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On freewill and choice.

 
 
Night Ripper
 
  1  
Reply Thu 13 May, 2010 03:33 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;163969 wrote:
It is clear that whether or not you have a will you are not saying anything about it when you say that you did something of your own free will, since what you are saying when you say that you did something of your own free will is that you were not compelled to do it.


Another possibility is that I am saying both that I have a will that is free and that I was not compelled to do something. That seems more plausible.
kennethamy
 
  1  
Reply Thu 13 May, 2010 06:24 pm
@Night Ripper,
Night Ripper;163994 wrote:
Another possibility is that I am saying both that I have a will that is free and that I was not compelled to do something. That seems more plausible.


Why would you think that is what you are saying rather than what you are, given your theory, you think you are saying? Here is a parallel: we know that people have all kinds of strange theories about what they mean when they use commonplace terms. For instance, some people if asked what it means to understand something will concoct some incredible theory about how it means to stand under this or that. But, of course, when we just examine how they actually use the term, "understand" all that garbage drops away, and they mean what people ordinarily mean by "understand" in ordinary language. So, when you are not theorizing, what you mean when you say that you do something of your own free will is just that you are denying that you were compelled to do that thing. You are not talking about "wills" whatever they may be (or not be). But, of course, when you theorize about it, you come up with an incredible story about what the phrase, "I did it of my own free will" means (or must mean if your theory is true). Of course, it means no such thing. That it could mean that kind of thing (whatever that means) is no reason to think that it does, and there is no evidence that it does, but, instead, a lot of evidence that it does not.
0 Replies
 
Gorilla Nipples
 
  1  
Reply Thu 13 May, 2010 10:28 pm
@Night Ripper,
Night Ripper;163816 wrote:
I believe that randomness can allow for free will. I think the reason why most people think otherwise is that they think the ideal example of randomness is the white noise seen on the older TV sets. There's no patterns, so how could anything like choice or even meaning exist in that? When people think of randomness they think of "even distribution". Look at the following two strings of coin flips.

1. THTHHTHTTHHTTHTH

2. THHHHTTHHTTHTTTT

Most people think (1) looks more random. The problem is, I made up that string while (2) was actually generated by a true random number generator (RANDOM.ORG - Coin Flipper). Randomess allows for lumpiness and patterns. If you flip a coin an infinite number of times, you will produce every pattern possible, including an infinite pattern of heads and tails, including a pattern that spells out in ASCII the King James Bible, and so on. Randomness is counter-intuitive and definitely too misunderstood to be a threat to free will without an elaborate argument.


The reason I believe that randomness doesn't allow for free will is because it represents a lack of cause. The lack of cause means there is a lack of control, and I think any significant account of free will has to grant the free agent some kind of ultimate control over itself.
north
 
  1  
Reply Thu 13 May, 2010 10:48 pm
@Doubt doubt,
Doubt doubt;161144 wrote:
I would like for anyone willing to give an example of freewill or a case were freewill is involved to do so here. i believe i can point out the lack of free will in any circumstance. can anyone say that even their own personality and thoughts has in any way displayed freewill.


psychology of freewill

---------- Post added 05-14-2010 at 12:54 AM ----------

once any being gets beyond instinct , that being has freewill
0 Replies
 
ughaibu
 
  1  
Reply Fri 14 May, 2010 03:12 am
@Night Ripper,
Night Ripper;163994 wrote:
Another possibility is that I am saying both that I have a will that is free and that I was not compelled to do something. That seems more plausible.
It's obviously not the case that "what you are saying when you say that you did something of your own free will is that you were not compelled to do it", agents often make actions which are neither compelled nor willed.
kennethamy
 
  1  
Reply Fri 14 May, 2010 07:05 am
@ughaibu,
ughaibu;164172 wrote:
It's obviously not the case that "what you are saying when you say that you did something of your own free will is that you were not compelled to do it", agents often make actions which are neither compelled nor willed.


What is true is that when it is suggested that I might not have done something of my own free will, what is suggested is that I was compelled to do that thing. Therefore, when I say I am acting of my own free will, I am rebutting that suggestion, or I am anticipating that suggesting and rebutting it.

But unless my action is compelled, my action is free. That I do not describe it as free even if it is, is a matter of the conventions of conversation ("conversational implicature") since to describe my action as free is to anticipate the suggestion that it was compelled. You are confusing the conditions of asserting that one's action is free with the conditions of the action's being free.
Night Ripper
 
  1  
Reply Fri 14 May, 2010 08:35 am
@Gorilla Nipples,
Gorilla Nipples;164085 wrote:
The reason I believe that randomness doesn't allow for free will is because it represents a lack of cause. The lack of cause means there is a lack of control, and I think any significant account of free will has to grant the free agent some kind of ultimate control over itself.


I think that the kind of free will that is required for moral responsibility doesn't require causation of our actions but rather the ability to predict them. If I can predict that, when I extend my arm, my fist will hit your nose, it doesn't matter if I'm the ultimate cause of the punch but rather it's simply the fact that I knew it was going to happen and I let it happen anyways. I'm not the ultimate cause but I still play a role. Of course, there's no guarantee that we won't just randomly punch someone. There's also no guarantee that when we do want to punch someone that our arms will work. In those cases we really don't have free will anymore than other people with defective brains or nervous systems have free will. However, we are products of evolution so we wouldn't be here having this conversation if randomness was really a threat to our wills. We couldn't even survive.
kennethamy
 
  1  
Reply Fri 14 May, 2010 08:43 am
@Night Ripper,
Night Ripper;164244 wrote:
I think that the kind of free will that is required for moral responsibility doesn't require causation of our actions but rather the ability to predict them.


Then if I am unable to predict what will happen if I neglect to repair the brakes on a car properly, I am not morally responsible for what happens if there is an accident on that account? Neat. I guess then that BP is off the hook. That's a relief. I own stock in BP.
Night Ripper
 
  1  
Reply Fri 14 May, 2010 08:52 am
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;164248 wrote:
Then if I am unable to predict what will happen if I neglect to repair the brakes on a car properly, I am not morally responsible for what happens if there is an accident on that account?


You're confusing infallibility with the ability to predict. It's funny how in arguments on knowledge you can recognize that infallibility isn't required. Of course, the problem is that you're just trying to find some kind of objection that you can be a sarcastic douche about rather than trying to have a meaningful discussion.

Also, we do allow that people are less morally responsible in an accident. They are blamed for their negligence not their malice. Are you trying to tell me that you can't predict what will happen if you never get your brakes checked? That would make you dumber than I thought.
kennethamy
 
  1  
Reply Fri 14 May, 2010 09:03 am
@Night Ripper,
Night Ripper;164251 wrote:
You're confusing infallibility with the ability to predict. .


I don't believe so. BP could not have predicted what would happen to its oil rig, infallibly or fallibly. But that does not mean that they are not morally, as well as legally, responsible for what happened. What makes you think they could have even fallibly? In law, the notion of strict liability recognizes that even if it is impossible that you should predict (even fallibly) what improbable thing may happen to your milk if you are a milk bottler, you are, nevertheless, held strictly liable for whatever does happen.

Strict liability - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Night Ripper
 
  1  
Reply Fri 14 May, 2010 09:08 am
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;164256 wrote:
BP could not have predicted what would happen to its oil rig, infallibly or fallibly


Then they aren't morally responsible. They didn't do anything morally wrong. What's the big deal? Of course, they are still legally responsible for the cleanup just like I'm responsible for cleaning up the trash that falls out of my truck, even if I had no way of knowing that trash would fall out (it was properly secured, etc). It's still my trash so I clean it up. What's your problem with any of this?
kennethamy
 
  1  
Reply Fri 14 May, 2010 09:24 am
@Night Ripper,
Night Ripper;164260 wrote:
Then they aren't morally responsible. They didn't do anything morally wrong.


Yes, strict liability does not confer moral responsibility, although it does confer responsibility (both legal and moral) is one is held strictly liable. But the point is, of course, that a person or a corporation need not have been able to know that its equipment would fail, and yet, it may be held liable (morally and legally) when the equipment does fail.
fast
 
  1  
Reply Fri 14 May, 2010 09:49 am
@ughaibu,
[QUOTE=ughaibu;161165]An agent has free will on occasions when they make and enact a conscious choice from amongst realisable alternatives.
I can type A and I can type B, thus I have established realisable alternatives.
I'm presently conscious.
I choose and type A.[/QUOTE]

I have free will even when I do not make choices. For example, I was at the mall not too long ago. I parked and walked towards the mall entrance. As I was walking, I passed a road sign.

I could have spit on the sign as I walked by had I chose to. And, of course, I could have made the choice not to spit on it. But, at the time, I never even contemplated spitting on it. It's not until now that I am even recalling the fact I walked by that sign.

The point is that I didn't make and enact (why are you saying "enact" anyway?) a conscious choice, yet it's still the case that at the time I could have done so of my own free will.*

By the way, I don't want to say you're wrong. I just think you're excluding certain occasions where people have free will.

Also, what alternatives do we have if they aren't realizable?

* Supposing no laws prohibiting it.
Night Ripper
 
  1  
Reply Fri 14 May, 2010 10:49 am
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;164264 wrote:
But the point is, of course, that a person or a corporation need not have been able to know that its equipment would fail, and yet, it may be held liable (morally and legally) when the equipment does fail.


Morally? I don't think so. Unpredictable accidents are not the kinds of things we hold people morally responsible for.
kennethamy
 
  1  
Reply Fri 14 May, 2010 01:04 pm
@Night Ripper,
Night Ripper;164293 wrote:
Morally? I don't think so. Unpredictable accidents are not the kinds of things we hold people morally responsible for.


Maybe. But the question is what it is that would make an accident an accident, predictable or not. Just what do you think an accident is? If an event is unpredictable, then the question is, why is it so?
Night Ripper
 
  1  
Reply Fri 14 May, 2010 01:27 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;164312 wrote:
Maybe. But the question is what it is that would make an accident an accident, predictable or not. Just what do you think an accident is? If an event is unpredictable, then the question is, why is it so?


What exactly is your point?
ughaibu
 
  1  
Reply Fri 14 May, 2010 03:40 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;164213 wrote:
That I do not describe it as free even if it is, is a matter of the conventions of conversation. . . . . You are confusing the conditions of asserting that one's action is free with the conditions of the action's being free.
I'm not confusing anything, I'm pointing out that will is an essential of free will.
0 Replies
 
kennethamy
 
  1  
Reply Fri 14 May, 2010 03:43 pm
@Night Ripper,
Night Ripper;164317 wrote:
What exactly is your point?


That unpredictability is not the criterion of accident.. I should have thought that was obvious.

---------- Post added 05-14-2010 at 05:50 PM ----------

ughaibu;164375 wrote:
I'm not confusing anything, I'm pointing out that will is an essential of free will.


"I am pointing out that p" is true only if p is true. For instance, no one can point out that 2+2=5, because 2+2 does not = 5. Now, since will is not an essential of the proposition that I am doing it of my own free will, it is not something that anyone can point out. What makes you think that we I say that I married Esmeralda of my own free will that I am talking about wills? In
English, I am just denying that I was compelled to marry Esmerald, and that I wanted to marry her. What would you mean by thet?
ughaibu
 
  1  
Reply Fri 14 May, 2010 03:53 pm
@fast,
fast;164274 wrote:
The point is that I didn't make and enact (why are you saying "enact" anyway?) a conscious choice, yet it's still the case that at the time I could have done so of my own free will.
You could have demonstrated free will had you made a decision to spit or not, as you didn't, you had no free will about the matter. If free will extended to choices that weren't considered, then all one's decisions would be made in almost complete ignorance. That's why free will, in order to be meaningful, requires a finite option set and consideration of all possibilities in that set.
fast;164274 wrote:
what alternatives do we have if they aren't realizable?
Any that couldn't be performed as an alternative to the action chosen. See this thread: http://www.philosophyforum.com/lounge/general-discussion/8820-realisable-possibilities.html

---------- Post added 05-15-2010 at 06:57 AM ----------

kennethamy;164378 wrote:
since will is not an essential of the proposition that I am doing it of my own free will
Of course it is. If I'm walking in the mountains, and I accidentally tread on a wasps nest and get badly stung, I wasn't compelled in any way, but I sure as hell didn't do it as a matter of free will. Willed actions are consciously intended actions, that there is freedom does not, in itself, imply that there is free will. Plants are free, do you think that they have free will?
Night Ripper
 
  1  
Reply Fri 14 May, 2010 04:09 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;164378 wrote:
That unpredictability is not the criterion of accident.. I should have thought that was obvious.


Why are you telling me this?
 

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