there is a fundamental reality

@Setanta,

No need for wittering !If you need me to explain Clerk-Maxwell's axiomatic "requirement" of the ether/aether I will do so. The fact that you don't mention him speaks volumes.

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@JLNobody,

Quote:

Set, your accusation that Fresco makes a "pathetic" appear to authority is inaccurate and unfair.

Well, I have made that same comment...and I do not see my making it as inaccurate nor unfair.

JL…there is a huge difference between citing authority and engaging in the logical fallacy of an appeal to authority. Fresco has crossed that line often and regularly. Take a closer look…I am sure you will see the truth of that.

In any case, I think both you and he are making another logical misstep.

Both of you, as do all of us, realize the inadequacy of language to describe something like REALITY…and even if we knew what the REALITY were (we don’t!), it appears as though human language would not be up to the job of communicating significantly about its properties.

You and Fresco want to morph that into “Therefore REALITY is what we human agree upon” (to one degree or another). But not only does that not logically follow…it is, in fact, illogical. Try setting it up in a syllogism and you will see.

Perhaps example of what I mean: None of us can say with any degree of certainty what alien life would be like on a planet circling a star system in a galaxy outside of the family of galaxies we call Our universe. Even if we did, different physics might apply, and the life might easily be different that we could not, using human language, be able to substantively comment on what such life might be.

It would be illogical, however, to suggest that therefore any such life must BE what we are able to communicate and understand. It must be an agreement of sorts of what we are capable of understanding.

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@Setanta,

Setanta wrote:

Basically, you're saying that if we assume A, we can deduce B, which denies that we''re entitled to assume A.

Set, the kinds of presuppositions I usually refer to are not the explicit assumptions we consciously posit; I'm usually referring to tacit presuppositions of unconscious levels of culture. We are "entitled" to these presuppositions if only because we cannot function without SOME, true or not.

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@Setanta,

Ah, what a bold statement. Naive Realism receives epistemological cred on the basis of the motives of philosophers of science.

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@fresco,

No, all it says is that his assumptions were not founded on an examination of data using the scientific method. He was correct that electricity, magnetism and light all operate within (or are affected) electromagnetic fields. However, his decision that there was a luminous aether as the medium in which light moved was never supported by experimentation, and the Michelson–Morley experiment falsified that assumption. The failure to demonstrate the existence of a luminous (or as he had it, a luminiferous) aether did not invalidate his unified electromagnetic field theory because it wasn't dependent on such a medium.

I can't think of anything i need to explain to me--given that i'm not interested in your bait and switch word games.

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@JLNobody,

You can twist what i say, but you cannot alter the import of what i say. I am indifferent to the concept of "naive realism," and the philosophers of science don't employ the concept.

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@Setanta,

So you really don't understand that his equations for light as an e-m wave required the axiomatic concept of an "elastic propagation medium" like that of air in the case of sound, in order for him to even suggest them. Contrary to your complete nonsense about "experimental evidence", the fact that his equations worked implied that his axiom was justified at the time. You'd flunk "History of Science" 101 if you wrote your rubbish !

You must realise that whenever you start thrashing about hurling accusations about "linguistic tricks" and throwing in a few "clown"s and "hilarious"s it merely implies you are on the intellectual ropes. Frank's rushing to your aid with the "magic sponge of IS-ness", isn't going to help that chip on your shoulder !

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@fresco,

Frank seems to be saying that reality is not limited by what we are able to say about it. We do not need to be so preoccupied by linguistics.

(that's what I get out of Frank's post, anyway)

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@wandeljw,

What Frank does not seem to understand ( post Wittgenstein) is the view that meaning/value/communicative import of any word, in this case "reality", depends on the social contexts in which it is used. Thus priests in a seminary discussing "transubstantiation"can validly talk of the "reality" of the wine as "Christ's blood", or amputees can validly talk of the "reality" of pain in a phantom limb.
What these contexts seem to have in common is that use of the term "reality" implies an unusual state of affairs giving rise to the modification of subsequent social behaviour. i.e "normal reality" is somehow being usurped. But the term "reality" is almost never used outside those contexts of potential dispute! (philosophy seminars excluded because they are aberrant). Now what Frank wants is for "reality" to be representative of an ontological "something"(normality ?). But the Wittgenstein analysis of "meaning as usage" (which I have partially outlined above) arises from closely argued points against such representationalism. It follows that we cannot subscribe to both positions, and if you can commune with my exposition about "dispute contexts" above, you cannot also take the view that the word "reality" is representative of a context independent "something",

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@fresco,

fresco wrote:

What Frank does not seem to understand ( post Wittgenstein) is the view that meaning/value/communicative import of any word, in this case "reality", depends on the social contexts in which it is used. Thus priests in a seminary discussing "transubstantiation"can validly talk of the "reality" of the wine as "Christ's blood", or amputees can validly talk of the "reality" of pain in a phantom limb.
What these contexts seem to have in common is that use of the term "reality" implies an unusual state of affairs giving rise to the modification of subsequent social behaviour. i.e "normal reality" is somehow being usurped. But the term "reality" is almost never used outside those contexts of potential dispute! (philosophy seminars excluded because they are aberrant). Now what Frank wants is for "reality" to be representative of an ontological "something"(normality ?). But the Wittgenstein analysis of "meaning as usage" (which I have partially outlined above) arises from closely argued points against such representationalism. It follows that we cannot subscribe to both positions, and if you can commune with my exposition about "dispute contexts" above, you cannot also take the view that the word "reality" is representative of "something",

fundemental reality is what we are discussing here , not the abstract reality brought on by thought of a higher life form , us

but " allows " life to be in the first place

hence why the I presented the periodic table of chemistry and space

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@wandeljw,

Quote:

Frank seems to be saying that reality is not limited by what we are able to say about it.

I certainly am saying that REALITY is not NECESSARILY limited by what we are able to say about it.'

But even if it is limited by what we puny humans are able to say about it...that is what the REALITY actually is.

Quote:

We do not need to be so preoccupied by linguistics.

All those words from Fresco, Wandel, are useful (to Fresco) in a way that has little to do with actually discussing the problem. Fresco is very intelligent. The "words" are like a physically powerful guy taking off his shirt and flexing his muscles while confronting someone with whom he disagrees.

The shirt off and the muscles flexing don't move the discussion along...nor do they make the big powerful guy's arguments any more logical or compelling.

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@fresco,

Quote:

What Frank does not seem to understand ( post Wittgenstein) is the view that meaning/value/communicative import of any word, in this case "reality", depends on the social contexts in which it is used. Thus priests in a seminary discussing "transubstantiation"can validly talk of the "reality" of the wine as "Christ's blood", or amputees can validly talk of the "reality" of pain in a phantom limb.
What these contexts seem to have in common is that use of the term "reality" implies an unusual state of affairs giving rise to the modification of subsequent social behaviour. i.e "normal reality" is somehow being usurped. But the term "reality" is almost never used outside those contexts of potential dispute! (philosophy seminars excluded because they are aberrant). Now what Frank wants is for "reality" to be representative of an ontological "something"(normality ?). But the Wittgenstein analysis of "meaning as usage" (which I have partially outlined above) arises from closely argued points against such representationalism. It follows that we cannot subscribe to both positions, and if you can commune with my exposition about "dispute contexts" above, you cannot also take the view that the word "reality" is representative of a context independent "something",

Be careful everyone. Don't step on the shirt. Fresco may want to put it back on.

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"Theories are our own inventions, our own ideas; they are not forced upon us but are our self-made instruments of thought: this has been clearly seen by the idealist. But some of these theories of ours can clash with reality; and when they do, we know there is a reality; there is something to remind us of the fact that our ideas may be mistaken. And that is why the realist is right."
--Karl Popper

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@wandeljw,

Interesting! I think the existence of theories that do not work does not, in itself, demonstrate that reality is something we experience without participating in its generation. Popper assures us that the fallibility of idealist theorizing is proof of the independent existence of reality. But does the failure--the fallibility--of the realist's efforts at theory building demonstrate the validity of the idealist thesis?

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@JLNobody,

(An interesting aside regarding Wittgenstein versus Popper).
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wittgenstein's_Poker

(Note also Kuhn's " Structure of Scientific Revolutions" was something of a tour de force against Popper's "falsifiability principle")

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@fresco,

No, Clerk-Maxwell's equations were a justification after the fact. He suffered a failure of imagination, and could not conceive of how light could move across vast distances, which were apparently empty, without a transmission medium. So he conceived of a transmission medium and set out to demonstrate the case. I understand that these concepts are difficult for you, especially when they question authority. There is no luminous aether, and light does not require such a medium. Being able to construct an axiom is not evidence of the truth of said axiom.

You needn't assume that there's a chip on my shoulder. Although this is entertaining, it's not important. In fact, it seems that you are the one who is getting exercised and angry here. I called you a clown (as i've already explained) because you has already suggested that i were either stupid or lazy. But you're a legend in your own mind. You're nothing to me.

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@wandeljw,

Karl Popper wrote:

"Theories are our own inventions, our own ideas; they are not forced upon us but are our self-made instruments of thought: this has been clearly seen by the idealist. But some of these theories of ours can clash with reality; and when they do, we know there is a reality; there is something to remind us of the fact that our ideas may be mistaken. And that is why the realist is right."

This bears repeating.

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@fresco,

I read the book, Wittgenstein's Poker. The poker was a metal rod used to stir ashes in the fireplace in the classroom. Students who attended the talk gave different accounts of what happened during the argument between Popper and Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein actually did pick up the poker during the argument. Bertrand Russell was the event's host and was heard telling Wittgenstein to put the poker down.

As far as Kuhn is concerned, he was primarily a historian and only secondarily a philosopher of science. Kuhn did not always agree with what his followers were saying about his famous book. At one conference Kuhn said, "There is one thing you need to get straight. I am not a 'Kuhnian'."

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The meeting between Wittgenstein and Popper took place in 1946, not long after the second world war ended. Popper felt that there were serious problems of moral philosophy that needed to be worked on. This seemed to contradict Wittgenstein's idea that problems in philosophy could be reduced to word games.

Interestingly, both Popper and Wittgenstein had been in danger during the Nazi Holocaust.

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@Setanta,

Oh you still want to advertise your misunderstanding of the "scientific method" ?

From an article on the derivation of the Clerk-Maxwell equations

Quote:

Similar to the constitutive relations in continuous medium mechanic there are also constitutive relationships in electromagnetics. Constitutive relations describe the medium’s properties and effects when two physical quantities are related. It can be viewed as the description of response of the medium as a system to certain input. For example, in continuous medium mechanics, the response of a linear-elastic medium to strain can be described by the Hooke’s law, and the resultant is the stress. The relation between stress and strain is the Hooke’s law. In another word, Hooke’s law is the constitutive relations for linear elasticity. In electromagnetics, there are four fundamental constitutive relationships to describe the response of a medium to a variety of electromagnetic input.

Maxwell equations were derived by analogy with mechanical elasticity,, in which he specified "the ether" as "the medium". Argument by analogy is common throughout modern physics as any university physics student knows. Indeed it is one of the principle devices for creative hypothesis formation.

(As an aside, my own experimental experience in speech perception involved testing a number theoretical analogies with visual perception. And one of the problems even involved a direct analogy with the " Heisenberg uncertainty principle" in physics in which amplitude and frequency of an audio signal cannot be independently specified).

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there is a fundamental reality

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