Destroy My Belief System, Please!

If you see rule utilitarianism and act utilitarianism as being just two sides of the same coin, then you're saying that the former is just as bad as the latter.

Is happiness the same as contentment...and contentment the same as happiness...

III. By utility is meant that property in any object, whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness, (all this in the present case comes to the same thing) or (what comes again to the same thing) to prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness to the party whose interest is considered: if that party be the community in general, then the happiness of the community: if a particular individual, then the happiness of that individual.

The "should" doesn't derive from the "is", it merely gets informed by it.

The "should" derives from the presence of empathy and goodwill in us that every form of ethics presupposes (*). Whatever it is that people prefer, we should let them obtain, even help them obtain, because we wish them well --- whatever "well" means to them.

The difference is epistemological and practical. Preferences you can easily observe directly in the real world; happiness, pleasure, and peace of mind are internal states of mind that are hard or impossible to observe directly.

Frank Apisa wrote:

Is happiness the same as contentment...and contentment the same as happiness...

In the classical traditions, entire systems of philosophy (such as hedonism and eudemonism) have fought each other over this distinction. My impression of the Utilitarian literature is that utilitarians try to avoid the subject. See, for example, the first chapter of Bentham (1789):

In his 'Principles of Morals and Legislation', Jeremy Bentham wrote:

III. By utility is meant that property in any object, whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness, (all this in the present case comes to the same thing) or (what comes again to the same thing) to prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness to the party whose interest is considered: if that party be the community in general, then the happiness of the community: if a particular individual, then the happiness of that individual.

I saw the same pattern of not distinguishing these things with other Utilitarian authors. (I have also read J.S. Mill, H. Sidgwick, and Peter Singer.)

The fact that people desire happiness doesn't inform utilitarianism, it is the entire foundation of the system. Take away that foundation and the structure crumbles.

I can't see why that should be true. Just because you desire something doesn't mean that I should make it more likely that you'll get it.

In contrast, if a husband would rather run off and live with Katie Holmes than stay with his wife and help raise their children, but decides, in the end, to opt for the latter because of the feelings of attachment and obligation that he has, can we truly say that he prefers to stay with his wife and children, just because that's what he ended up doing?

Well...you seem wedded to the notion that utilitarianism will be the decider for you, Thomas...

but I wonder whether you are suggesting that utilitarianism is the standard by which all of humanity ought measure how things ought be measured. (Circularity intended.)

I asked the question to which you responded, because I see utilitarianism as giving short shrift to the notion of "contentment rather than happiness"...and also, surprisingly, to the notion of "unconditional happiness."

Do you see, Thomas, utilitarianism as such a social tool?

'K . . . can you let me have a hundred bucks? It will dramatically increase my happiness.

Do you approve of used book stores and fish and chips from Mike's?

Setanta wrote:

Do you see, Thomas, utilitarianism as such a social tool?

I think so, yes. I think of utilitarianism as both my personal ethic and my political philosophy.

Hmm! I don't mean to bore you, but what is your touchstone for comparing what may appear to be conflicting moral choices?

Sure. In particular, preference utilitarianism falls apart if you take away the assumption that people prefer what they prefer. But I don't see how you can take that away from preference utilitarians without a contradiction in terms. So why should I worry about it?

Other things being equal, you should make it more likely that I get it because you wish people well.

And I know you wish people well because you wouldn't deal in ethics of any kind otherwise. (Even Kantian ethics don't work entirely without goodwill and empathy.)

Yes, something like that. We can truly say that he prefers one bundle (his family and a clean conscience) over the alternative (Katie Holmes and a life of guilt).

I'm not sure I see your point. I agree that people prefer what they prefer, but, as you admitted, that doesn't provide very much in the way of explanation, so I'm not sure why you're reverting to it here.

Other things being equal, you should make it more likely that I get it because you wish people well.

No, decidedly not. Certainly you'd agree that people don't act altruistically in the market, where preferences are most pronounced. If you and I both prefer a certain good that cannot be shared, then not only do I not want you to get it, but I will do everything that I can to prevent you from getting it.

Happiness, therefore, can be a "common good" in a way that preferences cannot.

I'm not sure I'd agree with you there. An ethical system based on divine command, for example, can dispense entirely with sympathy for one's fellow humans. As long as I'm obeying God's/Allah's/Zeus's/FSM's commands, the rest of humanity can take a flying leap.

And Ayn Rand would say that her ethical system was based solely on enlightened self-interest.*

Only to demonstrate that there is nothing for you to take away from Utilitarianism here.

That's why I said "other things being equal". If satisfying my preferences frustrates the satisfaction of other people's preferences --- including yours --- then other things are not equal.

Now we need to mitigate between preferences. In this case, the mitigation would probably work through a market auction: We would bid up the price to a point where one of us prefers to keep the money and forego the good and the other prefers to get the good and pay the money. That's a cleanly observed preference on both sides, and we both end up with whatever we prefer the most.

Not if both our happiness is tied to a good that cannot be shared. Your distinction makes no difference to the case you just described.

Perhaps I'm splitting hairs here, but I wouldn't consider this an ethical system but a legal system --- with god as the putative legislator and the Bible (or whatever) as His putative legislation.

But things are never equal. I will always value my preferences higher than yours.

That's fine for distributing economic goods, but we're not talking about economic goods here, we're talking about moral goods.

What you're suggesting is that someone's preferences can be more moral than another's

You may want to dismiss Rand, but damn, that sounds like something she might say.

Yes, you're splitting hairs. It's an ethical system, as it sets out rules for what is good and what is bad.