Why Free Will Is Incompatible with Human Experience

Your argument attempts to deny free will from the fact that the agent has a means of evaluation, but that is a requirement for free will.

To have a desire is not an evaluation it is an experience of a thought.

Also how do you know your alternatives are realisable do you just feel that under the same circumstances you could make a different choice?

1 - An external cause towards some need...
2 - my need forming a drive or an instinct towards action. (pre-conscience)
3 - a set of possibility´s to fit an outcome of my future chosen action...
4 - means of evaluation towards the given set, meaning restricted computational capability for judgement to arise in a given defined direction to best satisfy my want...
5 - and the specific set of means to apply the outcome of that very same judgement of course in the more efficient manner given my concrete knowledge at time x which is also restricted to some specific extent...

Fil Albuquerque wrote:

1 - An external cause towards some need...
2 - my need forming a drive or an instinct towards action. (pre-conscience)
3 - a set of possibility´s to fit an outcome of my future chosen action...
4 - means of evaluation towards the given set, meaning restricted computational capability for judgement to arise in a given defined direction to best satisfy my want...
5 - and the specific set of means to apply the outcome of that very same judgement of course in the more efficient manner given my concrete knowledge at time x which is also restricted to some specific extent...

And how is any of this meant to conflict with free will?

What do you mean by the "experience of a thought"?

I've demonstrated this, just a few posts ago. If I told you that I'm going to toss two coins fifty times and for each pair of tosses both coins will show the same face, and then I demonstrate it, you would not think that this was coincidence, would you?

I still don't see any contradiction, but aside from the fact that you might not know what a contradiction is, it is simply not true that if I do what I want to do, I am not in control of what I do.

Quote:

I still don't see any contradiction, but aside from the fact that you might not know what a contradiction is, it is simply not true that if I do what I want to do, I am not in control of what I do.

In terms of having control over your action, your following your desire is equivalent to a situation where a neurologist induces a desire in you by stimulating your brain. Would you still regard the act determined by this desire as your free will act?

How is it equivalent? In the case you envision, the desire is forced on me. But my desire to have chocolate ice-cream for desert is not forced on me. The two situations are utterly different.