the like desire, which is undoubtedly
in other men, being of one and the same nature? To have
any thing offered them repugnant to this desire, must
needs in all respects grieve them as much as me; so that
if I do harm, I must look to suffer, there being no
reason that others should shew greater measure of love
to me, than they have by me shewed unto them: my desire
therefore to be loved of my equals in nature as much as
possible may be, imposeth upon me a natural duty of
bearing to them-ward fully the like affection; from which
relation of equality between ourselves and them that are
as ourselves, what several rules and canons natural
reason hath drawn, for direction of life, no man is
ignorant, Eccl. Pol. Lib. 1.
Sect. 6. But though this be a state of liberty, yet it is
not a state of licence: though man in that state have an
uncontroulable liberty to dispose of his person or possessions,
yet he has not liberty to destroy himself, or so much as any
creature in his possession, but where some nobler use than its
bare preservation calls for it. The state of nature has a law
of nature to govern it, which obliges every one: and reason,
which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it,
that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm
another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions: for men
being all the workmanship of one omnipotent, and infinitely
wise maker; all the servants of one sovereign master, sent into
the world by his order, and about his business; they are his
property, whose workmanship they are, made to last during his,
not one another's pleasure: and being furnished with like
faculties, sharing all in one community of nature, there cannot
be supposed any such subordination among us, that may
authorize us to destroy one another, as if we were made for one
another's uses, as the inferior ranks of creatures are for our's.
Every one, as he is bound to preserve himself, and not to
quit his station wilfully, so by the like reason, when his own
preservation comes not in competition, ought he, as much as he
can, to preserve the rest of mankind, and may not, unless it
be to do justice on an offender, take away, or impair the life,
or what tends to the preservation of the life, the liberty,
health, limb, or goods of another.
Sect. 7.
And that all men may be restrained from invading
others rights, and from doing hurt to one another, and the law of
nature be observed, which willeth the peace and preservation of
all mankind, the execution of the law of nature is, in that
state, put into every man's hands, whereby every one has a right
to punish the transgressors of that law to such a degree, as may
hinder its violation: for the law of nature would, as all other
laws that concern men in this world 'be in vain, if there were no
body that in the state of nature had a power to execute that
law, and thereby preserve the innocent and restrain offenders.
And if any one in the state of nature may punish another for any
evil he has done, every one may do so: for in that state of
perfect equality, where naturally there is no superiority or
jurisdiction of one over another, what any may do in prosecution
of that law, every one must needs have a right to do.
Sect. 8. And thus, in the state of nature, one man comes by
a power over another; but yet no absolute or arbitrary power, to
use a criminal, when he has got him in his hands, according to
the passionate heats, or boundless extravagancy of his own will;
but only to retribute to him, so far as calm reason and
conscience dictate, what is proportionate to his transgression,
which is so much as may serve for reparation and restraint:
for these two are the only reasons, why one man may lawfully do
harm to another, which is that we call punishment. In
transgressing the law of nature, the offender declares himself to
live by another rule than that of reason and common equity, which
is that measure God has set to the actions of men, for their
mutual security; and so he becomes dangerous to mankind, the
tye, which is to secure them from injury and violence, being
slighted and broken by him. Which being a trespass against the
whole species, and the peace and safety of it, provided for by
the law of nature, every man upon this score, by the right he
hath to preserve mankind in general, may restrain, or where it is
necessary, destroy things noxious to them, and so may bring such
evil on any one, who hath transgressed that law, as may make him
repent the doing of it, and thereby deter him, and by his example
others, from doing the like mischief. And in the case, and upon
this ground, EVERY MAN HATH A RIGHT TO PUNISH THE OFFENDER, AND
BE EXECUTIONER OF THE LAW OF NATURE.
Sect. 9. 1 doubt not but this will seem a very strange
doctrine to some men: but before they condemn it, I desire them
to resolve me, by what right any prince or state can put to
death, or punish an alien, for any crime he commits in their
country. It is certain their laws, by virtue of any sanction
they receive from the promulgated will of the legislative, reach
not a stranger: they speak not to him, nor, if they did, is he
bound to hearken to them. The legislative authority, by which
they are in force over the subjects of that commonwealth, hath no
power over him. Those who have the supreme power of making
laws in England, France or Holland, are to an Indian, but
like the rest of the world, men without authority: and therefore,
if by the law of nature every man hath not a power to punish
offences against it, as he soberly judges the case to require, I
see not how the magistrates of any community can punish an
alien of another country; since, in reference to him, they can
have no more power than what every man naturally may have over
another.
Sect, 10. Besides the crime which consists in violating the
law, and varying from the right rule of reason, whereby a man so
far becomes degenerate, and declares himself to quit the
principles of human nature, and to be a noxious creature, there
is commonly injury done to some person or other, and some other
man receives damage by his transgression: in which case he who
hath received any damage, has, besides the right of punishment
common to him with other men, a particular right to seek
reparation from him that has done it: and any other person, who
finds it just, may also join with him that is injured, and assist
him in recovering from the offender so much as may make
satisfaction for the harm he has suffered.
Sect. 11. From these two distinct rights, the one of
punishing the crime for restraint, and preventing the like
offence, which right of punishing is in every body; the other of
taking reparation, which belongs only to the injured party,
comes it to pass that the magistrate, who by being magistrate
hath the common right of punishing put into his hands, can
often, where the public good demands not the execution of the
law, remit the punishment of criminal offences by his own
authority, but yet cannot remit the satisfaction due to any
private man for the damage he has received. That, he who has
suffered the damage has a right to demand in his own name, and he
alone can remit: the damnified person has this power of
appropriating to himself the goods or service of the offender,
by right of self-preservation, as every man has a power to
punish the crime, to prevent its being committed again, by the
right he has of preserving all mankind, and doing all reasonable
things he can in order to that end: and thus it is, that every
man, in the state of nature, has a power to kill a murderer, both
to deter others from doing the like injury, which no reparation
can compensate, by the example of the punishment that attends it
from every body, and also to secure men from the attempts of a
criminal, who having renounced reason, the common rule and
measure God hath given to mankind, hath, by the unjust violence
and slaughter he hath committed upon one, declared war against
all mankind, and therefore may be destroyed as a lion or a
tyger, one of those wild savage beasts, with whom men can have
no society nor security: and upon this is grounded that great law
of nature, Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be
shed. And Cain was so fully convinced, that every one had a
right to destroy such a criminal, that after the murder of his
brother, he cries out, Every one that findeth me, shall slay
me; so plain was it writ in the hearts of all mankind.
Sect. 12. By the same reason may a man in the state of
nature punish the lesser breaches of that law. It will perhaps
be demanded, with death? I answer, each transgression may be
punished to that degree, and with so much severity, as will
suffice to make it an ill bargain to the offender, give him cause
to repent, and terrify others from doing the like. Every
offence, that can be committed in the state of nature, may in the
state of nature be also punished equally, and as far forth as it
may, in a commonwealth: for though it would be besides my present
purpose, to enter here into the particulars of the law of nature,
or its measures of punishment; yet, it is certain there is such
a law, and that too, as intelligible and plain to a rational
creature, and a studier of that law, as the positive laws of
commonwealths; nay, possibly plainer; as much as reason is easier
to be understood, than the fancies and intricate contrivances of
men, following contrary and hidden interests put into words; for
so truly are a great part of the municipal laws of countries,
which are only so far right, as they are founded on the law of
nature, by which they are to be regulated and interpreted.
Sect. 13. To this strange doctrine, viz. That in the
state of nature every one has the executive power of the law of
nature, I doubt not but it will be objected, that it is
unreasonable for men to be judges in their own cases, that self-
love will make men partial to themselves and their friends: and
on the other side, that ill nature, passion and revenge will
carry them too far in punishing others; and hence nothing but
confusion and disorder will follow, and that therefore God hath
certainly appointed government to restrain the partiality and
violence of men. I easily grant, that civil government is the
proper remedy for the inconveniencies of the state of nature,
which must certainly be great, where men may be judges in their
own case, since it is easy to be imagined, that he who was so
unjust as to do his brother an injury, will scarce be so just as
to condemn himself for it: but I shall desire those who make this
objection, to remember, that absolute monarchs are but men; and
if government is to be the remedy of those evils, which
necessarily follow from men's being judges in their own cases,
and the state of nature is therefore not to how much better it is
than the state of nature, where one man, commanding a multitude,
has the liberty to be judge in his own case, and may do to all
his subjects whatever he pleases, without the least liberty to
any one to question or controul those who execute his pleasure7
and in whatsoever he cloth, whether led by reason, mistake
or passion, must be submitted to7 much better it is in the state
of nature, wherein men are not bound to submit to the unjust will
of another: and if he that judges, judges amiss in his own, or
any other case,
he is answerable for it to the rest of mankind.