Absolute determinism and the illusion of free will.

Well, let's be quite clear here: I am willing to concede that the physical universe is composed solely of matter and energy. There are, however, more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in your science, jonat.

Perhaps the problem here is a lack of common understanding concerning the notion of "free will." Typically, "free will" is understood as meaning the presence of some sort of volitional choice. Thus, for instance, if I am able either to lift my arm or not lift my arm, and I can choose to lift my arm, then it can be said that I have free will. In contrast, if I have no choice whether or not to raise my arm, then I do not have free will.

Now, the addition of a "random element" in any kind of predetermined material sequence (we'll stick with ABC) does nothing to obviate its character as a predetermined sequence. In other words, if ABC is not within a person's ability to choose, the addition of a similarly un-chooseable element, such as X, does nothing to make the sequence ABCX un-determined. After all, if I can't choose ABC because it's predetermined, and I can't choose ABCX because it's predetermined and random, then I am equally unable to choose either one. Randomness, then, does not alter the fundamental nature of the sequence as being determined; it just makes it determined and random.

Well, let's assume that you're right. If "love" is either matter or energy, then it can be measured. So what measure is appropriate for assessing and quantifying "love"?

Nonsense. Beliefs are profitably argued all the time.

....but seriously though guys you both seem to be involved in classic arguments about reductionism and/or dualism. On the face of it the "free will" arena is significantly about "morality" with "thought" as "given". Any sub-analysis tends to bring up the whole shooting match of the status of "sense data" and the relationship between neural structure and neural function, about which (despite recent advances) we actually "know" next to nothing. Talking about "free will" on the basis of "neural activity" is equivalent to talking about "music" on the basis of "the physics of sound". (This may even be a "category mistake" in the Gilbert Ryle sense who uses the analogy of the "tourist" who having been shown round various Oxford colleges and libraries asks "but where is the university ?")

jonat

The very idea that "matter and energy" are the last word in "existence" is "naive realism" in extremis !

jonat3

"matter" "energy" "randomness" and "explanation"
are bedmates in our pre-occupation with prediction and control. Other "apes" seem to get on quite well without them !

To all

Question: Why don't we ask if an ape or any other "animal" has "free will" ?

Answer: Because the concept ONLY has relevance to human social interactions and has nothing to do with neural circuitry, or survival, etc.

We are on murky quasi-religious territory here NOT in the synthetic clinical cocoon of empiricism.

jonat3

When you use "right" and "proof" you are assuming the objective existence of "facts". That is naive realism.

I, on the other hand, approach this question, from a viewpoint of a socially constructed reality in which "the universe" is replaced with "universe of discourse". I am saying that concepts like "free will" are more adequately "dealt with" from this standpoint than from yours.
(BTW I read somewhere that the Pope at the time was no fool and saw Galileo as a naive realist who didn't appreciate the "social problem" he might cause irrespective of his more "elegant" model.)

What does it mean to have free will? To have free will at least two conditions must be met.
1.We must have two or more possibilities 'genuinely open' to us when we face a choice; and
2.our choice must not be 'forced'.

ABC is forced to a set answer. I already gave the example that A=1, B=2 and C=3. The result would then be 1x2x3=6. 6 would ALWAYS be the answer to this equation. However ABCX has no set value, it's answer would be 6X. Since X is random, X does not have the power to force ABCX to a set value. That meets condition 2. And since ABCX has a different value each time, it would mean that condition 1 is met, meaning two or more possibilities are available.

That one has no power to choose X has nothing to do with it. X actually empowers us to have free will, not negate it.

If love is either matter or energy it can be measured. However if i could devise a method to do so, i would then be incredibly rich. Heck, i would then even be able to defeat death itself if i was smart enough to do that.

You've left something out. In order for there to be free will, there must be the ability to choose.

No, it does not meet your conditions at all.

Centroles has argued that neurological processes cause thoughts, so that the process preceeds the corresponding thought. You, jonat, have been somewhat vague on this point, suggesting that the material process is somehow simultaneous with the thought. As such, your position on "causation" is still unclear.

Nevertheless, it seems evident that you regard material processes to be, in some sense, causative. In particular, you hold that free will is dependent upon material processes that are, at least in part, "random." Consequently, we can surmise that this randomness, as it pertains to material processes, is a necessary condition for free will.

But, as you've described it, jonat, there is no "freedom" in your "free will." A material process that contains a random element (the X in the sequence ABCX) still determines a corresponding thought in the actor (presumably the thought ABCX). The actor, however, is not capable of choosing X: thus, the actor is just as determined by the material "random" process ABCX as he would be by a material "non-random" process ABC. The difference between the two is merely the level of predictability, not the character of "determinedness."

In effect, then, you've posited a "choice" without the ability to choose. In much the same way that Henry Ford offered car buyers a choice of colors, "as long as it was black," you've created a Hobson's choice model of free will, where an actor can choose anything he wants, as long as it's the "random" material process that determines his actions. Your version of "free will," in sum, lacks both "freedom" and "will."

The random element that you posit has nothing whatsoever to do with free will. At most, it makes our actions random, not free.

Once again, you are far too modest. Clearly, you know that love is either matter or energy. Certainly, there is some reason for this confidence, even if you can't devise a method of measuring the physical properties of love. What, then, causes you to believe that love is either matter or energy?

Just as I say that causation in human thought does not indicate a deterministic world, I would also argue that randomness in nature in no way supports the arguement for free will. They are totally different matters.