Why Free Will Is Incompatible with Human Experience

@kennethamy,

I see what you mean about using the description "without the influence of external factors". Influence is too vague a term. I think I better describe free will in the skeleton version of the argument as "ones ability to choose deliberately without the constraint of external factors." All I really mean and all that is necessary to the argument is that free will is a process where external factors do not determine your desire.
So maybe the best definition would be " one's ability to choose deliberately without that choice being completely dependent on external factors."

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@tomr,

tomr wrote:

I see what you mean about using the description "without the influence of external factors". Influence is too vague a term. I think I better describe free will in the skeleton version of the argument as "ones ability to choose deliberately without the constraint of external factors." All I really mean and all that is necessary to the argument is that free will is a process where external factors do not determine your desire.
So maybe the best definition would be " one's ability to choose deliberately without that choice being completely dependent on external factors."

Suppose my decision to visit the restaurant was, as I said, entirely due to the recommendation of my friend whose taste in these matters I respect. Suppose, indeed, that my friend is some well-known gourmet whose taste in restaurants is impeccable, and I would not have even thought of going to that restaurant had he not suggested it to me. I still do not see how I did not go to the restaurant of my own free will. Now, by contrast, suppose I was aspiring for a job as a food critic myself, and I needed the recommendation of my friend who, I know, takes it rather badly if people do not follow his recommendations, so that unless I did so, I would not expect to get his much desired recommendation. Then, there would be some reason to think that, in fact, I did not visit the restaurant of my own free will. Do you see the difference. In one case I am not under any kind of compulsion, but in the other case, I am not under any compulsion to visit the restaurant. It is being under compulsion, it is that influence, that mitigates against my acting freely. So, in this case, it is not simply that I was influenced that makes it questionable that I acted freely. Rather, is is that the influence was of a certain kind, Namely, compulsion.

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@thack45,

There must be an infinite amount of choices for desires because as I wrote in the skeleton version of the argument:

4. So to be in accord with free will every desire must be the result of a choice made by you. If not, there was only one option for the desire which was not decided by you.

5. Because of (4) there must be a choice for every desire. So when we desire something in a group of options we need to have made a choice for that desire and in that choice there had to be a “desire to desire something” and on and on. So that we get a chain of choices selecting desires without end. For example, “…. I desire to…desire something, I desire to desire something, I desire something and finally pick it.”

Proposition (4) is basically answering the question, "If you did not pick a desire then where did it come from?". Where did the statement "I want this option." come from, if it was not a choice then it was your only option and was forced on you.

Proposition (5) continues from (4) showing the consequences of having every desire be the result of a choice. And now we explore the example ("I want this option.") in (4) further, being aware now that every desire must be a choice and in that choice there is another desire. This previous desire selects the following desire from a group of options and the example statement becomes, "I want to want this option." picks the desire "I want this option." from a group of options. We can continue this process backward without end so that our will is the ultimate source of the desire.
Now finally because each previous desire as we go back along the chain contains within it the command to select the following desire, all desires that follow a particular desire in the chain are dependent on that desire. So, if that particular desire is determined by external factors then all following desires were completely the consequence of external factors.

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@ughaibu,

When you say "You seem to be claiming that the agent doesn't have free will because the agent doesn't choose who they are or all their means of evaluating." I can see how you thought this from my wording but it was not my intention.

When I said, "If we did not create the reasons or the desire for the selection then it was put there without our input and this contradicts the definition of free will.", I mean that by choosing the desire or reason we give our input to the desire by selecting it first. So what I meant by "creating desire" is only that the agent make the desire by choice.

Here is proposition (2) in different words:

2. To maintain that a particular agent and not something external to that agent is the source of a desire that agent must have chosen that desire from a set of options. If the agent did not specify that desire from a group of options, then it came to be as the only option without the input of the agent and this contradicts the definition of free will.

Also, in your analogy a hitchhiker is placed at a crossroads unknown to him or her. I agree that not having knowledge of your whereabouts would not stop you from picking a path. All that is required for someone to choose is a desire and a set of options regardless of what those options are.

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@tomr,

tomr wrote:

All that is required for someone to choose is a desire and a set of options regardless of what those options are.

Free will is, basically, conscious choice from amongst realisable alternatives. For example, I'm about to light a cigarette, if free will is the case, then I have the alternatives of lighting it with either my right or my left hand, if free will is not the case, then there is already a fact about which hand I will light it with. Where does desire come into this?

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@tomr,

The aspect of free will can always be challenged by the simple fact of coming into existence to begin with. Did you have the choice of being born or not being born? This is the most telling aspect of free will if you are discussing it in terms of theology. If you do not have the choice of coming into existence then where is the free will in that? I use the analogy of playing a game. With a game you have two types of people, players and those who are not playing. In my analogy all those alive are considered players while all those who are not alive are non players. This includes all those "potential" people who have never been born.

So do you have a choice to play the game or not? If you say yes, then why do you not remember it? Are you just assuming that you said yes and that is why you exist? That must be left as a huge assumption. But what if you are never asked and you exist despite the choice made on your behalf? Then you can challenge free will from this point of view. You are like a person tossed into a game that you might not have wanted to play. You are forced to be a player in the game of life. Where is the free will in that? You can try to argue that you can always end your life and that gives you the choice right there. But no that does not account for the initial start. That would be like being forced to play baseball but then you quit. That still does not address the initial forced decision.

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@kennethamy,

Compulsion is a good word that I could have used in the definition because it implies that there is some force that impels someone to do something. The compulsion would be caused by external factors, but I do not know that every choice I make I would say I feel compelled to do even if it was determined by external factors. This may have more to do with the connotations I have for the word compulsion than the actual definition.

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@tomr,

tomr wrote:

Compulsion is a good word that I could have used in the definition because it implies that there is some force that impels someone to do something. The compulsion would be caused by external factors, but I do not know that every choice I make I would say I feel compelled to do even if it was determined by external factors. This may have more to do with the connotations I have for the word compulsion than the actual definition.

Kennethamy insists on talking about the legal usage of "free will", if you're not interested in questions of law, I suggest that you ignore him, on this thread.

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@ughaibu,

If you are deciding to light a cigarette and you have two options, you are considering whether to use the right or left hand, you make a conscious selection between the two. This want to use one hand over the other is the desire in this case. This example applies to my argument in that I would question where the desire for one hand over the other came from. If it was not a choice for you to have the desire for the hand you wanted it based on no other options for a desire.
In the second case, the hand you chose was determined by outside factors. Just because the choice was ultimately determined by something outside you it does not mean that a want for something cannot be given and given in your voice or as a thought with the complete fullness of normal experience.

1 Reply

@tomr,

tomr wrote:

This want to use one hand over the other is the desire in this case.

In which case I do what I want to do. Why do you think that this is at odds with free will?

tomr wrote:

In the second case, the hand you chose was determined by outside factors.

Let's say I choose according to whether or not radioactive decay occurs within a certain period for which the probability is 50%. Relevant scientists generally hold that radioactive decay isn't determined, so my choice won't be determined.

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@Krumple,

I have also thought about this example. Not having a choice in being born is a clear example of a determined process. However, there are some problems when saying this is against free-will. Mostly because your will did not exist at least we can agree we have no recollection of its existence and the time just before birth and for that matter for a while afterwords. This is a better example of a determined process than a complete argument against free will because without any desire and no options or thought process there can be no choice at all.

You also bring up a good point about memory and whether or not it is necessary to be aware of a choice for it to be freely made. In my argument I have considered whether having recollection of the chain of choices is required to maintain free will.

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@ughaibu,

Yes, in case one, you do do what you want to do, but something outside you could have made you want that. If you did not choose the desire to light the cigarette with a particular hand where did that desire come from? Also, if you did not choose the desire, we cannot say you had alternatives to that desire so the desire to light your cigarette with a particular hand was the only option for a desire and it originated without your input and so is determined. The two hands are no longer options because the want to have one was already determined. Once you reach the conclusion that all desires must be chosen for free will to exist you can go on to set up the unending chain of choices that results from this.

In the second case, if you take it to be true that radioactive decay isn't determined, then you are right that the occurance of decay in the period you set up would be randomized. However, the initial desire to choose based on this randomized process would apply to what I have said before. After that you place the decision process in the hands of randomness and this is not free will. (Also, I believe that radioactive decay as well as all physical processes are determined by fundamental laws.)

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@Krumple,

I have no free will I suppose. I am conditioned by my past and expectations of what will happen in the future. In the present I can choose my course of action, evaluate and decide to stop my actions, or continue on set course. I am very determined to reach my goals.

I think it's a blessing not to be consious of all non-players. It would be very confusing to think in past, present and future settings all at Once.

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@tomr,

tomr wrote:

(Also, I believe that radioactive decay as well as all physical processes are determined by fundamental laws.)

Okay. I'm not interested in arguing about determinism, it fails to circularity, irreversibility, uncomputability, regresses and observation, on top of which there is no non-psychological justification for believing it to be the case. It's arrant supernaturalism, and experience suggests that arguing with supernaturalists is a waste of time.
Have fun.

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@ughaibu,

You have by far given the best critique on this argument. If you think it is more appropiate to stick to the propositions of the argument as we had done before I will never bring up any deterministic view outside of what this argument suggests again. If you are leaving for good thanks for your comments.

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@tomr,

tomr wrote:

There must be an infinite amount of choices for desires because as I wrote in the skeleton version of the argument:

4. So to be in accord with free will every desire must be the result of a choice made by you. If not, there was only one option for the desire which was not decided by you.

5. Because of (4) there must be a choice for every desire. So when we desire something in a group of options we need to have made a choice for that desire and in that choice there had to be a “desire to desire something” and on and on. So that we get a chain of choices selecting desires without end. For example, “…. I desire to…desire something, I desire to desire something, I desire something and finally pick it.”

Proposition (4) is basically answering the question, "If you did not pick a desire then where did it come from?". Where did the statement "I want this option." come from, if it was not a choice then it was your only option and was forced on you.

Proposition (5) continues from (4) showing the consequences of having every desire be the result of a choice. And now we explore the example ("I want this option.") in (4) further, being aware now that every desire must be a choice and in that choice there is another desire. This previous desire selects the following desire from a group of options and the example statement becomes, "I want to want this option." picks the desire "I want this option." from a group of options. We can continue this process backward without end so that our will is the ultimate source of the desire.
Now finally because each previous desire as we go back along the chain contains within it the command to select the following desire, all desires that follow a particular desire in the chain are dependent on that desire. So, if that particular desire is determined by external factors then all following desires were completely the consequence of external factors.

But why must I choose my desire in order to do as I desire, unless, of course, the desire is forced on me. I may be addicted to a drug, and crave a drug, but that is not the typical kind of desire. It is not like wanting to marry a girl because I love her. I agree that if I crave a drug, then when I act on that craving, I don't act freely. I am compelled. But how is that the same as my marrying someone because I want to do so. To return to my previous example: I do want to go to he restaurant because of my friend's suggestion. But how is my going to the restaurant something I help doing? It is nothing like the craving for the drug I described earlier. The mere fact that I want to do something doesn't mean that when I do that thing because I want to do it, that I am not acting freely. In fact, in general, it is just because I am acting from my wants that I am said to be acting freely; and it is when I am made to act contrary to my wants, and I am compelled< that I do not act freely.

1 Reply

@ughaibu,

ughaibu wrote:

tomr wrote:
All that is required for someone to choose is a desire and a set of options regardless of what those options are.
Free will is, basically, conscious choice from amongst realisable alternatives. For example, I'm about to light a cigarette, if free will is the case, then I have the alternatives of lighting it with either my right or my left hand, if free will is not the case, then there is already a fact about which hand I will light it with. Where does desire come into this?

But if I choose to hand someone my wallet because a mugger is pointing a gun at me, that is a conscious choice from realizable alternatives. But I am not acting freely when I hand over my wallet.

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@kennethamy,

Quote:

The mere fact that I want to do something doesn't mean that when I do that thing because I want to do it, that I am not acting freely.

I agree that the fact that you had a want to do something and then you do that thing does nothing to prove you have not acted freely. But what does your command to want a thing really mean if you did not put it in your head by picking it? Doesn't it make sense that a desire for something could be a thought you had but at the same time that thought might not be a choice by you? If this is the case, then you were forced to think the way you did, to want what you did, because it was your only option. In every example you give, whether it is about the restaurant or something else there must always be a desire, i.e. a thought to want something, and if that desire is not chosen by your thought process then something outside that thought process is responsible for it.

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@tomr,

tomr wrote:

Quote:
The mere fact that I want to do something doesn't mean that when I do that thing because I want to do it, that I am not acting freely.

I agree that the fact that you had a want to do something and then you do that thing does nothing to prove you have not acted freely. But what does your command to want a thing really mean if you did not put it in your head by picking it? Doesn't it make sense that a desire for something could be a thought you had but at the same time that thought might not be a choice by you? If this is the case, then you were forced to think the way you did, to want what you did, because it was your only option. In every example you give, whether it is about the restaurant or something else there must always be a desire, i.e. a thought to want something, and if that desire is not chosen by your thought process then something outside that thought process is responsible for it.

I seldom (but "seldom" does not mean "never") consciously choose what I want. But why should that mean that when I do what I want, I am not doing it of my own free will. Would I be doing what I do of my own free will if I did not do what I want, but instead, did what I was forced to do). It is still not clear to me why unless I consciously choose to want to do what I do, what I do is not done freely. It is true, of course, that if what I want to do is forced on me, as when, at the point of gun, I am forced to want to hand over my money, I am not freely handing over my money, why it follows that even when I am not forced to want to do what I do, I also do not act freely. Some desires are forced on me, it is true. And when I act on those desires, I am not acting freely. But why should it follow from that, that even when my desire (say) to visit a restaurant is caused by a suggestion of a friend, that I am not acting freely? In fact, I did choose to visit the restaurant at the suggestion of my friend, but why should the fact that I did not choose to want to act as my friend suggested, mean that I did not visit the restaurant freely? I don't follow the logic of that. In fact, of course, I did not have to act on my friend's suggestion. I was perfectly free not to do so. And, in no way, of course, is it true that my friend's suggestion forced on me. All that happened was that my friend's suggestion was the cause of my action. How that implies that I did not act of my own free will, I find mysterious.

I have the suspicion (in fact it is more than a suspicion) that you are simply assuming that simply because my desire to visit restaurant had a cause (in this case, the suggestion of my friend) that in virtue of that, my action is not one of free will, and I really see no reason to think that is true. In my view, to say that what I did I did freely is only to deny that I was compelled to do what I did, while suggesting that I could have done otherwise had I chosen to do otherwise. At least that seems to me how, in fact, we ordinarily think and speak about doing something freely, and nothing you have so far said gives me any reason to think that is wrong.

1 Reply

@kennethamy,

Let's look at the example of being robbed by gun-point. When the robber points the gun at you and asks for money, the desire you have is to comply and give money to him. You may think through reasons for this action like "I am afraid of the pain of being shot" and "I love my life and do not want to risk it here" or you may not have any real rational thoughts and act from fear to give the wallet over. If you react to the robber by fear there is still a desire to comply with the robber, but if you think about why you were afraid you cannot say because you wanted to be. So the situation is forced. If you had reasons why you complied with the robber, like the reason "I love my life and do not want to risk it" then for this to have forced you to act it must have been a thought forced on you. In otherwords, if you did not ultimately choose to feel love for your life, which is the reason you acted, then just as the fear to react was forced then so was your reason here.

Now your friend suggests that there is a restaurant you need to try. In no way is this suggestion forcing you to go just because you decide to take the advice. The friend is simply giving you information and perhaps being your friend he or she might have a good idea what you like. You have a desire to go to the restaurant possibly because you like the type of food there or because its close and you could walk there or both. So based on whatever reasons be they those I give or someother you desire to go. Just as in the example above with the robber, you need to make sure that the reasons for desiring to go to the restaurant are a choice by you. If these reasons are not your own, then since they are what determined you wanted to go to the restaurant you were forced to go by reasons that were not yours.

Quote:

I have the suspicion (in fact it is more than a suspicion) that you are simply assuming that simply because my desire to visit restaurant had a cause (in this case, the suggestion of my friend) that in virtue of that, my action is not one of free will, and I really see no reason to think that is true.

I do not assume that because your friend has given you knowledge about a restaurant that this forces you to do anything. What I am doing is trying to find out where the desire to go to the restaurant comes from. I want to find the point in a thought process where we no longer give input to the reasons or desires that is the cause of what actions we make. I argue because we cannot have ultimately choosen the desire to do something that we cannot have free-will.

The way I came up with this argument was only to ask the question,"Why do I want that?" to myself over and over again. If I found a deeper reason or desire for something I chose I would ask that question again. I think that the reason it is so difficult to convey my argument is because it is odd to do this, to ask this question over and over again until you can give no answer. I would suggest that you try to find out where your own choices ultimately come from by questioning the desires of the choices that you make be they complex or barely choices at all.

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Why Free Will Is Incompatible with Human Experience

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