@joefromchicago,
joefromchicago wrote:Historians face the same task of sorting the reliable hearsay from the unreliable. That's especially true of historians of antiquity, where an unreliable source may be the only source.
Historians are not entitled to claim that they know something when they don't. If their only source for some event is an unreliable source, then they
don't know, and the proper response is to be forthright about it. To say "oh well, let's settle for unreliable sources then", is
not the proper response --- not for a historian, not for
any honest intellectual.
joefromchicago wrote: A historian isn't a judge, though, and there's no rule that says that certain types of evidence are inadmissible.
In my opinon, if a piece of evidence would be inadmissible in a civil suit, it is very likely inappropriate for establishing historical narratives, too. I have formed this opinion from the assumption that the legal rules of evidence make sense for the respective standards of proof that the evidence needs to meet in a particular case. After all, these rules are tested far more often, and with far higher stakes, than the 'rules of evidence' historians follow informally. In dealing with evidence, then, I trust the rules of the legal system more than I trust the rules of the historical profession.
Now, the standard of proof that historians seek to meet --- or that I expect them to meet --- is preponderance of the evidence: Is a given claim about history more likely than not to be true, given the available evidence? As I said, I believe that judicial rules of evidence are well-adapted to the standard of proof that the evidence needs to establish. Therefore, it makes sense to me to evaluate historical evidence by the same rules a judge would use to evaluate evidence in a civil suit.
joefromchicago wrote:Instead, the historian sifts through all the evidence and makes a determination, based on historical criteria, which is reliable and which isn't.
Maybe this is me being dense, but I don't see how this approach differs materially from what a judge in a civil case would do.