An instrument cannot examine itself

@BrightNoon,

BrightNoon wrote:

No Paulhanke, you do not. I don't think you can, unless I'm much less coherent than I thought; perhaps I speak some strange patois of english that we only seem to have in common...tragic.

... darn - thought I had it :perplexed: ...

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@BrightNoon,

BrightNoon wrote:

... that human consciousness cannot understand human consciousness, because consciousness cannot, by definition, gain a perspective beyond itself from which to analyze itself: ergo, science (product of consciousness, in consc.) cannot present a unified theory of 'the external world' (also in consc.) and consciousness itself (as the experience, not the chem./phys. reactions which we might deduce are 'the cause of consciousness').

... that seems to narrow things down a bit - you're saying that a human consciousness cannot understand its own experience of human consciousness ("its own" being implicit in "it cannot gain a perspective beyond itself") ... but doesn't allowing a human consciousness to study the experience of other human consciousnesses at once "gain a perspective beyond" as well as discover phenomena of consciousness that reside above the chemical/physical level? ...

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@paulhanke,

paulhanke wrote:

... interesting point - if the unconscious makes up the bulk of "mind", then probing into "mind" requires the same sort of indirect observation as probing into another person's "mind", no? ...

Observation is sort of along the lines of the scientific method. Is direct observation possible? Is the mind, even one's own, to be an object to be observed? By conscious do we mean self-conscious, and then what do we mean by self? Self-evident means we know what the terms in the sentence mean, but do we know what the terms mean, both subject and predicate? How is that self related to the self in self-consciousness, or is it related by not being related? The problem is to pose the question correctly, says H, whose name shall not be mentioned here again.

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@Fairbanks,

Fairbanks wrote:

Observation is sort of along the lines of the scientific method. Is direct observation possible? Is the mind, even one's own, to be an object to be observed? By conscious do we mean self-conscious, and then what do we mean by self? Self-evident means we know what the terms in the sentence mean, but do we know what the terms mean, both subject and predicate? How is that self related to the self in self-consciousness, or is it related by not being related? The problem is to pose the question correctly, says H, whose name shall not be mentioned here again.

... all questions that become more difficult to answer the more we learn ... if Hawkins ("On Intelligence") has it right, the boundary between the conscious and the unconscious is plastic - for example, acquiring a new skill can be tough and require focused conscious thought, whereas by the time the skill has been mastered much of it has been pushed down into unconscious automatism ... are there clear lines to be drawn anywhere when it comes to "mind"?

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@paulhanke,

paulhanke wrote:

. . . are there clear lines to be drawn anywhere when it comes to "mind"?

Yes, there is a clear and bright line, and that is one of those joints where Derrida's knife would wedge itself in and open the divide wide. Things happen by cause, I was informed by Kant, and they are either scientific or psychological, that is, one is purely mechanical, just right for physics, and the other wouldn't happen ever if not for the non-mechanical cause. Happening by chance is not in the running since chance is not a force of any kind. The non-mechanical cause is intelligence, the one property of mind we will never deny. Well, somebody might deny it during this political season. :rolleyes:

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@Fairbanks,

Fairbanks wrote:

Well, somebody might deny it during this political season. :rolleyes:

... like I said, where does one draw the line? :devilish: ...

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@paulhanke,

you're saying that a human consciousness cannot understand its own experience of human consciousness...

There is no other experience of consciousness but one's own which can be known. There appear to be other consciousnesses, but they cannot be known experientially; they might be known through communication as one knows about other countries, planets, french cooking, etc. They are known as objects. Such knowledge does not address the problem, which is that an individual cannot understand the context in which he exists; an instrument cannot examine itself; a consciousness cannot understand the nature of consciousness.

...but doesn't allowing a human consciousness to study the experience of other human consciousnesses at once "gain a perspective beyond" as well as discover phenomena of consciousness that reside above the chemical/physical level?

The ideas one might have about other people's consciousnesses are just that; ideas, which inhabit one's own consciousness. One cannot ever know another's consciousness, if it exists; one can only know one's own idea of that other's consciousness.

P.S. Did you take my advice?

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@BrightNoon,

BrightNoon wrote:

P.S. Did you take my advice?

... not yet - don't think the boss would take to kindly to an amorphous blob with wild eyes oozing out of my office :eeek: ...

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@paulhanke,

Brightnoon, just how much are you willing to slice off the notion of consciousness here to make the thesis of this thread hold water? You say that consciousness cannot examine itself as though it were an axiom, and perhaps you are ultimately right, but isn't there a tremendous task to be done first? Shouldn't we clarify just what you mean by consciousness?

It seems that we're quite capable of examining our own memory, thought, belief, etc. - of not merely having the thought, but of inspecting it after the fact (moments or years later) from a perspective other than the one that spawned it. Is this not an instrument examining itself? A cat cannot perform this trick, but a man can; is the ability to examine and consider the internal world not precisely what makes man special? Or do these things exist outside of what you term "consciousness"? If we exclude the things which a consciousness can (?) examine, does the term "consciousness" lose its meaning?

The internal world is not bathed in sunlight, I agree, but that doesn't make it pitch black, either.

1 Reply

@Grimlock,

Grimlock wrote:

. . . but of inspecting it after the fact (moments or years later) from a perspective other than the one that spawned it. Is this not an instrument examining itself? . . .

:a-ok: the instrument examines itself examining itself . . .
This might get into an infinite regress, which might do for popular psych books. The problem needs some kind of limit at least. Can it be cut down to something finite?

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@Fairbanks,

Grimlock:
Brightnoon, just how much are you willing to slice off the notion of consciousness here to make the thesis of this thread hold water? You say that consciousness cannot examine itself as though it were an axiom, and perhaps you are ultimately right, but isn't there a tremendous task to be done first? Shouldn't we clarify just what you mean by consciousness?

I respond by quoting my own post from the last page; "I have defined consciousness in a certain way, as follows: all experience

It seems that we're quite capable of examining our own memory, thought, belief, etc. - of not merely having the thought, but of inspecting it after the fact (moments or years later) from a perspective other than the one that spawned it.

People are capable of examining specific memories, of reflecting on certain thoughts of theirs. I do not deny that, as I have already said. What a person is completely unable to do is examine the nature of consciousness as a whole, to determine the nature of that 'thing' in which they have thoughts and ideas. The specific content of consciousness can be understood because those contents are limited: a certain memory from last November, reflection on my opinion of Hawaiian pizza, etc. When we attempt to consider consciousness as a unity, a whole, a context in which those limited sections of experience exist, understanding is impossible, because understanding requires comparison (nothing can be defined/known in itself). Obviously, there is nothing within consciousness that can be compared to consciousness and all the things 'outside consciousness', such as the planet Jupiter, are experienced (existent) only in consciousness.

Is this not an instrument examining itself?

Therefore, no.

Nothing can be ultimately defined. My point, which is not as arcane as some of you seem to think, is that consciousness is no exception. However, it is unique in that it cannot even be defined or understood in the typical fashion. The motivation for this post was really to demonstrate that empiric science, which is an idea-system existing in consciousness, not something, somehow, beyond consciousness, cannot present an 'ultimate theory', encompassing everything, both physical reality and the inner experience.

Fairbanks:
the instrument examines itself examining itself . . .
This might get into an infinite regress, which might do for popular psych books. The problem needs some kind of limit at least. Can it be cut down to something finite?

That exactly demonstrates the insurmountable problem I'm talking about. In order to define something, one has to step back from it, to gain some other perspective with which that thing can be compared: nothing can be defined in itself. One cannot ever come to a definite halt to the regression in attempting to define consciousness simply because there is no perspective outside of consciousness with which a comparison could be made. That is why it is impossible.

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@BrightNoon,

Ok, you seem to be scaling consciousness down to the realm of "hot" feelings - stepping on a thumbtack, drinking a beer, screwing. Yes, I agree, we cannot numerically represent pure sensations, not because we lack the tools, but because there is no surface for the tool to grip. The elements of supra-consciousness, that is the inner world being examined and explored, may well be quantifiable, however, as they seem to correspond (cause/effect comments omitted for clarity) to physical changes within the brain.

The point I'm trying to make here is that science may well make a great deal of inroads into the "cold" elements of consciousness - thought, memory and such. Perhaps you anticipate this and are staking a claim to the ultimate primacy of philosophy in this realm or perhaps you are making an argument against metaphysical truth? In either case, I would not dissent.

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@Grimlock,

Grimlock wrote:

Ok, you seem to be scaling consciousness down to the realm of "hot" feelings - stepping on a thumbtack, drinking a beer, screwing. Yes, I agree, we cannot numerically represent pure sensations, not because we lack the tools, but because there is no surface for the tool to grip. The elements of supra-consciousness, that is the inner world being examined and explored, may well be quantifiable, however, as they seem to correspond (cause/effect comments omitted for clarity) to physical changes within the brain.

The point I'm trying to make here is that science may well make a great deal of inroads into the "cold" elements of consciousness - thought, memory and such. Perhaps you anticipate this and are staking a claim to the ultimate primacy of philosophy in this realm or perhaps you are making an argument against metaphysical truth? In either case, I would not dissent.

Alright, I think we've come to as much of an understanding as we are going to. your right that I want to smash any designs scientists have on the 'inner experience' (I use quotation marks sarcastically because I don't think there is any inner or outer, there is just one experience, in which are imagined the inner and outer, but that's another issue). I don't make a distinction between thought and feeling, except in that the former is a complex of the latter, a series of arrangments of sensations, as remembered, which are 'brought to mind' when there is something related in present experience. Anyhow, my basic view I want to state again for clarity; it's not a criticism of your last post.

(1) The world (i.e., everything) is the perceived world, consciousness. There are no external objects that we feel; there are feelings which we have organized into the concept 'object'.

(2) All ideas arise from expererience via sensation and cannot, therefore, define experience as a whole. Nothing can be defined in itself; definition requires reference to something else, some object of comparision. Individual components of consciousness can be defined because they can be compared (defined in terms of) other elements. Consciousness, the unity, the context in which all the parts exist, cannot be defined or understood as a whole because there is nothing that we could compare it to, which is not also a part of consciousness.

(3) The empirical science makes the asumption opposite from my first point, that objects are real and not just apparent; that they have a life of their own, outside our experience of them. This assummption is an idea, a theory, which has arisen from consciousness, as have all other ideas. Therefore, for the reasons already stated in my second point, science cannot explain the inner experience (consciousness) in the same way it explains what it imagines to exist outside of consciousness. This is demonstrated by quantity and quality and their inability to be reconciled. Moreover, quanitity has never bee experienced, whereas all experience is qualitative only. Quanity is an idea, like empiric science, that comes from consciousness, like all other ideas.

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@BrightNoon,

I don't agree upon the title of this thread.
I am sure one can design a computer to examine itself.

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@Sir Neuron,

Sir Neuron wrote:

I don't agree upon the title of this thread.
I am sure one can design a computer to examine itself.

:eek:
The computer so designed would not be an instrument as it would intend something and the examining faculty would refer to something deeper than its program or diodes--the true instrument.

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@BrightNoon,

Right. The idea is that an instrument, though it may be able to measure itself in some respects, cannot determine what it is itself. A computer isn't the same thing, because a computer begins with knowledge, i.e. programming; a person makes up the knowledge as he goes. A computer can be programmed with a point of refernce outside of itself; not so with a person. A person is trapped within his own perspective.

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@BrightNoon,

BrightNoon wrote:

Alright, I think we've come to as much of an understanding as we are going to...

Nice summary BrightNoon, somehow I missed this when you posted in Sep.

Would this, therefore, be a good summation of what you've said: Although an instrument can examine itself, it cannot do so objectively or with any measure of accuracy <?>

I very much like the point you make on, "... nothing to compare", no objective measure, etc..

Thanks

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@Khethil,

Yes, absolutely Khetil. I suppose I should have said that 'an instrument cannot examine itself accurately or in absolute terms.'

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@Fairbanks,

BrightNoon wrote:

I have noticed some threads, especially the one titled Neurons, which are concerned with the explanation of the inner phenomena of life, such as emotion, sensation, etc., by means of the nature of the empirically observed external world. That is not possible. It is a matter of quantity eventually forming quality. The empirical world exists only as observed, via the human mind; as such, the understanding of the empircal world cannot extend to that mind. Eventually, no doubt, science will be able to predict or maniplaute aspects of inner experience from the conditions of neural arrangment, but there can never be a discovery of the physical properties of hate, orange, the feeling of a pinecone, etc.

Fairbanks wrote:

:eek:
The computer so designed would not be an instrument as it would intend something and the examining faculty would refer to something deeper than its program or diodes--the true instrument.

Fairbank,

What is Brightmoon saying hear?

Do you agree with him?

Is he say that we are comparable to instruments?

And if so, are you saying that our examining faculty would not refer to something deeper than compared to a program or diodes.?

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@Sir Neuron,

Sir Neuron wrote:

. . . we are comparable to instruments?

are you saying that our examining faculty would not refer to something deeper than compared to a program or diodes?

Our instrument is language, which we are fairly certain is not we ourselves.

(:cool:The use of apparently poor grammar is a literary if not literate code indicating a possibility of presence of ironic intent.)

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An instrument cannot examine itself

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