A perfect god can not exist?

But if there is a distinction between subjectivity and relativism (which there clearly is) then why is pointing out the distinction pedantic? I am not clear what it means to say, "It is just very debatable "objective" has meaning anymore if a contextual non-absoulte moral judgment does not have moral applicability to all human beings when made within a culture". Especially the part about the debatability of whether "objective" has meaning anymore. Careful. You are beginning to sound like Fido and Reconstructo.

The relativist hold that it is objectively true that it is right in a cannibalistic society to eat people. Why does "objective" "lose meaning" when applies to that society? Or rather, what does that mean? I know what the relativist means.

Just because it is difficult to determine what the objective moral facts of a given case are, does not entail there is no objective moral fact of the matter at all.

If people don't know whether the earth is round or flat, does that entail there is no fact of the matter about the earth? No. So why would you think this about moral judgments too? Again, you have no case.

it does appear entrain that your commitment to moral objectivism is so passionate that you cannot see any consistency or worth at all in alternative points of view. This may or may not be conscious intolerance towards any other system, or it may be that you truly do not understand other moral perspectives.

There are many values with moral relevance. pragmatism, loyalty, truth, tolerance, intolerance, selfishness, altruism and so on. For most people i think would agree that it is therefore not mathematically or logically possible to model it.

Moral values are more like ecosystems. They evolve and change with time and circumstance.

In the absence (and for many a necessary absence) of a moral objective system ....

then surely even you yourself can see the worth of 'temporarily imperfect' non objectivist morality. Its not as if we can wait around in a moral vacuum for a rationally complete system to turn up .... even if we were one of the few that believe it is possible.

The failure to build a rational system is most obvious in the case of rationally based systems of law. They often resort to mucky subjective techniques like juries and not least the inclusion of the word 'reasonable' throughout legal definition and judgement. 'reasonable' as an ironic (in the objective sense) appeal to concepts like experience, social conditions, mental health, intuition, empathy, crimes of passion and so on. Moreover when the law is applied without these types of consideration it is shown to be on occasions 'unjust'.

justice isn't always lawful. Law isn't always just. Might certainly isn't always right.

As an ideal i have no objection to the insights of objective morality being considered and included. But morality is messy and it shifts with context. Context that often isn't within our control.

But that is no reason to give up on trying to be 'reasonable'. On the contrary, intelligence and empathy are important when we try to make sense of other values. That requires imagination too. To really try and understand a different cultural perspective rather than dismiss it outright over one disagreement, or try to dismember it into isolated constituent values.

Morality changes, both back and forth. It is culturally holistic. It is often inconsistent. It is contextual.

The trouble with that argument is that in the flat or round case we know how to determine whether Earth is flat or round, we just cannot, or do not. So, disagreement in that instance does not imply there is no fact of the matter. But in the case of moral disagreement, we don't know how to determine who is right or wrong. Or, at least, many of us do not.

It is much more plausible to believe that what is actually right and wrong never changes, but that people's beliefs about what is right and wrong changes. I would like to think we are advancing in the direction of tolerance, justice, fairness, kindness. According to Cultural Moral Relativism, we are not "advancing" because there is no objective fact of the matter about whether slavery is wrong from one culture to the next both past and present in the first place.

Relativists don't think that right and wrong change either. They think they are just different relative to the particular society.

Cultural relativism espouses not moral beliefs at all. It just describes or explains them.

But Moral relativism does espouse moral beliefs, and some moral relativists might hold that within cultures there is moral progress. At least there seems to be no reason why they should not hold that view.

Moral relativists, on the other hand, cannot consistently hold that there is moral progress, since what is actually right and wrong is a direct function of what a culture believes!

Exactly. And if, in the antebellum United States there was slavery, and in the postbellum U.S. slavery was extinguished, then in that society there was moral progress, relative to that society. But not in some Arab or African countries where there is slavery still.

Exactly. And if, in the antebellum United States there was slavery, and in the postbellum U.S. slavery was extinguished, then in that society there was moral progress, relative to that society. But not in some Arab or African countries where there is slavery still.

whats necessarily wrong with logical fallacies? Morality isn't all logic. It is often conflictory. eg loyalty versus truth. Both have moral value. Neither can be given an absolute numerical ranking.

on the contrary, right and wrong are not necessarily clear by comparison. Difference does not necessarily imply a right and wrong division from a culture to the point of confrontation. There can be shades and mixes of values between cultures such that neither is right over the other because of difference.

There is value in a culture that strongly emphasises say loyalty as compared to one that say emphasises truth. Neither have to elevate one value over the other exclusively in all cicumstances nonetheless. The emphasis and complexity of a value system thus places a context for other values within that system........ and this contextual perspective disables right wrong black and white value divisions. It is holistic. To seperate a particular value and judge it without considering the context from whence it came is to diminish its full complexity.

Sometimes of course we may do that as relativists because something particular is abhorrent ..... but not generally and certainly not habitually. And even then we do not chuck out the whole barrel because of one rotten apple.

But this does happen and has happened. There are so many examples I can give to show that a culture acceptance or moral values does endorse intolerance.

What you seem to be thinking is just because you do not agree with intolerance, you want to reject moral subjectivity. It's weird because you even state the case for what we actually observe happening and has happened and call that no evidence for moral subjectivity.

You always have a case. The case is built upon your subjective moral value. If you believe what he is doing it is wrong, then by all means you can hold him accountable for being wrong.

But if there is a distinction between subjectivity and relativism (which there clearly is) then why is pointing out the distinction pedantic? I am not clear what it means to say, "It is just very debatable "objective" has meaning anymore if a contextual non-absoulte moral judgment does not have moral applicability to all human beings when made within a culture". Especially the part about the debatability of whether "objective" has meaning anymore. Careful. You are beginning to sound like Fido and Reconstructo. The relativist hold that it is objectively true that it is right in a cannibalistic society to eat people. Why does "objective" "lose meaning" when applies to that society? Or rather, what does that mean? I know what the relativist means.

But the part you completely miss, is that by saying I am wrong about subjective moral values it implicitly suggest that there must be objective moral values. You have not show that there are objective moral values and completely dodge doing so. If I have no case, your case for dismissal is completely invalid. All you are really saying is, "no you are wrong". With nothing other than that, it is completely pointless discussing this topic with you.

Amp, it's truly good to see someone on the same page.

Everyone else is confused about what the Meta-Ethical view of Cultural Moral Relativism actually says.

I don't even know why I bother having this discussion with you. Once again you take something that is measurable to use as an example for moral values? Moral values can not be measured.

But the part you completely miss, is that by saying I am wrong about subjective moral values it implicitly suggest that there must be objective moral values. You have not show that there are objective moral values and completely dodge doing so.

If I have no case, your case for dismissal is completely invalid. All you are really saying is, "no you are wrong". With nothing other than that, it is completely pointless discussing this topic with you.

There is cultural relativism. There is moral relativism. But what is "cultural moral relativism"? What does it actually say? Or, rather, what does it say?

Moral Relativism, on the other hand, is a meta-ethical thesis about the objective status of moral jugments across cultures which says that whatever a culture believes to be right and wrong really is, in fact, right and wrong.

This sounds like what happens when someone says "vanilla ice cream tastes good" but what they are really meaning to say is "vanilla ice cream tastes good to me". It's definitely true that vanilla ice cream can taste good or bad to a certain person but that's not at all the same as saying flat out that "vanilla ice cream tastes good" without qualification. That sounds like you are really saying "vanilla ice cream tastes good to everyone."

So, while I agree that moral relativism, if construed as above, is plausible, unfortunately, it doesn't give any basis for moral prescription anymore than your feelings on ice cream give any basis for culinary prescription.

You can say that murder really is wrong to you but so what? If it isn't really wrong to me then why do I care?

Amperage and myself have been offering arguments the entire time that shows Moral Relativism is self-refuting.

T

You can say that murder really is wrong to you but so what? If it isn't really wrong to me then why do I care?

Are you sure you know what moral relativism is? Please explain what is self-refuting about the claim that: "moral judgments have their origins either in societal or in individual standards, and that no single objective standard exists by which one can assess the truth of a moral proposition."

Source: Moral relativism - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

You can go back and read our posts and respond to them accordingly. I don't need to repeat myself.

Besides, you have a faulty source there above in Wiki.
Try stanford instead:Moral Relativism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

But I will add that normative relativism (how it is defined there) is self-refuting because the bold-faced is inconsistent, and no philosopher that is a Meta-Ethical Cultural Relativist subscribes to it:

"Normative relativism, further still, is the prescriptive or normative position that as there is no universal moral standard by which to judge others, we ought to tolerate the behavior of others even when it runs counter to our personal or cultural moral standards."

If there is no universal standard by which to judge others, then "we ought to tolerate the behavior of others" is false, since this is a universal prescriptive standard itself.

All that means is that I believe that murder is wrong, but you do not believe murder is wrong. And in that case, there really isn't any disagreement, since it is like saying, "I am going to Mexico for vacation" versus, "I am not going to Mexico for vacation". There is a kind of clash of attitudes, but no moral disagreement. It is possible for you to think that murder is wrong, and for me not to think that murder is wrong. There is no imcompatibility, is there?

Right but that doesn't actually address what I said about meta-ethical moral relativism which is what I believe. What's self-refuting about the claim that: "moral judgments have their origins either in societal or in individual standards, and that no single objective standard exists by which one can assess the truth of a moral proposition?"

That doesn't really do much for the credibility of your moral admonishments. You can scold me for murder but I can scold you equally for not murdering. It's just a clash of attitudes after all.