It might be that we can only understand things or events from within a certain human perspective (nodding to Kant in this regard) that supplies meaning to the universe of entities. Knowledge then becomes strictly human knowledge, and the organisation and objectification of entities is transcendental in the sense that it is shared knowledge, a great part of which seems to be socially constructed. The test might be whether we can know "raw sense-data" at all.
It might be that we can only understand things or events from within a certain human perspective (nodding to Kant in this regard) that supplies meaning to the universe of entities. Knowledge then becomes strictly human knowledge, and the organisation and objectification of entities is transcendental in the sense that it is shared knowledge, a great part of which seems to be socially constructed. The test might be whether we can know "raw sense-data" at all.
It makes sense to organize knowledge in our minds but is everything in the universe organized for us to understand it or do we make it understandable by organizing it, giving it form?
Can one understand something which is not organized? That depends on what is meant by 'organization' and 'understanding.' My view is that for something to be organized is precisely and nothing other than for it to be understood, and vice versa.
What does it mean, for example, for a soda can to be understood? Does it mean anything other than having an awareness of, a concept of, its structure? And by structure I mean all of its nature, including potentially infinite relations with other structures: e.g. its location relative X, its cost relative X, etc.
One could substitute the word 'structure' for 'definition,' or substitute 'understanding' for 'the ability to define.' And any definition involves organization. Something which is not defined is not organized or understood, and for something to be understood or defined, is for that something to be organized, via that defining.
Which is to say, by a circuitous route, that we create the organization, as opposed to discovering organization which already exists in nature.
But 'Aha!,' say the materialists, 'do you mean that physical things do not exist except when and as we experience them?'
Yes and no. No doubt a world exists external to our experience, which our experience is 'of' in some sense, but not directly; i.e. the external world is chaos which does not have form or organization. 'So then a plate is not a plate when I'm not looking at it?' Yes and no. What we are calling plate and defining as such does not exist except as a concept in ours minds. Our particular nature determines the way in which we organize the chaos into 'things,' including the thing called 'plate.'
A priori, there is no reason that what we are calling 'plate' and defining by certain characteristics could not be conceived of as many 'fudlums' defined each in terms of some other characteristics, or so on in any other way.
Our knowledge is not absolute, it is purely utilitarian. Our understanding of something, our awareness of its structure, our ordering of it, is in accordance with the way we must be - what we must do in order to survive and exist. That we cannot think without the concept 'thing' does not demonstrate the absolute (i.e. objective) reality of any given things; it demonstrates only that a certain animal cannot exist without organizing chaotic reality in a certain way. That 'plate' is considered a thing and not some collection of other things, or a part of some larger thing, is a function of the fact that it is most practical to conceive of it as such. We have a need to do so; if we had other needs, there would be no plates, but rather some other thing or things with different definitions.
As Socrates was asked (in I forget which dialogue) what is the form of mud or of excrement?
Mud still has a form, meaning that it is organized in such a way that makes it mud, that makes it look like chaos, what I'm saying is that we understand things because they have form or we give things form so that they can be understand, therefore everything has form.
Can one understand something which is not organized? That depends on what is meant by 'organization' and 'understanding.' My view is that for something to be organized is precisely and nothing other than for it to be understood, and vice versa.
What does it mean, for example, for a soda can to be understood? Does it mean anything other than having an awareness of, a concept of, its structure? And by structure I mean all of its nature, including potentially infinite relations with other structures: e.g. its location relative X, its cost relative X, etc.
One could substitute the word 'structure' for 'definition,' or substitute 'understanding' for 'the ability to define.' And any definition involves organization. Something which is not defined is not organized or understood, and for something to be understood or defined, is for that something to be organized, via that defining.
Which is to say, by a circuitous route, that we create the organization, as opposed to discovering organization which already exists in nature.
But 'Aha!,' say the materialists, 'do you mean that physical things do not exist except when and as we experience them?'
Yes and no. No doubt a world exists external to our experience, which our experience is 'of' in some sense, but not directly; i.e. the external world is chaos which does not have form or organization. 'So then a plate is not a plate when I'm not looking at it?' Yes and no. What we are calling plate and defining as such does not exist except as a concept in ours minds. Our particular nature determines the way in which we organize the chaos into 'things,' including the thing called 'plate.'
A priori, there is no reason that what we are calling 'plate' and defining by certain characteristics could not be conceived of as many 'fudlums' defined each in terms of some other characteristics, or so on in any other way.
Our knowledge is not absolute, it is purely utilitarian. Our understanding of something, our awareness of its structure, our ordering of it, is in accordance with the way we must be - what we must do in order to survive and exist. That we cannot think without the concept 'thing' does not demonstrate the absolute (i.e. objective) reality of any given things; it demonstrates only that a certain animal cannot exist without organizing chaotic reality in a certain way. That 'plate' is considered a thing and not some collection of other things, or a part of some larger thing, is a function of the fact that it is most practical to conceive of it as such. We have a need to do so; if we had other needs, there would be no plates, but rather some other thing or things with different definitions.
I was thinking of this when I was thinking about my own personality, how certain things I do seem to occur all the time also with others also. What I mean by form is a certain organization. Everything has form; music, personalities, nature, even chaos. Though they seem to deviate from their usual pattern they still have form because we are able to understand it. What I'm getting to is: Is our knowledge based on form? Meaning do we only understand things that are organized or what we want to make organized? It makes sense to organize knowledge in our minds but is everything in the universe organized for us to understand it or do we make it understandable by organizing it, giving it form?
The test might be whether we can know "raw sense-data" at all.
We may have raw sense data, although that is dubious. But it is certain that we do not know them. For they are supposed to be what we have in order to know what we know. We don't know them.
Knowledge might be a social construction. I expect that to say so is, on analysis, a trivial truism. But what is clear is that that what we know is not a social construction. To argue that because our knowledge is a social construction, that what we know is a social construction, is patently fallacious. Only those with no sense of logic at all would think to produce such an argument.
But you're saying nothing exist unless I see it. And what of chaos, if what you said is true that things are organized to be understood, then chaos must be organized as well because we understand it. Chaos must then be some sloppy organization then. Then what if no one were here to understand it then? Would the universe still have form? Would sounds and things still be organized?
As Socrates was asked (in I forget which dialogue) what is the form of mud or of excrement?
It is a philosophical presumption (and assumption) that if everything is an appearance (to us) then it must be an appearance of some-thing (simplistically, external to us). The endless debate about what that some-thing actually is, however, suggestive that the "other side of the coin" is most likely unknowable; this in turn suggests that if there is knowledge or science, it is of appearances alone. Thus, it makes little progress to assert that "reality" while it might be logically prior to our knowledge, exhibits in itself any organisation independent of our understanding of it and its human meaning.
By conducting a scientific thought experiment we can conclude the legitimacy of the assertions. Normally there are two types of experiments we could use, one that is orientated towards observation of one's self, and one that is orientated towards the observation of others. Yet due to the nature of that of which we seek to understand, we should take out all variables of intelligence, and use the first type of experimentation.
Now, under the context of the above statement, the scenario stated below has been produced to convey an existence of a human overseeing a city with no prior intelligence of the world before him/her or him/her self. With this stated, ask yourself the question stated below in the scenario.
"You do not exist, and now you do, what do you see before you?"
The most common replies from my thought experiment are as follows, and are listed in order of greatest to least, and are based on the questioning of 100 humans:
1. I don't know (76%)
2. What the &!*@# (21%)
Based on the data, I have concluded with high probability and great certainty that things have such a form due to human's experiences whether they are inherited, individually obtained, or collectively obtained. I have based this off the fact that all responses to the proposed scenario are asked due to the lack of a previous experience of their surroundings. Hence I have named this concept, "The Adam & Eve Complex".
Clearly, the form imposed upon a thing by a human obtained exercise with the thing, is real, regardless if the form is product of another human, it's still real. For the form of everything is as real as the words you see before you now. For they are what you say they are, therefore you make them what they are...In this context, that is the only truth of "form", and there are no more illusions past this point.
As wisely spoken in the first post in this thread, understanding is the key.
(*Note: There are some interesting implications here as well, please feel free to dispute my findings. Possible methods include a philosophy forum poll, implied logic, or alterations to terminology.Lastly, I had excluded 3% of the poll.)
It is a philosophical presumption (and assumption) that if everything is an appearance (to us) then it must be an appearance of some-thing (simplistically, external to us).
Yet how can the human know existence, if he never experience non-existence, how can he know that he is truly alive if he never knew seen a non-existence thing? Just when we experience the difference between hot and cold, we know no the difference because of experience and we gave them meaning because if of the experience. So how can I know that I am alive or exist if I can't compare the opposite?. Though we give meanings to existence and death, we really have no idea of them because of our lack to experience it.
Something that Nietzsche and Hegel seem (I know it's not this simple) to have had in common was a rejection of this duality. The idea of a reality behind appearance is itself one more form within "appearance." Which would lead us to a monism, at least on the conceptual level. The ideas/abstractions of appearance and reality exist within the same system of human concept. What do you make of this? I think the appearance/reality distinction is practically necessary but logically difficult.
---------- Post added 05-25-2010 at 06:45 PM ----------
This is a great point. I would say that we have our abstractions, our conceptual forms, AND the raw sensual emotional experience that largely inspires them. "Nonexistence" is just a concept within existence. And "existence" is just a concept within.......[silence]
Hmm a concept, within silence eh? elaborate please. As I said before everything that exist has form. Yet I even believe existence is itself a form, somewhat of an organized system, or it could be a form of some greater organization. Yet our cannot be based solely on concept, there must be reality some where, if not then we are living in someone's imagination. And if this greater organization is silence, then what is the meaning of all this racket we are making then?
What! so you're saying everything we see is not real then. How so? Then our very existence is fake. Is not what we experience real, must it only be a symbol of something else. I do believe that there authenticity in the world. If all things are of appearance only then what is the real truth? How can we find it if we are searching in unreal places, to say?
I think that all we know is our experience of the universe (although even that is not right, because it is not as if 'knowledge' is one thing and 'experience' another). What we call the universe - or whatever else we are looking at, or talking about - is manifestly a combination of sensory inputs - seen, heard, felt - combined by the human intelligence into a whole. This is what I mean by 'conceptual construction'. It is something much more inclusive and deeper than 'a concept'. It is more like a gestalt.
Now at this point, you will say 'but you are talking about the representation of the reality, not the reality itself'. What I am saying is that the object is a representation. It is not ultimately possible to differentiate the thing known from the act of knowing it. We will then try and look at the representation, the act of cognition, to differentiate it from the object. But representation itself cannot be directly cognized. Everything is a representation, including one's attempt to conceptualise the act of representation. We are always, actually, in the relationship of knower-act of knowledge-object.
Kant's most original contribution to philosophy is his "Copernican Revolution," that, as he puts it, it is the representation that makes the object possible rather than the object that makes the representation possible. This introduced the human mind as an active originator of experience rather than just a passive recipient of perception.
...I even believe existence is itself a form, somewhat of an organized system, or it could be a form of some greater organization. Yet our cannot be based solely on concept, there must be reality some where, if not then we are living in someone's imagination.
For Aquinas, following Aristotle, cognition is an activity which knowing subject perform, not something that happens to them. Thus, contrary to the kinds of actions where one thing acts on another, (e.g. fire heating water) cognition is an action that an animal performs but which remains in the animal. It is, therefore, called an immanent action. As when water becomes hot from a fire, there is a change in us when we know, and it is a sort of union, as the fire and water approach the same temperature. As an immanent activity, though, we do not become merely like something else, as water becomes hot like the fire. Rather, in cognition we become the thing, in such a way that we do not cease being what we are. This way of becoming another is called the intentional order.....
Knowledge presupposes some kind of union, because in order to become the thing which is known we must possess it, we must be identical with the object we know. But this possession of the object is not a physical possession of it. It is a possession of the form of the object, of that principle which makes the object to be what it is. This is what Aristotle means when he says that the soul in a way becomes all things. Entitatively the knower and object known remain what they are. But intentionally (cognitively) the knower becomes the object of his knowledge as he possesses the form of the object, That is why Aquinas says with reference to intellectual knowledge:[INDENT]Intelligent beings are distinguished from non-intelligent beings in that the latter possess only their own form; whereas the intelligent being is naturally adapted to have also the form of some other thing; for the idea of the thing known is in the knower. (ST I, 14, 1.) [/INDENT]
Form is made finite by matter, inasmuch as form, considered in itself, is common to many; but when received in matter, the form is determined to this one particular thing... Form is not made perfect by matter, but is rather contracted by matter.
I think it is important to understand the way in which the intellect constructs our experience of reality. This is not to deny the existence of external objects. But what we know is the experience of those objects.
.