Is truth subjective or objective?

My glass (long stemmed crystal)
contains 50% dry red wine ( of dubious vintage )and 50% fresh country air (tinged with the scent of evergreens).....it is all subjective!!!!

Shepaints observes the same "truth" as me !

... quantum theorists might talk about the probability of "wine particles" in the "air region" ...and at what "instant".... etc, etc.

All " facts" are observer dependent .
All is in flux.
"Truth" is agreement for mutual purposes including agreeing with "yourself"
i.e. Truth is about "what to do next" including doing nothing !.

A very nice blend of ancient and contemporary insights.

yourmissing my point , whatever liquild you chose to pretend is in the glass whatever the chimical compounds are , in this " Metaphor". the equation never changes . what is in the glass is in the glass , it is the idea behind the arguments of half full or half empty are opinion , opinion is subjective not truth. just becouse someone chooses to beleave something dose not make it truth , and just becouse someone chooses to ignore a fact dose not make it subjective. So , any view based out of a emotional theory in not an actual truth

fresco: I'm not sure I understand that last bit in your post...would you mind clarifying? I don't want to jump in and argue a point if it turns out that's not what you meant at all. Thanks.

Are you thirsty? Do you like wine?

Those of you who wish to define truth as the objective world that exists independent of human interpretation also inexplicably downplay the validity of human experiences and emotions. Is your thirst not real? If you are thirsty and say you are thirsty, is this statement not true? Does the fact that you can't experience another person's desire mean that it is should be ignored/marginalized?

If these subjective experiences are real, why attempt to define them out of "truth"? One of the several benefits of a definition of truth that includes subjective experience is that it paves the way for a far more satisfying ethics. We can take the needs and values of others seriously, and easily allot weight to acts that satisfy these needs.

What are the benefits of defining human values, emotions, motives out of truth?

Chombis

Chombis: I get what you're saying, but the statement "I'm thirsty" has it's base on physical facts, i.e., your stomach has nothing in it, and your body is thus not getting nutrients, so PLEASE FEED ME!!!!

I'm not sure why you thought we were disregarding subjective experience as "not real." I think If you'll look back, you'll find that we're(or at least I'm) saying that beyond our own personal, subjective "reality," there's a universal, objective reality that we can only get a glimpse of. Glad to have you aboard.

kflux

Your view is technically "naive realism". You are assuming existence without an observer. My view is that reality is socially constructed, including what we call "physical reality". And see below regarding the nature of "truth".

Taliesin

My point is that in "real life" the concept of "truth" is never raised except as part of a decision making activity. Human activities usually involve "languaging" which has a subdivision we might call "truthing",

Take the well utilised example from philosophy classes "Is it true that Peter has a pain". Out of context " (or as Wittgenstein might say "when language goes on holiday") learned texts" are written about the nature of "truth", "evidence" and "knowledge" but all that matters in the flow is what we do about Peter ! We have a node in a decision tree ...a pause which briefly encapsulates "a situation" involving our social interaction with Peter...and then after a brief internal or external "discussion" we move on. Note that such situations/pauses are always subject specific as is the breadth and depth of the perceptual window involved.

What you've refuted, Taliesin, is not really the crux of my argument:

A. I fully expect you to accept subjective experience as something that is real, that exists;
B. I fully expect you to realize the importance of not disregarding subjective experience;
C. I argue that despite the unique difficulties in accurately assessing subjective experiences, I see every value to be gained in affording it the status of full-blown "truth"; I see nothing to be gained in denying it this status;
Therefore, in defining the term "truth" (which I believe is a decision that we ought to make based upon an assessment of which definition generates the greatest value/utility), I think we're better off including subjective experience in the term.

The fact that subjective experience is more difficult to assess makes it no less real. It's our duty to make every effort to assess it if we want to be good people.

It's easy to self-servingly dismiss people's values and viewpoints if they're arrived at using a calculus that is different from our own. It becomes more difficult if we remind ourselves that conflicting values are as real as our own; we promote this effort by affording each person's values the same status of "truth" that we intuitively attach to our own.

Chombis

Fresco, science has shown that the Earth was around well before there was any kind of sentient life on it. Would you say that

a) The scientists are wrong, Earth did not exist until we did
b) There had to have been sentient life, it just conspicuously left no trace at all
or
c) We as sentient creatures created that prehistoric Earth via some sort of time flux

?

Rufio,
I'm sure we have discussed this before.

1. "Time" is a psychological construct. (see Einstein)
To talk about "before sentient beings" requires a sentient being to exist with the concept "before".

2. That "sentient being" who is "observing in its a minds eye" is you. I defy you to "think" about the "Earth's existence" without evoking a picture. (This is entirely synonymous with "the tree in the forest...")

3. Normal epistemological terms such as "knowledge" and "existence" presuppose a "control disposition" which is a characteristic of "cognition", Such control necessarily uses "time" and "objective existence" as a priori concepts in order to predict and control elements of current interactions.

4. It is the job of philosophers to expose these covert cognitive mechanisms at the risk of "satisfactory" anthropocentric coherence, but with the hope of a more general level of coherence. (See Capra)

Chombis: In response to your points:
A) Yes, real to us, but not real to others, necessarily.
B) As I said, I'm not disregarding subjective experiences, just qualifying your statement.
C) The point is to make the distinction between an "Ultimate reality" and our own, "Individual reality". We might choke if we believe a man named Bob is throttling us, but if there's nobody else in the room, then "Bob" is not "real" in the grander sense.

Other letters:

Hmm...I don't think we can include subjective experience in there because by nature, subjective isn't universal. Feel free to refute me, though; I'd be interested in hearing more about why you think it merits the same status.


What does morality have to do with defining reality? I'm not trying to shut you down, I just don't see how you made that jump. We should of course take others' views into consideration, but in an academic argument, the thing that really matters is truth, not feelings. Is that what you meant?


I hope this isn't meant to be as hostile as it sounded to me. As I said above, I'm not trying to dismiss you offhand, I'm just arguing a point. That being said, I disagree that all of people's views are equally valid. If an atheist were to say "God doesn't exist" to a theist, while they should both respect each others' views, they should never have to accept them as indisputable truth.

RADICAL EMPIRICISM

Subjective realities are plural. They all differ and at any point in time, many of them exist simultaneously. An empirical survey of the elements of reality will reveal the physical world as well as both first-hand (your own personal experience) and second-hand (the observation of volitional behavior on the part of your fellow humans) evidence of the plurality of subjective experiences. A more nuanced version of this empirical survey (termed "radical empiricism" by William James) also takes into account dynamic interactions that exist between subjective experiences and the physical world, causing the former to change over time. For example, strong rhetoric can change the way you look at the world, as can the passage of time or a change of scenery.

The fact that the subjective experiences of two different people differ isn't evidence that one or both don't exist. The fact that someone is mistaken about a point of fact doesn't mean that his or her experience of mistakenness doesn't exist.

There are indeed difficulties in assessing the subjective states of others, but that doesn't mean that it's not an important undertaking, and it certainly isn't evidence that they don't exist. It's clear that we can't (yet) be absolutely certain that someone is being honest in any given instance where he or she reveals his/her subjective experience to us, but we all operate on a day-to-day basis with just an operative level of certainty, adjusted for the probability of deception.

A physical object such as a book isn't universal either. It exists in a localized place at a localized time. The fact that physical objects or mental states are limited, that their existence is circumscribed, in a variety of ways doesn't mean that they don't exist, but rather reveals the dimesnions of their existence.

THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE ACT OF DEFINING "TRUTH" TO ETHICS

The axiom that "the unexamined life is not worth living" is an expression of aesthetic preference. The process of philosophy has positive moral value only to the extent that it improves people's lives (increases value according to their own set of values). Philosophical discourse is just another tool; the value of any particular discussion can therefore only be measured by the increase in net utility it generates. I include the fact that some people enjoy philosophical discourse as a hobby (and some even go so far as to claim to take the above axiom literally) as an element of "net utility", but certainly not an overriding one.

Following this analysis, the act of defining reality has an intimate relationship with ethics. In addition to believing that the version of "ultimate reality" described above is the one that most closely conforms to all data available to me, it also appears auspiciously engineered to be the metaphysics (at least among the two that we're arguing over), which, if adopted, provides the most promising foundation for a fine, compassionate, pragmatic ethical system. For me, this is the most (perhaps only) important reason to tarry on the decision to define truth in one way or another.

SELF-SERVING DISMISSAL OF VALUES

Here, I warn against the trait that I believe is universally human: a tendency to use whatever means necessary to dismiss/undermine positions that are adverse to our own values. I would argue that this tendency (I now realize that some Catholics call it the "Original Sin" of self-centeredness) is the single greatest (heck, perhaps the only) hinderance to ethical behavior by man. I suggested the more inclusive definition of "truth" discussed above as an important component of a unified strategy to immunize us from this sad and self-defeating tendency. I wasn't making a point specific to you or your posts, Taliesin, nor lodging an accusation directed at you; instead, I sought to assert what I feel is a very important practical benefit of the more expansive definition of truth. Now you understand that the desire to secure this and other such moral benefits is the reason I'm participating in this discussion, and provides the meat of my argument.

Chombis

The concept of (objective) Reality is a social construct: I never would have it if I had not learned it from others who learned it from others, all the way back to its inventor. But it's a construct that makes intuitive sense to me. All the realities of life, taxes, gravity, illness, birth and death are constructions as well, in so far as they are representations we make to ourselves about what we see as the conditions of our existence. Truth, however, as a NOUN is not necessary for me. I see an honest statement as "truthful", i.e., sincere, but not as an expression of some Plantonic Truth. Truth is an adjective that we attach to propositions, and we seek them in order to remove, as Fresco notes, obstacles to the flow of our lives. Their value is pragmatic, not metaphysical.

it's not that i'm a realist . i'm actually a very optimistic person , it's more the definition of the word truth that i am arguing , not the importance of "subjective opinion based on experience" . that statement contains the whole equation , the experience it's self is true, but how one interprets that exspirience and how one alows it to affect their opinion on a subject is subjective in as two people can experience the same thing yet draw two different mental concept of it. in addition to that the concepts concluded may well change given time and personal growth. the opinions are as important as truth , they simply do not fall under the same definition . i would look more at psycoligy than philosophy on this issue.

oh , and yes i like wine verv much .

ok i found this quote , and not only dose it address in a roundabout way the issue (kind if you read in to it). but it's so funny i had to post it somewhere so humor me please.

A schedual for reform of the english method of spelling

For example, in Year 1 that useless letter "c" would be dropped to be replased either by "k" or "s", and likewise "x" would no longer be part of the alphabet. The only kase in which "c" would be retained would be the "ch" formation, which will be dealt with later. Year 2 might reform "w" spelling, so that "which" and "one" would take the same konsonant, wile Year 3 might well abolish "y" replasing it with "i" and Iear 4 might fiks the "g
j" anomali wonse and for all.

Jenerally, then, the improvement would kontinue iear bai iear with Iear 5 doing awai with useless double konsonants, and Iears 6-12 or so modifaiing vowlz and the rimeining voist and unvoist konsonants. Bai Iear 15 or sou, it wud fainali bi posibl tu meik ius ov thi ridandant letez "c", "y" and "x" -- bai now jast a memori in the maindz ov ould doderez -- tu riplais "ch", "sh", and "th" rispektivli.

Fainali, xen, aafte sam 20 iers ov orxogrefkl riform, wi wud
hev a lojikl, kohirnt speling in ius xrewawt xe Ingliy-spiking werld.

Mark Twain (1835 - 1910), "A Plan for the Improvement of English Spelling"

Nobody
Reality is not only a social construct. You don't learn how to breathe. But even with aspects of reality that are learned, that does not mean that they are nothing more than social conventions. Things do exist in our experience. And they exist as we experience them. I don't know what a thing is outside my experience level.
The idea that truth is an adequation must be understood as an adequation of relations. I am present in a reality that includes me, and I exist, I live, within a set of relations, within my possible experience. In my experience an apple is an apple. As I eat an apple I am making an adequate relation, because I expect that what seems to be an apple is an apple and that an apple is eatable. Even if I am wrong and the apple is made of plastic, that doesn't change the adequation of the relations I established between me and things. In fact an apple is eatable and I have reasons - habit reasons - to believe that something that seems like an apple is problably an apple.
Eating a real apple is a relation based on truth. I don't eat a stone. Because I believe that an apple is eatable and a stone isn't. And that belief is not only a social convention. Of course I need that someone teaches me that an apple can be eat. But what, in this case, is teached is true. It's adequate within our experience.

When you mencioned that gravity is a social construction, that doesn't mean that the fact that things fall or that the earth moves around the sun are social constructions.
See this example: more than two thousand years ago, Hiparco of Samos claimed that the earth moved around the sun. In the cultural context of that historic period it was an absurd theory. Aristotle, and later Ptolomeu physical theories gave the demonstration of the impossibility of an earth mouvement.
Would you say that Hiparco of Samos was wrong?

Objective reality is not a social convention. If it is, then where do we exist? Unless you want to argue that where is an illusion in which in that case no one can really argue about one or the other...

Anyways, I exist, and people outside me exist. They feel "like" me and they have feelings, etc. Thus, objectively speaking, people exist. If say there are no humans in existence, then is reality still there? Yes, it is.

Chombis: Nice post; you really clarified your views for me. I'm glad to see that you didn't mean the "dismissal" remark personally, and your further exploration of it also explained your tie-in to ethics.

Now, to argue some more :wink: :


I have to disagree with your example, but I can see where you're going with it, and that, I agree with. just because something has a transient existence doesn't mean that it doesn't exist at all. A book that is burned 5 seconds after it's made still existed, and indeed does still exist, if only in ash form, and it will exist for everyone who isn't suffering from some psychosis. A hallucinatory book from that psychosis, on the other hand, only "exists" in your mind, and while from your perspective, and your "dimension" it does exist, in the universal "dimension" it doesn't. I can know that you're seeing a book, and that's it's real for you, but that still doesn't make it real for me or the other 90-something percent of the population. I think that's what you meant in your example, but if I'm wrong, please correct me.


Now I see how ethics related to truth for you. To be honest, I had never thought of applying "truth" in an ethical manner; the two have always been distinct entities. Thanks for giving me some thought-food.