@ughaibu,
ughaibu wrote:
kennethamy wrote:as near as I can make out, his argument goes like this:
1. Whenever anyone believes some proposition, he believes that proposition is true.
2. Therefore, there is some sense or other in which that proposition is true.
Thanks, but I dont see it. Can you insert portions, of the quoted passage, to construct such an argument, please.
I am assuming that Pascal is producing an argument here, and not just suggesting (as Dave Allen understands him "Looked at cynically, it's a game - one person pretending respect for positions he doesn't hold in the expectation that his pretence will fool the other into actually considering positions he doesn't hold")
a tactic to move someone from error to truth by pretending that he believes something true, but (perhaps) is not putting it the right way, and then suggesting the right way of putting it which is actually very different from what he actually said, and even the opposite. On that assumption I am trying to reconstruct Pascal's argument (which, as I allow, might not even exist in the first place) Reconstruction of arguments is (unless the argument is pretty clear to start with) a chancy business since you are, in a way, trying to peer into the mind of the arguer to determine what, despite all of the window-dressing, and all the junk that may accompany it. Given that, let me cite this bit:
show another that he errs, we must notice from what side he views the matter, for on that side it is usually true, and admit that truth to him, but reveal to him the side on which it is false.
He is satisfied with that, for he sees that he was not mistaken, and that he only failed to see all sides.
Now, what does P. mean when he says that although the arguer errs (says what is false) that from the side he views the matter, what he says is (usually) true? How could a false statement be, nevertheless true (however frequently) from the person's view? What can that mean except that although he is wrong, he
believes it is true? Well, of course he does. Whatever a person believes, he believes is true. If he did not believe that what he believes is true, he would not believe it in the first place. Necessarily, A believes that p entails A believes that p is true. (It is not only true, it is a necessary truth). So that is Pascal's premise.
1. If A believes that p, then A believes p is true.
But, so what? What is suppose to follow from that.
What I think Pascal thinks follows from that is that is some form of "perspectivism" (a la Nietzsche). Namely that from A's perspective (i.e. what he believes is true) that what he believes is true ("for him") and so, true (but in a way).
Thus, the conclusion, 2. above.
And, as I wrote in the earlier post, that kind of thinking does fit it with the kind of thing Pascal writes in other parts of his
Pensees. He also seems to believe there is such a thing as "subjective truth". That is Kierkegaard's term, but a lot of Continental philosophers always have believed that kind of thing. It comes out of Descartes and the other Rationalists. As I say, both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche latched on to this (what I think is a nefarious idea) and, of course, it has not gone away by any means. It is a staple of the Postmodern diet. And, it is something that the British empiricists from Locke to Hume (Berkeley is a rather special case) rejected, and that rejection transmits to philosophers like Russell, and recent analytic philosophy.
I like this passage from Pascal. It makes for a superb target for analytic philosophy (as I hope I have illustrated). It would make an excellent passage for analysis for philosophy students. The exam might just begin with, "What is wrong with what Pascal argues here?". And, of course, it has all sorts of philosophical ramifications, as I just mentioned.