@Brandon9000,
Yes--i would say that the answer is that engagements the outcome of which has hinged on hand-to-hand combat have been extremely rare in the last few centuries, and especially within the last century. I would also say that mere physical size will not necessarily determine the outcome in hand-to-hand combat. A woman skilled in martial arts will make a monkey out of a linebacker who simply attempts to flatten her using his larger size.
It has long been held in military historical circles that after the spread of the use of the bayonet, the outcome of combats involving the bayonet were determined by the moral aspect, and by nothing else. That is to say, it has long been held (and many military historians claim) that the side launching a determined bayonet attack will win every time. Despite initial heavy casualties, those using the bayonet will almost inevitably rout their opponents, because soldiers simply won't stand up to a bayonet attack. In bayonet combat, the effectiveness of the individual soldier is determined by their skill with the bayonet, and not their size. There are many similar circumstances in which it is the "moral" attitude which matters, and not numbers nor size. At the battle of Murfreesboro or Stone's River during the American civil war, Joe Wheeler (a famed Confederate cavalry commander) continually harassed Federal lines of communications, to great effect. However, when he tried that against the corps commanded by George Thomas, that didn't work out so well for him. Thomas was something of a martinet, although he took very good care of his men, who usually cheerfully accepted the strong discipline. Thomas was using the 11th Indiana Regiment of United States Volunteer Infantry as field police--today we would call them combat MPs. When Wheeler's cavalry attacked Thomas' trains, the initial response was predictable--the drovers and the carters ran, abandoning their cattle and their wagons. But the commander on the scene called on the 11th Indiana, who shook out a line and formed for "repel cavalry," which meant that the front rank knelt with bayonets fixed, and the rank behind them stood with bayonets fixed, and prepared to receive the charge of Wheeler's cavlary. The 11th was magnificently disciplined, and Wheelers cavalry broke before coming to grips with the Indiana infantry. They were, of course, badly punished by the musketry fire of the Indianans as they rode away. The 11the then "advanced bayonets" and the herds and wagons of Thomas' train were quickly recovered. The entire engagement lasted less than an hour.
At the first battle of Balaclava in 1854, known to the English participants as the battle of the Causeway Heights, when the Turks had been swept from the redoubts on the heights, about 7,000 Russian cavalry threatened the flank and rear of the Anglo-French army besieging Sevastopol. The only troops to oppose them were Lord Lucan's cavalry division (about 1200 men) to the west of the Russians, and the fewer than 600 men of the 93rd Highlanders to the south, supported by a detachment of Royal Marines. The Highlanders were attacked by the Russians first, when about 2000 cavalrymen were sent against them. They formed "repel cavalry" with bayonets fixed, and emptied as many saddles as possible as the Russians approached. The Scotsmen didn't flinch, and the Russians turned aside without pressing the attack. Dispatches by telegraph to England lead people to speak of the "thin red line of heroes," meaning the Highlanders and Marines. So, even men in skirts can be pretty damned formidable with 16 pounds of gun and a 28" bayonet in their hands.
Lord Lucan was not on very good terms with his brigade commanders, especially Lord Cardigan who commanded the Light Brigade. Lucan gave his orders, and then withdrew to a nearby eminence to watch the battle develop. Lord Cardigan would later get into a bitter controversy with Lucan over his orders, both because he failed to support the Heavy Brigade, and because he squandered his Light Brigade in a pointless attack at the end of the battle. However, General Scarlett commanding the Heavy Brigade had no problem with initiative, nor with Lord Lucan's orders (the men were unimpressed with their divisional commander, and referred to him as Lord Look-on, meaning he would do nothing if left to his own devices). After the Highlanders and Marines had repulsed the Russian cavalry, and seeing a grey mass of Russian cavalry at the western end of the Causeway Heights and still threatening the flank of the Anglo-French position, Scarlett decided to attack.
The charge of the Heavy Brigade wasn't much of charge as these things go--they were too close to reach a speed much more than a trot, and several of Scarlett's subordinate commanders initially hesitated. At the outset, about half of Scarlett's brigade (about 300 men) joined him as he personally lead the attack on the Russian cavalry. Scarlett's other troopers eventually joined the melee. Scarlett had confronted about 4000-5000 Russian cavalry with his 600 man brigade. The portion he attacked was about 2,000 Russians, about the same number as had attacked the Highlanders. Scarlett's charge caught the Russians flat-footed, and after some fierce fighting, they withdrew. They left about 50 dead and 200 wounded behind, while Scarlett's brigade had about 100 casualties. The Royal Horse Artillery arrived at about that time, and dissuaded the Russians from reforming and counterattacking.
All of that was followed by the completely useless and horribly bungled attack of the Light Brigade, which is about all anyone seems to know about the Crimean War. But the two main engagements of the first battle of Balaclava--the repulse of the Russian cavalry by the Highlanders and the Marines, and the charge of the Heavy Brigade point out the issue of "moral" ascendancy in combat. (I'm not inventing that use of the word moral, it's been used that way for a long time.) In the case of the failed Russian attack, the Highlanders and Marines were obviously prepared to stand there and receive the Russians with the bayonet, and the Russians were not prepared to press the issue. Scarlett's cavalry was prepared to attack the Russians with the saber, even though they were initially outnumbered by more than six to one, and the Russians were not prepared to stand and take it. Neither engagement lasted for more than ten minutes. The Russian cavalry were not defective, nor were their officers. In both cases, the troops they faced had gained "moral" ascendancy over them in terms of close combat.
The exact same conditions applied 40 years later when the all-women regiment of the Dahomeans attacked the French troops. The African women were prepared to go in with spear and knife and fight it out toe-to-toe, and the French, with their modern rifles and their bayonets, were not prepared to do that. Size had nothing to do with it, the women initially gained the moral ascendancy over their opponents, and that was what mattered.
