Im assuming you mean quantum mechanics. These two concepts are at two totally different levels of opeartion.
Experiments in quantum chemistry(as an example) identify the signature of causality regularly. Weve been able to define their signatures by accurate equations and laws.
Mon 3 Jan, 2011 04:29 pm
is the principle of indeterminism of quantified mechanics in opposition to the philosophical principle of causality?
Who claimed it was truly indeterminate (if QM was what you really meant)?
Max Tegmark:Although quantum mechanics is often described as inherently random and uncertain, the wave function evolves in a deterministic way. There is nothing random or uncertain about it. The sticky part is how to connect this wave function with what we observe. Many legitimate wave functions correspond to counterintuitive situations, such as a cat being dead and alive at the same time in a so-called superposition. In the 1920s physicists explained away this weirdness by postulating that the wave function 'collapsed' into some definite classical outcome whenever someone made an observation. This add-on had the virtue of explaining observations, but it turned an elegant, unitary theory into a kludgy, nonunitary one. The intrinsic randomness commonly ascribed to quantum mechanics is the result of this postulate. Over the years many physicists have abandoned this view in favor of one developed in 1957 by Princeton graduate student Hugh Everett III. He showed that the collapse postulate is unnecessary. Unadulterated quantum theory does not, in fact, pose any contradictions.
--from "Parallel Universes", article published in an issue of *Scientific American* during the early 2000s.
It perfectly fits my book...
I can´t stand indeterminism as a concept...confusing an epistemic problem with an Ontic one that is...
Another physicist -- Wojciech Zurek -- also points out that one can adopt aspects of Everett's work (like decoherence) without necessarily having to address its baggage of "many-worlds". Everett never used the term in his papers, and Zurek contends there are less controversial ways to interpret his formal scheme.