Cause

Again, Hume's main aim is to show that our understanding of causality is based on habit and convention, rather than inviolable a priori principles. Who was he criticizing? The scholastics, of course, and the Aristotlean 'categories of causation' that we started out with.

I agree that it might be true that the explanation of his broken toe was not that a heavy object fell on it. All that means is that it is not a self-contradiction to suppose that the heavy object did not break the toes. But that is not a good reason to suppose that the heavy object did not break the toes, nor that someone who argued that because it is logically possible that the heavy object did not break the toes that we do not know that the heavy object broke the toes is saying something that is reasonable. Unless you think that unless it can be shown that it is impossible for the object not to have broken the toes, that we do not know that the object broke the toes. Suppose I claim to know that Obama is now president. And suppose that someone objects that I do not know that Obama is president because it is not logically impossible that he is not president. Do you think that would be a reasonable objection to my claim that I know Obama is president. Is it a necessary condition that it be impossible for Obama not to be president for me to know he is president. Similarly, is it a necessary condition that is be logically impossible that the heavy object did not break my toes for me to know that the heavy object did bread my my toes? Why?

jeeprs wrote:

Again, Hume's main aim is to show that our understanding of causality is based on habit and convention, rather than inviolable a priori principles. Who was he criticizing? The scholastics, of course, and the Aristotlean 'categories of causation' that we started out with.

I don't disagree, either with you or Hume. My post was simply to point out that in the event of a broken toe, different habits and conventions might generate a different schema for causation. (I've become enamored of the word "schema" this evening, obviously.)

@kennethamy

kennethamy wrote:

I agree that it might be true that the explanation of his broken toe was not that a heavy object fell on it. All that means is that it is not a self-contradiction to suppose that the heavy object did not break the toes. But that is not a good reason to suppose that the heavy object did not break the toes, nor that someone who argued that because it is logically possible that the heavy object did not break the toes that we do not know that the heavy object broke the toes is saying something that is reasonable. Unless you think that unless it can be shown that it is impossible for the object not to have broken the toes, that we do not know that the object broke the toes. Suppose I claim to know that Obama is now president. And suppose that someone objects that I do not know that Obama is president because it is not logically impossible that he is not president. Do you think that would be a reasonable objection to my claim that I know Obama is president. Is it a necessary condition that it be impossible for Obama not to be president for me to know he is president. Similarly, is it a necessary condition that is be logically impossible that the heavy object did not break my toes for me to know that the heavy object did bread my my toes? Why?

I have to admit, I've become a bit lost while trying to decipher what you are getting at. You might need to break it down for me a bit; I'm feeling a little logically unsophisticated tonight.

I'm not arguing that a perfectly logical argument could not be made that the falling object broke the toe. I'm just pointing out that the argument would be based on the underlying assumption that in most cases (esp those involving sensation) one event is the result of the occurrence that immediately preceded it. If one worked from a different underlying assumption, one might make a different argument just as reasonably. In other words, different theories of cause and effect may be equally reasonable, but based on different casual propositions.

So, although I do have some explanation in mind for why my foot was harmed by the heavy object, that explanation is, I think well confirmed by our further experiences with that kind of thing. Assuming a theory is inevitable. But there is nothing wrong with making an assumption for which we have every reason to think is true, and no reason to think is false. Is there?

kennethamy wrote:

So, although I do have some explanation in mind for why my foot was harmed by the heavy object, that explanation is, I think well confirmed by our further experiences with that kind of thing. Assuming a theory is inevitable. But there is nothing wrong with making an assumption for which we have every reason to think is true, and no reason to think is false. Is there?

It's the assumption in the background that's in question. That once you've related two past events, that you can now make a prediction. Hold a brick above your toe. If you drop it, what's going to happen?

You know good and well it's likely to damage your foot. Is it possible to doubt that? I can't. Neither can I justify my knowledge empirically or through reason. I can't observe the future, and noting that things have always been a certain way doesn't make a logical argument that they will be that way in the future.

You know the laws will stay the same. Don't let that fool you into thinking that you arrived at that knowledge through some logic.

Demanding that someone prove that your knowledge is wrong... noting that they can't... that's not a proof.

Proof requires starting with doubt and then gaining confidence through the proof. If you can't doubt that the laws of physics won't change then you're never going to be able to prove it.

So if you really want to say you have a foundation of reason for cause.. you're first going to have offer a convincing testament to your own doubt that the brick will hurt your foot when you let go of it.

My advice: don't drop the brick.

The idea, then, of causation must be deriv'd from some relation among objects... I find in the first place that whatever objects are consider'd as causes or effects, are contiguous... The second relation...'Tis that of PRIORITY of time in the cause before the effect...Shall we then rest contented with these two relations of contiguity and succession, as affording a compleat idea of causation? By no means. An object may be contiguous and prior to another, without being consider'd as its cause. There is a NECESSARY CONNEXION to be taken into consideration; and that relation is of much greater importance, than any of the other two above-mentioned

1. The inspection of any two events or objects, one of which is said necessarily to cause the other, never reveals a direct causal link or power that connects these items.

2. The idea of power or necessary connection arises from the constant conjunction of two events or objects, or two events or objects of the same type.

3. The repetition of a conjunction neither reveals nor causes anything new in the events or objects said to be necessarily connected. But such a repetition does produce a 'customary transition' in the mind. It causes us to infer from the experience of one item of a customarily conjoined pair the second item in that pair.

4. This 'customary transition' is the source of an impression, namely, a felt determination of the mind. This determination is in turn the source of our idea of necessary connection--this determination copied, in the way that ideas copy impressions, is the idea of necessary connection.

5. It follows then that causal power and necessary connection are feelings of the mind, not qualities found in events or objects.

Could you explain what it would mean to reject cause and effect? Would it mean, for example, to reject that if something heavy fell on your foot and your toes broke, that the first event explained why the the second event occurred?

What did Hume say that makes you think he rejected cause and effect rather than (and this is important) rejecting a particular theory of cause and effect?

Do you believe that Hume thought that if a heavy object were to fall on his toes and his toes break, that there was no connection between the first event and the second event so that the sequence was just an accident or a coincidence?

Most fortunately it happens, that since reason is incapable of dispelling these clouds, nature herself suffices to that purpose, and cures me of this philosophical melancholy and delirium, either by relaxing this bent of mind, or by some avocation, and lively impression of my senses, which obliterate all these chimeras. i dine, I play a game of back-gammon, I converse, and am merry with my friends; and when after three or four hour's amusement, I wou'd return to these speculations, they appear so cold, and strain'd, and ridiculous, that I cannot find in my heart to enter into them any farther

Mammals have livers = a priori.

Thanks Huxley!

Well, this is causing me to pull down my copy of Hume's Treatise and reinvestigate. (or is it? )

I'll try to build to concrete instances, but I would prefer to start out from Hume's conception of cause. What I mean by "rejecting cause-and-effect", I mean that I think Hume thought that cause-and-effect is not a real but fictional. So, to answer your question about the particular theory -- meh, I don't think that he just criticized this one notion of cause-and-effect. He attaches necessity to cause-and-effect. If the necessary connection between cause-and-effect isn't there, then we're no longer discussing cause-and-effect, according to Hume. Supposing your example: If I drop a rock on my foot, I would infer that this would hurt, at least, if not break my foot. This is a necessary connection. We're not allowing for the possibility that I miss my foot, or something: If the rock is dropped from a sufficient height, and hits my foot, then it will hurt. However much we abstract, Hume is attacking the connection itself -- my anticipation of pain from this cause. Hume claims that my anticipation is not something that is real, but is fictional -- that I have no basis for believing this aside from a feeling of conviction.

Also, in A Treatise of Human Nature, Hume is intentionally focusing upon how human beings form beliefs, knowledge, and ideas with the purpose of understanding morality -- in essence, he's trying to extend the scientific method to morality, and to do so he first needs to understand how we form knowledge (think of him as the the analytic version of Kant ). So, I guess I'll just begin. Up front: I'm reading through the introduction by David Fate Norton to present this, while looking up some select passages. As such, take what I have to say with a grain of salt. I'm only looking at old notes, the intro, and highlighted portions to remind myself rather than reading the whole thing.

Hume believed that the immediate object of the mind, whether it be an emotion, a tree, or the abstract thought of a triangle, was an object of the mind in all cases. However, he wasn't interested in proving the existence of external objects and other related problems: Instead, he was interested in explaining how it is that we come to believe that there are external objects (amongst other related problems). As an empiricist, Hume argues that our beliefs and knowledge comes from perceptions. Of these perceptions there are two types: Ideas, and Impressions. Impressions are the immediate objects of our senses and emotions, while ideas are the copy of these immediate sensations (the difference between these two is also related to how strongly they come across, but this is only a probable description according to Hume -- sometimes memories can be stronger than our immediate sensations). These ideas are mediated by two faculties, our memory and our imagination. The memory stores the ideas, while the imagination moves them, connects them, or compares them in various relations. There is also a connection of "vivacity" to these two faculties -- memory is thought to be more vivacious (stronger) than the imagination, and the imagination is thought to be less ordered than the memory.

It is in the relationship between ideas that we come across cause-and-effect in Hume. There are other relations, but I'll focus in on this one now. I'll only note that in the general system there are two types of relations, that which leads to intuitive knowledge and that which leads to demonstrative knowledge. Intuitive knowledge is better as it is more certain, and demonstrative knowledge is obtained by demonstration. From this Hume believes that causation is never more than probable, as it depends upon the order of events, and that order could differ at some point in the future.

So, what is the relation of causation, and what does causal reasoning entail? If we see that the ground is wet outside, for instance, but that the sky is clear, we would infer that it had rained, but the clouds had dissipated or moved on. Similarly, thinking about what would happen if we let a heavy rock fall on our toe, we would conclude that the rock would break our toe (or make it hurt a lot, at least). The catch with Hume is that we don't immediately perceive this, yet we infer it, and not only do we infer it, but Hume wants to know why we believe it. He states

Hume wrote:

The idea, then, of causation must be deriv'd from some relation among objects... I find in the first place that whatever objects are consider'd as causes or effects, are contiguous... The second relation...'Tis that of PRIORITY of time in the cause before the effect...Shall we then rest contented with these two relations of contiguity and succession, as affording a compleat idea of causation? By no means. An object may be contiguous and prior to another, without being consider'd as its cause. There is a NECESSARY CONNEXION to be taken into consideration; and that relation is of much greater importance, than any of the other two above-mentioned

(Treatise of Human Nature, 1.3.2.6-11, with abbreviations)

From this conception of causation, he asks immediately below this

"For what reason we pronounce it necessary, that every thing whose existence has a beginning, shou'd also have a cause?"

"Why we conclude, that such particular causes must necessarily have such particular effects; and what is the nature of that inference we draw from the one to the other, and of the belief we repose in it?"

Hume argues against the notion of the first question, and argues that our notion of cause-and-effect is neither intuitive or demonstrative knowledge and therefore must necessarily come from experience. He leads his argument to a point where he connects these ideas to the question "Why we conclude, that such particular causes must necessarily have such particular effects, and why we form an inference from one to another?" (1.3.3.9)

Hume's answer to the question is that we form a connection of cause-and-effect because of repetition of something coming before another thing. Eventually, we conclude "OK, this is the cause, this is the effect, and now I can go on operating under this necessary connection". And, surely, we do do this: No one actually believes that when they let go of a rock it won't fall. But, the only basis we have for believing this is that we've experienced it several times over and so we conclude that we will always experience it from this point onward. This, in the words of Spock, "Is not logical".

I'm going to quote the introduction at this point, because I think it gives a good impression of the argument on necessary connection and causation in summary:

David Fate Norton, I36-I37 in Treatise of Human Nature wrote:

1. The inspection of any two events or objects, one of which is said necessarily to cause the other, never reveals a direct causal link or power that connects these items.

2. The idea of power or necessary connection arises from the constant conjunction of two events or objects, or two events or objects of the same type.

3. The repetition of a conjunction neither reveals nor causes anything new in the events or objects said to be necessarily connected. But such a repetition does produce a 'customary transition' in the mind. It causes us to infer from the experience of one item of a customarily conjoined pair the second item in that pair.

4. This 'customary transition' is the source of an impression, namely, a felt determination of the mind. This determination is in turn the source of our idea of necessary connection--this determination copied, in the way that ideas copy impressions, is the idea of necessary connection.

5. It follows then that causal power and necessary connection are feelings of the mind, not qualities found in events or objects.

So, inferences regarding cause-and-effect, the one relation Hume thought could lead us to knowledge of something more than our immediate experiences, is nothing but the result of habit, feeling, and fiction. This is what I mean by "reject cause-and-effect".

To answer your questions

kennethamy wrote:

Could you explain what it would mean to reject cause and effect? Would it mean, for example, to reject that if something heavy fell on your foot and your toes broke, that the first event explained why the the second event occurred?

It would mean exactly that.

Quote:

What did Hume say that makes you think he rejected cause and effect rather than (and this is important) rejecting a particular theory of cause and effect?

The above quotation, where he defines cause-and-effect, should suffice to explain this. If cause-and-effect were only contiguous in time-and-space, then everything would cause everything (or something close to it). We attribute more to the notion of cause-and-effect, a "necessary connexion", as Hume puts it, and why we place this necessary connection in cause-and-effect that Hume wanted to explain. His explanation is that it's only a feeling of conviction we get from habit, and therefore, cause-and-effect isn't a real relationship in the world. You could propose another definition, such as "an explanation" (as I did, myself), but I think Hume would then say that we're playing with words rather than explaining cause-and-effect, and are basically admitting just as much as he's already demonstrated.

Quote:

Do you believe that Hume thought that if a heavy object were to fall on his toes and his toes break, that there was no connection between the first event and the second event so that the sequence was just an accident or a coincidence?

Yes. Also, no. Hume admitted to himself that even though cause-and-effect are not real, that he couldn't operate within the world without cause-and-effect.

Hume wrote:

Most fortunately it happens, that since reason is incapable of dispelling these clouds, nature herself suffices to that purpose, and cures me of this philosophical melancholy and delirium, either by relaxing this bent of mind, or by some avocation, and lively impression of my senses, which obliterate all these chimeras. i dine, I play a game of back-gammon, I converse, and am merry with my friends; and when after three or four hour's amusement, I wou'd return to these speculations, they appear so cold, and strain'd, and ridiculous, that I cannot find in my heart to enter into them any farther

(Treatise, 1.4.7.9)

From this he concludes that Philosophy is a worthless pursuit, and it would have been better had he spent all this time enjoying it with his family and friends. But then he goes back on this, and states that it's worthwhile to know that everything we hold to be true can be and ought to be held in doubt, even something as simple as stones falling from the cause of gravity. After this, he goes onto what he initially wanted to do: explain what Human nature is, and from that, build a science of morals.

Sure, that's what I meant it to be. But you asked me about Hume, and why I thought the things I did about Hume.... so.... I told you.

Sure. You can begin by answering these questions:

But is this notion of causation defensible (for science), or is it too metaphysical for science?

Do we need to think of cause in the efficient cause way in order to make a solid scientific contribution?

Do we need to think of cause in any way at all to generate scientific knowledge?

What is cause?

actually I think I'm the one who introduced Hume, mainly because it was his critique of the notion of causality which still seems very influential. I never really got it. Nor do I understand why modern philosophy things causation is 'metaphysical'. As far as I am concerned, everything is connected. I don't think I will try to bother working out the details, but just act accordingly.

I think we can get somewhere by asking a specific question like the one I just asked above. Else, we'll just go round, and round, and round.

kennethamy wrote:

I think we can get somewhere by asking a specific question like the one I just asked above. Else, we'll just go round, and round, and round.

You have stated earlier that causes are not descriptions, so, what are causes? The fact is, that by returning to one of your standard questions, these threads just go round and round. Huxley started this thread and I assume he knows what he wants to talk about.

It is? Do mean we never had to look to see whether all mammals had livers? How did we know it, then.

Thanks! I didn't know that Hume was criticizing Spinoza, I thought he had the scholastics in his sights. That is interesting. Without knowing the details, I instinctively agree with Spinoza about 'freedom' and 'will'. One of the spiritual teachers I used to read would say the same: 'will is the instrument of desire'. Therefore will is always bound to do desires bidding. Freedom is not freeedom to do whatever you want, but freedom from being driven by what you want. I suppose this is essentially a spiritual attitude, but Spinoza was actually a spiritual kind of guy, I think.

As for 'everything being connected' it seems to me in the 'age of science' the scope given to causality has been made smaller and smaller and smaller until now it is practically at vanishing point. I think the reason why is that it is not politically correct to say that 'things happen for a reason'. It sounds kind of spooky. So scientific philosophers insist that things happen for no reason, except their material causes, which just happen to be as they are, for the reasons described by the Laws of Physics. That is about the size of it, isn't it?