I think it would be excessively anthropocentric to attribute our kind of "mental" awareness to everything including inanimate forms in nature--I wouldn't even do that with other mammalian forms. But I do very much like the idea of expanding the term, awareness, to everything, as a metaphor for relationship, connections or the unitarian processes of unification.
Limited to only a metaphor, yes. Since if what follows death is the absence of everything (a combo of extinctivism and anti-panexperientialism), then such a general "awareness" would be transpiring in the dark/silence, lacking presentations of any kind. Seemingly equating, as Cyracuz may have suggested elsewhere, to the materialist's lawful-like interactions between bodies.
That is, even the attractive and repulsive fields of sub-atomic particles seemingly "detecting" each other and responding with reliable changes would just be part of the universe's regulation by general laws. And not so much (in that context) a genuine awareness, the latter being more a figurative ascription or everyday useful term reducible to local mechanistic patterns abiding by global habits of the cosmos.
For that reason, I usually emphasize the phenomenal content or presentations
of consciousness as what makes the latter a concept distinct from the matter concept -- or the connections and activities of various bodies that physicalists desire to reduce it to. IMO, most of the rest of consciousness could indeed be construed as potential folk psychology, explained-away by neuroscience, computer sciences, etc.
Below, Kant considered the speculation of panpsychism, or attributing ubiquitous experience to matter, but suspended belief of it because the possibility lacked positive evidence in much the same way as noumena. It would be unknowable, something that garnered only an empty conception; and would be different from the manifestations of human consciousness even if dogmatically asserted to be so. (Kant refers to this as "thinking" in the translation, but he surely means appearances / experiences, needed just to verify any reasoning, language, etc. as taking place....)
KANT: In the Transcendental Aesthetic we have proved, beyond all question, that bodies are mere appearances of our outer sense and not things in themselves. [...] Extension, impenetrability, cohesion, and motion -- in short, everything which outer senses can give us -- neither are nor contain thoughts, feeling, desire, or resolution, these never being objects of outer intuition, nevertheless the something which underlies the outer appearances and which so affects our sense that it obtains the representations of space, matter, shape, etc. , may yet, when viewed as noumenon (or better, as transcendental object), be at the same time the [unknowable] subject of our thoughts.
[...] I may further assume that the substance [matter] which in relation to our outer sense possesses extension is in itself the possessor of thoughts, and that these thoughts can by means of its own inner sense be consciously represented. In this way, what in one relation is entitled corporeal would in another relation be at the same time a thinking being, whose thoughts we cannot intuit, though we can indeed intuit their signs in the [field of] appearance.
Accordingly, the thesis that only souls (as particular kinds of substances) think, would have to be given up; and we should have to fall back on the common expression that men think, that is, that the very same being which, as outer appearance, is extended, is (in itself) internally a subject, and is not composite, but is simple and thinks.
But, without committing ourselves in regard to such hypotheses, we can make this general remark. If I understand by soul a thinking being in itself, the question whether or not it is the same in kind as matter -- matter not being a thing in itself, but merely a species of representations in us -- is by its very terms illegitimate. For it is obvious that a thing in itself is of a different nature from the determinations which constitute only its [phenomenal] state. If, on the other hand, we compare the thinking 'I' not with matter but with the intelligible that lies at the basis of the outer appearance which we call matter, we have no knowledge whatsoever of the intelligible, and therefore are in no position to say that the soul is in any inward respect different from it.
--CPR, p 338-340, Norman Kemp Smith translation