Moral Realism

@Fil Albuquerque,

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you need two operators to establish an operation...function depends on contextual systemic background, and value arises in it...

You seem to be referring to emergent, supervenient, or irreducible properties in a natural system. For example, the identity relation between H2O molecules and the property of "wetness"; or the identity relation between brain structures and consciousness. You'll notice that we're still talking about one and the same natural object or system, just at different levels of description. This is an epistemic issue insofar as we're unable to decompose the descriptive identity of one concept into the other. However, there is no logical or metaphysical contradiction.

One way to tackle this problem is to treat irreducible properties through a system of transcendental logic (e.g., Hegelian metaphysics) rather than with an empirical theory. That is, the interrelations and consequences between levels of identity could be mapped out in conceptual terms by a priori reasoning. If performed successfully, you could derive an ordered set of values, organized in the context of their priority or finality; lower-order values would be logically entailed by higher-order values. With this knowledge in hand, metaphysical principles could be built to specify the ends and values of an ideal society. These principles would serve as a kind of "grundnorm" (or pure normativity) to structure real institutional practices. So, basically, you don't need to begin your analysis of the practical Good from the perspective of concrete social realities (i.e., empirical science); you could define it from the perspective of ideal institutional forms (i.e., pure practical reason); then work backwards.

1 Reply

@Lichtung,

No it goes deeper and further then that... I am suggesting the measurement on the, say "wetness" depends not only on the property´s of water, we agreed in that, but similarly say on the degree of "wetness" of the measurer in such a way that he can consider water to be wet when functioning with him...what I am saying is that only a final degree of relational order as a whole can establish the proper true functions on any smaller entity (primitive) in the set or in the system...any string of information in the set whoever big it is, if not final, cannot ever establish a true description of the real operational value of any function, thus only describing objects in, relative, measurement comparative, terms...whoever I am convinced that a final, non qualitative infinite description, must exist, to establish a proper ground (substance) to all included set operators...even if such set temporally and phenomenally operates in an infinite loop...(false infinity)(which to my understanding is the only possible infinity there can be, from the very substantiated ground of finity) anyway I am side tracking here but hope you get my idea.

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@Fil Albuquerque,

Quote:

I am saying is that only a final degree of relational order as a whole can establish the proper true functions on any smaller entity (primitive) in the set or in the system

I think you are seeking more precision than the subject matter will allow. For example, an apple is likely to be infinitely dense in terms of its intrinsic nature (e.g., internal relations of information or energy). However, to achieve this level of detail is inconceivable and unnecessary for understanding the conceptual or essential character of the apple. All that complexity ultimately collapses into a single perceptible object that can be grasped by our minds. So rather than attempt to apprehend the nature of objects in their totality, the goal is to ascertain those features of a thing that are most essential or relevant to its nature. In this way we can order our concepts of reality abstractly; which is very useful for the theoretical work of science and philosophy. We are unlikely to ever grasp the comprehensive Good in an absolute sense; and that's fine with me. We don't need a perfect vision of things to make progress.

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@Lichtung,

I perfectly agree with what you said in pragmatical terms but you see I was not referring to the "apple" which is a relative object...we were if I recall it correctly debating objective (non fully describable) stuff, moral values, or whatever else one can think off, say, meta-objects...and on that ground alone I cannot concede if not to a pragmatical less exigent usage of the term objective which I did already define in a similar post...to a relative (scope) question, a perfectly proportional and optimally functional equally relative answer...anyway s I think in the essential we are in agreement.

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@Lichtung,

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I agree that pain has intrinsic value/disvalue. However, there is an enormous variety of things with this character; most of which are non-moral. I can hardly be said to be acting morally when I sit down to eat my breakfast or when I enjoy the beauty of a sunset.

The normativity of these actions isn't the point at issue: what is at issue is whether intrinsic value exists within these actions. If you enjoy a sunset or eat some breakfest, we might say the pleasure derived from aesthetic appreciattion or nutrition is of intrinsic value, though I'm not quite sure of the latter (aesthetics). Food, on the other hand is necessary for individual well being. All that would entail is that these actions have value (if they have value.) Whether these actions are morally required or impermissable, obligatory, right or wrong is a seperate question for normative ethics.

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I didn't say they "ground" moral judgements. Rather, I'm arguing that they qualify or characterize our evaluative or normative claims as being more or less moral.

Fair enough, but this is what I am interested in, and so too should the virtue ethicist whom assumes in some way or another rightness/wrongness/good/bad.

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@igm,

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You've failed to answer the above point. It not so easy to dismiss this as it's at the heart of your assertion. What evidence do you have that 'intrinsic value' exists

Re read the OP. I've listed my premises there.

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The Contemporary philosophers you'd be arguing against would include: A. J. Ayer, C. L. Stevenson, R. M. Hare, Simon Blackburn & Allan Gibbard Hägerström etc. etc.

Whew those are some big name philosophers. Have you read them carefully? I could definitely say that both Ayer and Stevenson are big influences on me, albeit for different reasons. With Ayer I am attempting to reconcile empiricism with moral judgements (some logical positivists thought moral judgements themselves were not applicable to truth are conditions and hence are "pseudo statements"). With Stevenson, emotivism doesn't answer the common sense assumption that moral judgements attempt to (1) describe reality and for the most part (2) get things right e.g. torturing a cat is wrong. The logic behind emotivism requires all moral judgements reduce to individual feeling or attitudes, but I'm not convinced all moral judgements reduce to individual subjective feeling or attitudes. My OP clearly provides reasons for believing why this not the case. Hare's analysis of the logic within moral judgements has led me to more interest/preference utiltarian thinking, and I feel this type of normative thinking requires a moral realist position. Hence, the OP.

Does that answer your question?

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@bigstew,

I see that your position on the objective nature of moral values reflects your personality. You are in a, pardon the expression, big stew over the issue because your position meets your needs. The same for me regarding my subjectivist relativism. But then that's no proof for my position. I'm nobody.

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@bigstew,

bigstew wrote:

Quote:

You've failed to answer the above point. It not so easy to dismiss this as it's at the heart of your assertion. What evidence do you have that 'intrinsic value' exists

Re read the OP. I've listed my premises there.

Quote:
The Contemporary philosophers you'd be arguing against would include: A. J. Ayer, C. L. Stevenson, R. M. Hare, Simon Blackburn & Allan Gibbard Hägerström etc. etc.

Whew those are some big name philosophers. Have you read them carefully? I could definitely say that both Ayer and Stevenson are big influences on me, albeit for different reasons. With Ayer I am attempting to reconcile empiricism with moral judgements (some logical positivists thought moral judgements themselves were not applicable to truth are conditions and hence are "pseudo statements"). With Stevenson, emotivism doesn't answer the common sense assumption that moral judgements attempt to (1) describe reality and for the most part (2) get things right e.g. torturing a cat is wrong. The logic behind emotivism requires all moral judgements reduce to individual feeling or attitudes, but I'm not convinced all moral judgements reduce to individual subjective feeling or attitudes. My OP clearly provides reasons for believing why this not the case. Hare's analysis of the logic within moral judgements has led me to more interest/preference utiltarian thinking, and I feel this type of normative thinking requires a moral realist position. Hence, the OP.

Does that answer your question?

My hunch based on what I do know is that 'Intrinsic value' does not exist but I'll leave it there.

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@JLNobody,

My position on the matter like big stew although supporting the belief in a closed system reality, presupposes that final value can only be established in the final set of all sets, thus ends up empathizing the epistemic impossibility of determining the true layer contextual final value of any would be property once it cannot ever be computed by any entity or subject which is itself a smaller contained part of the very system...more, it refutes intrinsic value, or non relational value, once assuming differentiated substantive effects, and form itself, that is shape, on any object/sub-system/set or thing can be further down described as an yet layer down effect of relational functions in between similar property´s which are similar by necessity of non transcendence in the act of communication or on how "things" inform "things"...information informs complexity of arrangements of similar property´s that can be organized in different ways as a whole but it does not inform property´s if not as second order effects which cannot have by definition intrinsic value in itself as an ontological or non phenomenal substantial qualitative difference...

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@JLNobody,

My position reflects common sense assumptions about the nature of morality. Objective ethics makes the most sense because ethically speaking, the right thing to do isn't a matter of "just me" so to speak. Others beyond my self interest matter. When atrocities occur, nothing can be more plainly obvious.

Even subjectivists adhere to morality. The problem is, does that conception of morality make sense, all things considered?

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@bigstew,

bigstew wrote:

Hare's analysis of the logic within moral judgements has led me to more interest/preference utiltarian thinking, and I feel this type of normative thinking requires a moral realist position.

Do you (personally) believe in the notion of 'the greater good’? Taken to the extreme doesn't it lead to absurdities like e.g. justifying the killing of one person to save the lives via transplants of say four (or more) people? Isn't that an example of 'the greater good'? What does this say about the logic of Utilitarianism?

It’s also not proven either logically or scientifically. Appealing to facts that depend on other facts is as you know a fault explained in the 'regress argument' the counter is to say as you have that ethics are not about truth but agreed upon definitions. All sounds like a dead-end to me.

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@igm,

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...ethics are not about truth but agreed upon definitions...

...that is in no way whatsoever a counter rebuttal for objective moral values...either they report an intrinsic non relational state of affairs on the moral property´s which are not extrinsically justified or they don´t and thus are not objective but rather emergent or derivative...and while I believe things are grounded on an actual state of affairs, that is, that they are substantive, I don´t believe their basic substance is in any way qualitatively differentiable in such a way that intrinsic value (information) can be inferred from it...the functional arrangement of quantity´s of such primordial substance in turn can generate information and complexity from where property´s can arise as phenomenal effects which eventually comparatively may induce value judgements to different operators in the "game"...you ought to know better...

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@igm,

Quote:

Do you (personally) believe in the notion of 'the greater good’? Taken to the extreme doesn't it lead to absurdities like e.g. justifying the killing of one person to save the lives via transplants of say four (or more) people? Isn't that an example of 'the greater good'? What does this say about the logic of Utilitarianism?

This is an issue for normative ethics, and I think if you are interested in that stuff specifically you should start up a thread perhaps on the virtues/faults of the many (and there are many) kinds of consequentialist ethical theories. I'm not trying to side step your concerns with this reply though as I'd be happy (and really interested) to see what your self and others have to say.

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It’s also not proven either logically or scientifically. Appealing to facts that depend on other facts is as you know a fault explained in the 'regress argument' the counter is to say as you have that ethics are not about truth but agreed upon definitions. All sounds like a dead-end to me

What isn't proven logically or scientifically? Goodness you mean? Moral realism isn't committed to scientific reductionism, but certainly it can be committed to a naturalistic account of ethics which is in part informed by science. Logic has to do with the grounding of moral judgements. If the argument holds that at least one intrinsic value exists (pain), then logically speaking, that would be enough to ground at least some of our moral judgements would it not? Also, you'll notice in my OP I refer to irreducibility of pain as a moral fact: badness is something we experience and it isn't explainable by other non moral facts. Try and describe how bad pain feels e.g. being lit on fire in non moral terms. Doesn't seem like a coherent alternative is available does it? And I do believe ethics is certainly concerned with truth, that there is a right and wrong outcome to ethical matters.

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...Recently, a special spin has been put on the principle of organic unities by so-called “particularists.” Jonathan Dancy, for example, has claimed (in keeping with Korsgaard and others mentioned in Section 3 above), that something's intrinsic value need not supervene on its intrinsic properties alone; in fact, the supervenience-base may be so open-ended that it resists generalization. The upshot, according to Dancy, is that the intrinsic value of something may vary from context to context; indeed, the variation may be so great that the thing's value changes “polarity” from good to bad, or vice versa.[71] This approach to value constitutes an endorsement of the principle of organic unities that is even more subversive of the computation of intrinsic value than Moore's; for Moore holds that the intrinsic value of something is and must be constant, even if its contribution to the value of wholes of which it forms a part is not, whereas Dancy holds that variation can occur at both levels...

link: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-intrinsic-extrinsic/

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I wish someone would factually explain in a clear and explicit manner, that is, without resourcing on to much bullshit, how is it that pain can have an intrinsic value without being dependent on a set of relational factors necessarily present on the subject that vary on a multiple number of ensemble conditions, from the species genotype, to subjective interpretation of data, raw sensations and emotions, diversified environmental habitat and ( in some rare cases ) cultural conditions, with the resulting effects of accommodation for referential default background noise, to the ever relativistic establishment of functions with a progressive value scale directly linked on relational input/output efficiency on all the interactions resulting from this variables working together etc etc etc...

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@Fil Albuquerque,

..but go figure, no less no more, indeed if no other, what better argument to be provided against the pretension intrinsic value of pain as being "bad" or "wrong" then Darwinism itself ? How is it that the course of natural selection privileged pain as a major feature of very much any species around this days if pain indeed was not useful and good for the very individual who suffers its effects ? enough said...

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@Fil Albuquerque,

...scientifically speaking, pains is indeed reducible to the ringing of an "alarm clock" located in the central nervous system which is set on a multiple variety of possible dysfunctional relational processes going on in the individual either physically or mentally and even sociologically that finds its practical usefulness by calling the conscience attention of the subject under its effect towards the rapid resolution of its extrinsic cause in the shortest possible amount of time ...if ever to attribute an intrinsic natural value to it, that value would be self preservation, a paradoxical "good" out of a "wrong", but then again, the instinct of self preservation is not even a guaranty of self preservation in itself...

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@Fil Albuquerque,

Quote:

I wish someone would factually explain in a clear and explicit manner, that is, without resourcing on to much bullshit, how is it that pain can have an intrinsic value without being dependent on a set of relational factors necessarily present on the subject that vary on a multiple number of ensemble conditions,

Pain feels bad. That feeling is an irreducible fact- you have to experience the feeling of pain in order to make any sense of the badness of pain. Try describing how bad pain feels in non moral terms. It doesn't make any sense. You've tried too believe me. Now try describing the badness of pain in terms of goals or attitudes. It doesn't make sense either because goals or attitudes regarding avoiding pain only make sense because pain itself feels bad. That is why we have different goals predicated on avoiding pain e.g. food for the malnourished is a worth while goal (because the pain of starvation feels bad and ought to be avoided).

The irreducibility of pain is just one reason to believe pain has intrinsic moral value. I've listed the others in the OP. As far as relational factors go, what exactly is the point at issue? If you think intrinsic values commits us to accepting strange new moral properties in the universe you're wrong. I'm a materialist and I believe the best way to understand intrinsic values is through a materialist metaphysics.

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...subsequently it directly follows from the sequence of previous posts, that both, either in the input relative causes of pain, in the difficult underpinning of its specific property´s, as in its relative consequences, there´s nothing left to ground its objective moral value other then a piece of typical cheap sophistry when one states that "pain is painful" a tautology which is empty of any informative reasoning value other then to generate confusion...

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@bigstew,

...damn stew...geee, pain is painful when it is painful...how can you tell when its the case that pain is not painful ? pain is a measurement dependent effect and measurements are relative to causes measurer's and consequences...

1 Reply

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