philosophy of probability

the problem with probability is that it is by its very Nature inaccurate

the problem with exact calculations is that it is extremely complex , and therefore closer to the truth of the way things are ,( beyond us really at this point )

hence a connundrum

probability or exact calculations ?

If you mean exact calculations of outcomes, ie predictions, Solomonoff has proved that they're impossible, regardless of whether the model is deterministic or probabilistic. What does that imply about "the truth of the way things are"?

that they are not impossible just extremely complex

Okay, where did Solomonoff go wrong?
Publications of Ray Solomonoff

But thermodynamics is not necessarily QM theory. Therefore thermodynamics is conceivably true even in a deterministic universe. Probability theory then becomes a matter of distribution and approximation..... rather than measurement itself.

Of course thermodynamics may be a part of QM theory and is thought to be by todays science. But it did exist before QM.

Surely there is a difference? Probability is saying potentially two different things about measurement IF QM indeterminism is true. The philosophical question is "is it possible to be able to tell the difference?".

At first sight it can , on the basis that QM predicts entangled states.

BUT something looking very much like entangled states (and classically isnt), with the same probabilities can be constructed. Thus the probabilities themselves cannot tell us whether they are intrinsic to that which is being measured ........ or approximations coming from incomplete measurement of something that is actually determinate.

The context of the unknowable is intrinsic to the thing in itself in QM

The context of the unknowable is extrinsic to the thing in itself for determinism.

Which can we tell from the thing in itself and its associative probability? ie how can science conceivably perform an experiment upon nature that settles the issue one way or the other?

So i drop a die into a hole in a box so i cant see how it lands. It seams to me that there is a zero percent chance it is anything but what it is and a hundred percent chance it is what it is.

how is a dynamic equation any better than a guess at predicting the static result?

Whats the probability of the probability being right?

It seams to me that this time would be better spent practicing throwing dice in a way that is consistent so you could predict the outcome 100% of the time.

In a deterministic universe where all forms are well defined. . . .

i mean in the sense of say the billiard ball model of the universe as compared to 'the probability wave potentially collapsing to what looks like a billiard ball with fuzzy edges' universe. The idea of well defined physical forms upon which measurement attempts to describe. As compared to a theory of matter such that physical forms arise from fluctuating fields, and from a distance look well defined.

Both of course can retain cause and effect.

Videcorspoon disagrees.

However, as far as saying that if thermodynamics is not necessarily "QM" theory (which I would caution using this abbreviation because there are other scientific theories with "QM" in them, like "quantitative measurement,") then thermodynamics is conceivably true even in a deterministic universe? I disagree with this statement fundamentally. Propositionally (logic wise), simply saying if X is not Y, then Z, that is a fallacious argument wrought with induction. It would be like me saying "an orange is not an apple, therefore I have a pear." And this has little connection to "probability theory becoming a matter of distribution and approximation etc."

thermodynamics in the QM context is different to thermodynamics without it

thermodynamics still makes sense in a deterministic universe. But whatever...

In a deterministic universe where all forms are well defined, it still makes sense to do probability theory on the basis of the difficulty of obtaining a perfect measurement of an unambiguous form. The instruments of measurement do not have to be perfect in order to be useful, and probability theory in this context enables imperfect measurement to be useful.

On the other hand, in QM the form to be measured is intrinsically ambiguous. Thus probabilty theory is useful in the different context of the intrinsic indeterminism of the form.

ok ..... on with the pseudo science lol

The difference between the world being inherently fuzzy and on the other hand appearing fuzzy, is of course just a tad fundamental in its consideration. Probability theory is used to refine the picture under both circumstances, but can it decide which philosophical scheme is more accurate?

The 'return to determinism' contenders are most notably called the hidden variable theories. Theories that claim that QM 'may appear' to be inherently indeterministic, but this is only an approximation of an underlying classicalism (determinism).
Probability theory is always seen in these terms, as what is required to manage the incomplete acquisition of information, that is nevertheless always there to be had.

One sense in which QM can be described as indeterminate is that according to QM, exactly the same experiment repeated would yield only a probability that we would get exactly the same result, even if it were possible to set it up exactly again and again. ie there are no hidden structures that can be set up such that an experiment will repeatedly yield the same result, as compared to the previously predicted probability distribution of QM of the same experiment.
Probability theory is always seen in these terms as what is required to understand the fundamental nature of reality ..... and not just the management of missed or generalised information.

There doesn't appear to be a way of telling which is true by probability theory itself. It works just as well and as strangely in either circumstance. But having said that, QM is weird! It describes entangled states between particles such that they are concieved as instantaneously connected while also being in an indeterminate state prior to the collapse of that state. Thats something classicalism would never come up with. Its a possibility.

Generally speaking as people we have the common sense view that something exists clearly. Yet when we use probability theory on such cases as the two child problem above, we get confused. There is nothing QM going on here. Why does this happen? I wonder if the reason is because we have as people a completely contrary view to existence as we do to the future. ie common sense tells us that the future is not determined, and any of six numbers can occur on the face of the next dice. In other words the future doesn't exist clearly. With regard to the past on the other hand we tend to have a more ambiguous attitude. It clearly happened, but doesn't exist!

What probability theory in the classical sense does, is on occasions mix our common sense of clear existence in the present, with our common sense of the future does not exist and our ambiguous relationship to the past. I think the two child problem and the two envelope problem can be seen in these terms such that we can get a clue as to why we become confused.

Determinism makes the present all nice and clear. It is attractive for that reason. Indeterminism makes the future unclear, and is attractive for that reason. Classicalism makes the past and future as clear as the present, and that can feel uncomfortable. QM makes the future and the present unclear......... and that feels weird

But what about the past? We use probability theory in the classical sense to manage incomplete acquisition of information. That feels ok because our relationship to the past is ambiguous anyway. But could we apply indeterminism to the past and feel ok too?