Cause

. . . . the denial of free will, and scientific certainty.

The existence of change characterizes a number of the pre-Socratic dialogs. As far as I can tell, Aristotle's Physics was his general response to these questions of change, as well as his specific response to several thinkers in his day. It is from here that we (the Western Tradition) derive a notion of cause.

What Aristotle meant by cause was not what we generally mean by cause -- he had four, the material, the efficient, the formal, and the final. Cause, in our modern world, is the cause of cause-and-effect, or to use Aristotle's terms, the efficient cause. It is from this notion of causation that we obtain the Cosmological argument, the denial of free will, and scientific certainty.

But is this notion of causation defensible, or is it too metaphysical for science?

Do we need to think of cause in the efficient cause way in order to make a solid scientific contribution?

Do we need to think of cause in any way at all to generate scientific knowledge?

Lastly, what is cause? If you don't have a good definition that you're willing to defend, that's fine. In that case, what is your concept of cause?

Why is the denial of free will anti-scientific?

Well, often the argument for determinism comes from the notion of cause-and-effect (if it is argued for, rather than just presupposed). Further, an argument explaining scientific certainty comes from the notion of cause-and-effect (look at Kant, for one such argument). Although, I would say there is a difference between scientific certainty and, say, Cartesian certainty. Science certainly does operate with certainty, just not some sort of fixed certainty. As an idea is used more and converges, it is thought to be more certain (if never indubitable. Note the difference between indubitability and certainty).

I'm not saying that I'm arguing for these things. I'm noting such positions because they are tied up with our notion of cause, which is what I was trying to introduce so that I could ask questions about cause.

Why is the denial of free will anti-scientific?

What is supposed to be indefensible about saying that dropping a heavy object on my foot caused my toe to fracture. Or that placing water into a freezer caused the water to turn to ice? Is there supposed to be something that matter with that? Could you say what it is?

kennethamy wrote:

What is supposed to be indefensible about saying that dropping a heavy object on my foot caused my toe to fracture. Or that placing water into a freezer caused the water to turn to ice? Is there supposed to be something that matter with that? Could you say what it is?

No, I don't think it's supposed to be wrong. How would you characterize this use of the word "cause", though?

I'll try and explain where I'm coming from with this question by taking your examples.

Let's take each of these scenarios. The cause of your fractured toe could be "dropping a heavy object on your foot". The same effect could be characterized by the cause "A gravitational force accelerated a ball into your foot". Another cause could be "An impulse caused energy to be transferred to my toe at such a rate that the bone fractured". Or, "The kinetic energy of some object was transferred into my toe, and the crystal lattice of my bones was broken", etc. etc. Each of these causes describe the same event -- a broken toe. But which is the cause? Or is the cause before these moments, where the thought (in scientific terms, a synapse fires) to let go of the ball occurred, and so on back to the big bang? At that point, is cause even scientific, or is it only metaphysical?

Or suppose the water example. The cause could be placing the water in a freezer (which would follow the same line of reasoning of cause-and-effect back to the big bang, and the question of whether this is a scientific conclusion or a metaphysical conclusion). The cause could also be "The water lost enough energy such that its vibrations no longer kept it in the liquid phase, and the molecules settled into potential energy well lattices to form ice". The cause could be attributed to a macroscopic description of thermodynamic processes as well -- it's 0 degrees and enough heat transfer has occurred that there isn't enough energy to keep the water in the liquid phase, so it's ice now.

There are a multiplicity of causes, and one is tempted to continue following a chain of cause-and-effect to the beginning of the universe. Are such arguments scientific arguments, or are they metaphysical arguments? Is such a notion of cause indefensible (as scientific)?

If Free will is a necessary presupposition for scientific investigation, as you say, Would a scientist that is a determinist then fail at scientific investigation?

Well, if they wouldn't fail whether or not they were determinists/compatibalists/etc., in what respect do you mean that a scientist must presuppose free will in order to do science?

After all, it is possible that the universe is deterministic, and that this is the reason why science "works". I'm not arguing this is a necessity, myself, but I don't see how you've ruled this out in the above argument.

I can go with that. Supposing what I stated were descriptions, though, and that descriptions differ from causes, what in each of these instances was the cause?

Well, if they wouldn't fail whether or not they were determinists/compatibalists/etc., in what respect do you mean that a scientist must presuppose free will in order to do science?

After all, it is possible that the universe is deterministic, and that this is the reason why science "works". I'm not arguing this is a necessity, myself, but I don't see how you've ruled this out in the above argument.

There can be a number of different descriptions of the same chain of events or causes. Of course, some of them may be better than others. And some of them incorrect.

Scientists, like everyone else, make decisions which they are not compelled to make. Why would they have any special issue with doing things of their own free will? Do you know of scientists being under some compulsion or other?

All healthy human adults unavoidably assume the reality of free will, whether they're scientists or not and whether they're determinists or not. This is admitted by deniers, it's part of what they call the "illusion of free will". If one performs a scientific experiment, which relies on an assumption, and the success of that experiment is in accordance with the correctness of that assumption, then that needs to be included in the results and their interpretation. Otherwise, one is not doing science.

I haven't ruled it out with the above argument, this argument aims only to show that denial of free will is anti-scientific.

what you need is an argument that attaches the presupposition of free will to the process of science

I'm not sure I agree with the word "healthy" being attached there -- it bolsters your position, in that anyone who denies free will can be described as being unhealthy.

Huxley wrote:

what you need is an argument that attaches the presupposition of free will to the process of science

That's what I gave. The specifics of doing science include the assumption of the reality of free will. This is irrelevant, and can be ignored, for all experiments other than those which purport to refute free will.