Zetherin wrote:Honestly, I don't think when most people do this, they mean for it to be a cynical game.
I think you have slightly but fatally misunderstood me. I said that if you looked at this piece of (what I assume to be) sophistry with the veiw of a cynic you could well conclude it was a game ("looked at cynically, it's a game"). Therefore I'm suggesting any cynicism is in the eye of the beholder - not necessarily those playing the game. The game could be played innocently or cynically or in many other moods - that would be down to the participants themselves.
In terms of human transactions I'm pretty sure it's a game. One player (the teacher in your example) is wagering with himself that he can better impart something to another (the pupil) by making an apparent effort to "go the extra mile" by acknowledging the pupil's point of view. In fact the teacher may be hoping to save time and effort because he predicts that not indulging the point of veiw of the student will result in greater resistence to the lesson, idea, subject, whatever.
Maybe the teacher is genuinely interested in encouraging the student's critical thinking - but that's not Pascal's stated concern - he is teaching a bit of sophistry designed to assist one player better imparting an idea to another by acknowledging the other's position.
Well, if that is what he is teaching, then it is, I suppose, a sophistry that is intended for the good of its victim. Even if the victim errs, Pascal will lead him to to truth (or, I imagine that some here would want me to write Truth, or even "Truth")
When we wish to correct with advantage, and to show another that he errs, we must notice from what side he views the matter, for on that side it is usually true, and admit that truth to him, but reveal to him the side on which it is false.
"Now, no one is offended at not seeing everything; but one does not like to be mistaken, and that perhaps arises from the fact that man naturally cannot see everything, and that naturally he cannot err in the side he looks at, since the perceptions of our senses are always true.
After all, this was the guy who thought that it was a good idea to "fake it" and maybe the Christian God wouldn't notice (or care) about that disingenuousness.
Pascal is begging the question when he asserts that, "the perceptions of our senses are always true," and is predicating his conclusion thereupon.
He seems to be assuming that what is precived is true enough for the preciever. Regardless whether those preceptions are incomplete, or outright erroneous. If it is precieved it is true.
I read the Pensees and quite enjoyed them; though I do recall not agreeing with it all. In any case...
kennethamy wrote:When we wish to correct with advantage, and to show another that he errs, we must notice from what side he views the matter, for on that side it is usually true, and admit that truth to him, but reveal to him the side on which it is false.
Well, this is poorly worded and is therefore fertile ground for confusion:
- "When we wish... to show another that he errs", asserts that this other person is incorrect - that someone IS in error and its a given that such is the case.
- ".. but reveal to him the side on which it was false", directly implies that there are sides to this issue, question or subject. That its correctness/incorrectness is contingent on factors.
So I'd ask ole Blaise, "So which is it? Is this an issue that's correct or not dependent on setting, circumstances or point of view or not?"
kennethamy wrote:"Now, no one is offended at not seeing everything; but one does not like to be mistaken, and that perhaps arises from the fact that man naturally cannot see everything, and that naturally he cannot err in the side he looks at, since the perceptions of our senses are always true.
This is quite good and worthwhile on those 'truths' that may or may not be depending on the circumstances (ethical judgments, being a prime example). Another that comes to mind are those ideals that one may think applies to all, when in fact vary from person to person.
In these deals I try to grasp the intent of where they're headed, when taken in context with the whole work/chapter. I also try and get a sense of the mindset and time in which they live. So much of what we take for granted "that is" was viewed very differently in that culture and era. Yea, it's a stretch, but only leads me to not read in too literally. After all, this was the guy who thought that it was a good idea to "fake it" and maybe the Christian God wouldn't notice (or care) about that disingenuousness.
Thanks
I think you have slightly but fatally misunderstood me. I said that if you looked at this piece of (what I assume to be) sophistry with the veiw of a cynic you could well conclude it was a game ("looked at cynically, it's a game"). Therefore I'm suggesting any cynicism is in the eye of the beholder - not necessarily those playing the game. The game could be played innocently or cynically or in many other moods - that would be down to the participants themselves.
In terms of human transactions I'm pretty sure it's a game. One player (the teacher in your example) is wagering with himself that he can better impart something to another (the pupil) by making an apparent effort to "go the extra mile" by acknowledging the pupil's point of view. In fact the teacher may be hoping to save time and effort because he predicts that not indulging the point of veiw of the student will result in greater resistence to the lesson, idea, subject, whatever.
Maybe the teacher is genuinely interested in encouraging the student's critical thinking - but that's not Pascal's stated concern - he is teaching a bit of sophistry designed to assist one player better imparting an idea to another by acknowledging the other's position.
However, I just wouldn't call something like this a game. For some reason I always interpret the term "game", used in the context of human interaction, tantamount to deceit or manipulation.
Zetherin wrote:However, I just wouldn't call something like this a game. For some reason I always interpret the term "game", used in the context of human interaction, tantamount to deceit or manipulation.
I doubt any game can be free of manipulation, though I think manipulation can be free from malign intent. I don't think deceit is a necessary component of games, but it is a common one.
Most psychological games are about figuring out a need the other player has, and then facilitating or denying that need for the payoff feelings that result. Psychologists call the particular needs of people their "gimmicks" (or sometimes "drivers" or even "roles"). Most debates are games - some are even open about it with rules, turns, winning conditions and the like.
Sophistry indulges in this a lot - the sophist engages in tactics to better win a debate that need not have anything to do with the actual truth of the matter. If sophists of yore had the language of today's psychologists they'd surely couch their techniques with psychological models like Transactional Analysis in mind.
I think Pascal has realised that a popular gimmick is "I must appear wise", and he outlines a method of exploiting that need.
As a futher thought, I think most logical fallacies target common gimmicks. Godwin's Law for example, panics some debaters because "I must appear in opposition to tyranny" is a common gimmick. Fallacy of etymology targets a less common gimmick - but "I must appear to have comprehensive knowledge" is a need of many a debater.
The only difference between Pascal and the cold explanation as I see it is that Pascal is claiming to hold objective truth. However, I suspect this is merely a core of sophistry within the greater sophistry.
I agree with most of what you write here, although when you say that no game is free of manipulation, I suppose you really mean that in most games we try to win, and winning involves trying to outwit the opponent.
And I really don't know what you mean when you say that the accusation of committing a fallacy targets a gimmick.
Accusing someone of committing the fallacy of affirming the consequent (a formal fallacy) is not that, since committing the fallacy of affirming the consequent is not a gimmick.
Similarly, someone who commits the informal fallacy of begging the question is making a mistake. There is no gimmick involved.
But he does seem to believe that every error is somehow just a little bit true.
... Now, as I said, if reading philosophy literally were reading it too literally, I would be on your side and opposed to that. But if, for instance, Pascal tells us that we should not worry about whether we have any reason to believe in God, and we should just do it, how should I read that? I read that as bad advice. Is that reading Pascal too literally. Is it reading someone too literally if he says something foolish or wrong, and we read what he says as foolish or wrong?
kennethamy wrote:... Now, as I said, if reading philosophy literally were reading it too literally, I would be on your side and opposed to that. But if, for instance, Pascal tells us that we should not worry about whether we have any reason to believe in God, and we should just do it, how should I read that? I read that as bad advice. Is that reading Pascal too literally. Is it reading someone too literally if he says something foolish or wrong, and we read what he says as foolish or wrong?
We might be mixing up the Wager with what appears to be an argument for subjective truth. So... in total agreement with the bad-advice-nature of the Wager, and more towards this subjective-truth intonation...
I don't disagree with you, here either in intent or your specific examples. Bad advice (as soon as its deemed so) is just bad. Spinning it doesn't help but warp what may or may not have been said as long as the situation's been carefully delineated. That's not what I'm saying or suggesting.
There is an interpretational factor to the quoted passage, the instant he says, "... from what side he views the matter...", he interjects an undeniable aspect of subjective or situational interpretation. There are 'true statements' which are framed in such a general fashion as to require clarification. I think its this clarification-need that he's hinging the true-evaluation.
General Statements which may or may not be true depending on the framework of the speaker (i.e., what 'side' they're viewing the question from):
- That is green
- Killing is wrong
- My neighbor's an idiot
- That hot dog is awesome
Another attempt at an example:
Question: Is it wrong to kill my cat?
Bill's Statement: It is wrong to kill your cat
Bill's view: As in the situation that no living thing of this quality should be killed without a good reason
Sally's Statement: It is not wrong to kill your cat
Sally's Side: As in the situation where if necessary to preclude starvation in desperation.
When viewed from different sides (perspectives and views), its easily seen that something may be true or not. Therefore, part of the interpretation of our evaluation must take into account from which side, situation, circumstance or view someone else is seeing it. This, to the extent it follows, would only apply to statements or assertions that 1) Are vague -and- 2) Are of such a nature that they SCREAM for what conditions or side ones' viewing from. Perpiscuity is essential and woefully absent in most of our communications and I believe this is the intent on which Pascal is intimating; that we must realize we may not fully understand the details upon which others are basing there assertions.
I'll shut up now... but I hope I've done my point justice
Thanks
I think all Pascal means by this is that although we might be wrong if we think that when we see something blue, that there is something blue we see. There might, in fact, be nothing blue in the world outside of our senses. But (Pascal would say) we cannot be wrong when we have a blue perception, for then, even if there is nothing blue that the blue perception corresponds with, we are still having a perception of blue. So, although it may not be true that there is anything blue there, it must be true that we have a blue perception, or that in other words, our perception of blue is true. And, isn't he right about that?
I doubt any game can be free of manipulation, though I think manipulation can be free from malign intent. I don't think deceit is a necessary component of games, but it is a common one.
Most psychological games are about figuring out a need the other player has, and then facilitating or denying that need for the payoff feelings that result. Psychologists call the particular needs of people their "gimmicks" (or sometimes "drivers" or even "roles"). Most debates are games - some are even open about it with rules, turns, winning conditions and the like.
Quote:I think all Pascal means by this is that although we might be wrong if we think that when we see something blue, that there is something blue we see. There might, in fact, be nothing blue in the world outside of our senses. But (Pascal would say) we cannot be wrong when we have a blue perception, for then, even if there is nothing blue that the blue perception corresponds with, we are still having a perception of blue. So, although it may not be true that there is anything blue there, it must be true that we have a blue perception, or that in other words, our perception of blue is true. And, isn't he right about that?
He's right about that insofar as the perceiver is concerned. But then there is the other side of that "truth" on which it is, or might be, false. For example, one perceives blue, but another perceives yellow. The difference is that the former suffers from tritanopia.
That the former sees "blue" is true enough for him, but what he sees as "blue" may not be "blue" at all because his perception is erroneous.
Isn't the idea of: "true but erroneous" false on a certain formal level?
Does winning an argument that way really produce truth
