@Aedes,
Aedes wrote:The 16th amendment to the Constitution gives the authority to Congress to establish and enforce income taxes. There are some frivolous arguments against the 16th amendment that have been struck down in court.
You need to learn what the words mean in the 16th amendment. Its all in the meanings. And in fact there have been numerous cases where people have won their court cases because the IRS cannot show that any law states you have to pay income taxes on your wages. So those cases in which people go to jail and end up paying, do not challenge the IRS about the actual law. Point in case, would you? if no, thats weird to me. Why wouldn't you ask to see the law that can supposedly ruin your life?
above i mentioned Direct and indirect taxes.
Although the meaning of "direct tax" has sometimes been questioned, it was always understood that taxes imposed by Congress could apply to, and be collected from, individual citizens, and that not every tax collected directly from the population was a "direct tax" within the meaning of the Constitution.
One common mistake made by tax protesters is in assuming that the phrase "Capitation, or other direct, Tax" in the Constitution is a reference to any tax that is collected "directly" from the person on whom it is imposed, while "indirect" taxes such as "Duties, Imposts and Excises" are collected on goods during manufacture, or in transit, and the ultimate burden is passed along to someone else (usually the consumer). That is a definition of "direct" and "indirect" that is frequently used by economists, but it is
not the meaning of "direct" and "indirect" that has been applied by the U.S. Supreme Court.
In
Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. 171 (1796), the Supreme Court was unanimous in its opinion that Congress could impose a tax on a citizen of Virginia for carriages held for personal use and that the tax was an excise or duty and
not "direct." Of the four justices who heard the case, two (William Paterson and James Wilson) were members of the Constitutional Convention that drafted the Constitution, and presumably knew what it meant.
In
Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586 (1880), the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of an income tax against an individual, William H. Springer, finding that the income tax was a constitutional "duty or excise" and not a "direct tax."
In
Tyee Realty Co. v. Anderson, 240 U.S. 115, 117 (1916), one of the appellants was an individual named Edwin Thorne, and he complained about the constitutionality of "a progressive tax on the income of individuals." The Supreme Court denied the appeal saying that "we need not now enter into an original consideration of the merits of these contentions because each and all of them were considered and adversely disposed of in
Brushaber v. Union P. R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 60 L.Ed. __, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 236." (And the
Brushaber decision upheld the constitutionality of an income tax under the 16th Amendment.)
More recent judges have rejected this argument as well:
[INDENT]"[Becraft's] position can fairly be reduced to one elemental proposition: The Sixteenth Amendment does not authorize a direct non-apportioned income tax on resident United States citizens and thus such citizens are not subject to the federal income tax laws. ... We hardly need comment on the patent absurdity and frivolity of such a proposition. For over 75 years, the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have both implicitly and explicitly recognized the Sixteenth Amendment's authorization of a non-apportioned direct income tax on United States citizens residing in the United States and thus the validity of the federal income tax laws as applied to such citizens." [/INDENT]
In re Becraft, 885 F.2d 547 (9th Cir., 1989).
[INDENT]"[W]e have rejected, on numerous occasions, the tax-protester argument that the federal income tax is an unconstitutional direct tax that must be apportioned. See, e.g.,
Lively v. Commissioner, 705 F.2d 1017, 1018 (8th Cir.1983) (per curiam)" [/INDENT]
United States v. Gerads, 999 F.2d 1255 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. den. 510 U.S. 1193 (1994).
[INDENT]"As the cited cases, as well as many others, have made abundantly clear, the following arguments alluded to by the Lonsdales are completely lacking in legal merit and patently frivolous: .. .. (3) the income tax is a direct tax which is invalid absent apportionment, and Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 15 S.Ct. 673, 39 L.Ed. 759, modified, 158 U.S. 601, 15 S.Ct. 912, 39 L.Ed. 1108 (1895), is authority for that and other arguments against the government's power to impose income taxes on individuals.. .." [/INDENT]
Lonsdale v. United States, 919 F.2d 1440, 1448 (10th Cir. 1990).
[INDENT]"It is generally agreed that Article I of the Constitution authorizes Congress to tax the income of individuals, and that the Sixteenth Amendment eliminated the requirement that such taxes be apportioned among the states."[/INDENT]
In re: Michael FlemingSecora v. United States, 1997 WL 460162, at 6 (U.S.D.C. Neb.).
The meaning of "direct tax" urged by many tax protesters as a "tax imposed directly" would trivialize the Constitution, because it reduces the constitutional definition of "direct tax" to a mere question of how the tax is collected. So, if the U.S. were to impose a tax on employees for the wages they receive, that would be a "direct tax" according to the tax protester definition, but if the U.S. were to impose a tax on
employers for wages
paid (or a tax on banks for the payment of interest, or on corporations for the payment of dividends), that would be an "indirect tax" and constitutional, even though the net effect would be exactly the same (i.e., the employees or depositors or shareholders would bear the burden of the tax through reduced wages and salaries, interest, or dividends). The meaning of "direct tax" that has been consistently applied by the Supreme Court is much more sensible (as well as consistent with the known intent of the framers of the Constitution), because it focuses on
what is being taxed (the value of property, but not transfers of property) rather than on
how the tax is collected.
A final note:
Some courts have referred to the income tax as a "non-apportioned direct tax," which is unfortunate because it suggests that the income tax is a "Capitation, or other direct, Tax" that does not need to be apportioned, a suggestion that was explicitly rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Brushaber. Under the Constitution, a "direct tax" must be apportioned, while an "indirect tax" must be uniform throughout the United States. One of the questions raised in
Brushaber was whether the 16th Amendment created a type of tax that need be neither apportioned nor uniform, and the court rejected that possibility, stating (in a rather convoluted sentence):
[INDENT]"[T]hat the contention that the Amendment treats a tax on income as a direct tax although it is relieved from apportionment and is necessarily therefore not subject to the rule of uniformity as such rule only applies to taxes which are not direct, thus destroying the two great classifications which have been recognized and enforced from the beginning, is also wholly without foundation since the command of the Amendment that all income taxes shall not be subject to apportionment by a consideration of the sources from which the taxed income may be derived forbids the application to such taxes of the rule applied in the Pollock Case by which alone such taxes were removed from the great class of excises, duties, and imposts subject to the rule of uniformity, and were placed under the other or direct class." [/INDENT]
Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 240 U.S. 1 (1916).
The court then went on to hold that the income tax satisfied the requirement of geographical uniformity imposed by the Constitution, even though the rate of tax was not uniform on all incomes.