Who are the proper subjects of moral consideration?

Are these interrogative questions aimed at me because you portray me as some sort of a proponent of moral relativism or more specifically cultural relativism? Have you ever considered me as being a proponent of moral pluralism who view moral reality to be consisting of multiple and competing moral values?

However, I don't know if it is also true for the rest of the six billion plus people living in the world, nor do I intent to speak for them.

Where do rights come from? If women (or any group of people) have rights, who gave it to them? Do chimpanzee females have the same rights?

Where do rights come from?

If women (or any group of people) have rights, who gave it to them?

Do chimpanzee females have the same rights?

I meant virtue approach, or in other words virtue based ethics

the auto speller on my phone seems to think other wise.

Technology:0 Human:1

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Re: Frank Apisa (Post 5247454)
Frank Apisa wrote:

To Bennett, you wrote:

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another moral relativist

Sounds to me like a put-down that you wanted to present as something less than a put-down, Matt. Am I wrong about that?

No. I did not mean it as a veiled insult.
I did label the position as moral relativism, which I believe is an accurate label.
I did not point this out as an insult, but I did mean it as a lament.

I lament because, I feel as though taking such a position won't offer much in the way of a discussion of my OP.

If moral relativism is granted, then questions of "should" or "ought" have no meaning outside of a cultural reference. This moves the discussion of ethics from domain of philosophy to the domain of anthropology.

I am not claiming that a position of moral relativism is invalid. I am just pointing out that dismissing the possibility of objective or absolute ethical truth claims, leaves little to discuss philosophically.

In the same way that dismissing the possibility of objective or absolute epistemological truth claims leaves little to discuss philosophically (as in your debate with igm).

Since you asked about my views:
I do believe that ethical truth claims can be evaluated on merits not dependent upon specific cultural conventions. (If there is interest, perhaps I will create a forum to discuss this.)

You are waltzing around the obvious answer Matt. Rights are a human invention,

We have rights for the sole reason that we say we have rights. There is no other reason. Rights are invented by humans.

We made them up as part of creating societies. Outside of human society, rights have no relevance anywere in the Universe, In places where there is a breakdown in social structure, rights disappear.

What you stated has:
Class #1=[all humans]
Class #2=[all beings deserving of moral consideration]
Class #3=[all beings capable of moral consideration]

You claimed that Class #2 includes all of Class #3 (valid)
You claimed that Class #3 includes most of Class #1 therefor all of Class #1 is included in Class #2 (invalid).

You may see it as right or wrong, but I see it as a variable range in a given context from an individual's perspective.

Some may see the duty aspect of moral experience suggests the reality of justice, which is inherently relational and thus irreducible to any interpretation of morality as mere personal fulfillment. They see the joviality aspect of moral experience to be a suggestive reality of desire-for-the-good, which is inherently personal and thus irreducible to an interpretation of morality as mere social or divine obligation.

Now my question of interest is why do you think it is simply wrong to extend moral consideration outside the class of beings capable of moral consideration?

I'd like to point out that the idea of a being capable of moral consideration extending moral consideration outside the class of beings who are capable of moral consideration is a vague idea.

The first thing that must be clarified is what does one mean by the phrase moral consideration as it is being used? And there is the aspect of equality. Should all humans be morally considered equally? Or should all sentient beings be morally considered equally?

From daily observation do sentient beings outside the class of beings who are capable of moral consideration, extended moral considerations, albeit it may not be on equal footing with a human being? The line of reasoning that suggests no moral consideration be extended to sentient beings not capable of moral consideration just doesn't hold up in ordinary moral discourse. With such a construct creating animal suffering and being cruel to sentient beings not capable of moral considerations changes from being an immoral act to an amoral act.